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I. INTRODUCTION
Observers of urban development have adopted the term "gentrifi-
cation" to describe involuntary residential displacement caused by
the return of affluent gentry from suburbia to well-located but deteri-
orated inner city areas.' This displacement process has remained the
darker side of urban revitalization and restoration for at least two
decades.2 Estimates of the magnitude and extent of the problem
vary. In 1978 the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) cited data that indicates approximately 1.4 mil-
lion persons are forced to move from their homes annually.3 Other
studies, however, project a displacement incidence from 2.4 to 2.8
million persons per year.4 A 1975 survey indicated the problem was
national in scope, with private sector neighborhood revitalization ac-
tivities underway in nearly half of the 260 cities surveyed with 50,000
or more population.' Of the thirty largest cities surveyed in 1977,
nearly all had some form of neighborhood restoration or revitaliza-
tion in progress.6
In the continuing struggle for urban space, displacement occurs
when a household is forced to move its residence because of condi-
tions that affect the dwelling or its immediate surroundings. These
conditions typically: (1) are beyond the household's reasonable abil-
ity to control or prevent; (2) occur despite the household's compliance
with all previously imposed conditions of occupancy; and (3) make
continued occupancy of the residence by that household impossible,
hazardous, or unaffordable.7 Gentrification, like its corollary "in-
1. See London, Gentr#Fcatlon as Urban Reinvasion: Some Preliminary Definitional
and Theoretical Considerations, in BACK TO THE CITY 77 (S. Laska & D. Spain eds.
1980).
2. In the United States, gentrification was discussed in the literature beginning in
the 1970's. Many consider the seminal conceptual work to be C. WEILER, REINVEST-
MENT DISPLACEMENT: HUD's ROLE IN A NEW HOUSING ISSUE (1978). THE NA-
TIONAL URBAN COALITION, DISPLACEMENT: CITY NEIGHBORHOODS IN TRANSITION
(1978) established that the problem was nation-wide in scope.
3. LeGates & Hartman, Displacement, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 207, 215 (July
1981).
4. Id at 220.
5. Black, Private Market Housing Renovation in Central Cities: 4 ULI Survey, 34
URB. LAND, Nov. 1975, at 3, 6.
6. Clay, Neighborhood Revitalization and Community Development: The Experience
and the Promise, CENTER FOR ECON. DEv. NEWSLETTER, Aug.-Oct. 1978, at 1.
7. G. GRIER & E. GRIER, URBAN DISPLACEMENT: A RECONNAISSANCE 8 (1978).
Both HUD and advocates for the poor have accepted this definition of displacement.
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cumbent upgrading,"8 results largely from the effects of private mar-
ket forces, though it is often aided and abetted by actions of
governmental entities. Gentrification should be distinguished from
the residential displacement resulting from public programs such as
urban renewal, which was the primary engine of urban displacement
in the 1950's and early 1960's.'
The pervasiveness of this phenomenon is no accident. One urban
geographer has pointed out that "[neighborhood upgrading] is gener-
ally considered a positive externality by city administrators and plan-
ners because of the perceived social and economic benefits that may
accrue from such activities. . . . Simultaneous with decreasing
See. e.g.. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., DISPLACEMENT REPORT (1979);
LeGates & Hartman, supra note 3, at 214.
8. Professor James H. Johnson, Jr., of U.C.L.A. has pointed out the similarities
and differences in the two processes in Gentrpication and Incumbent Upgrading: Bene-
fits and Costs, 6 UCLA CENTER FOR AMERICAN STUDIES NEWSLETrER, Nov. 1981, at
10. Professor Johnson notes:
Gentrification describes the process by which predominantly white, middle in-
come households "resettle" in older urban neighborhoods and attempt to reverse
the cycle of decline and deterioration .... These neighborhoods usually have
historic character and/or architectural appeal and are generally located within a
one-half mile radius of the Central Business District .... In contrast, incum-
bent upgrading usually occurs most often in neighborhoods located at a consider-
able distance from the CBD (usually greater than one mile) which are comprised
of primarily deteriorating but structurally sound single family houses and du-
plexes. Whereas gentrification is spearheaded by outsiders, incumbent upgrad-
ing is accomplished by existing residents who collectively attempt to upgrade
their residential environments, primarily through strong community
organizations.
Id
9. D. MANDELKER, C. DAYE, O. HETZEL, J. KUSHNER, H. MCGEE, & R. WASH-
BURN, HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 520 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
MANDELKER].
The displacement of households and their forced relocation to other areas of
the community has always been an inevitable and usually unfortunate outcome
of community development programs. Urban displacement was rampant in the
days of large-scale urban renewal and highway construction projects. One esti-
mate indicates that over two million persons were displaced by urban renewal
and highway programs between 1964 and 1972.
Id.
The impact of urban renewal on the poor, a process once called "Negro removal,"
is vividly captured by Hartman, Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief, 57 VA.
L REV. 745 (1971). The futility of judicial relief is discussed in McGee, Urban Re-
newal in the Crucible of Judicial Review, 56 VA. L. REV. 826 (1970). The highway
situation is analyzed in Roberts, Homes, Roadbuilders, and the Courts.- Highway Relo-
cation and Judicial Review of 4dministrative Action, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 51 (1972).
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crime rates are improvements in other neighborhood services includ-
ing schools, public transportation, and garbage collection."' 0 More
significantly, sharp increases in property values, which in turn con-
tribute to the city's tax base, are a major incentive behind revitaliza-
tion.'" As the tax base rises and the neighborhood metamorphosis
continues, new business, social, and cultural institutions appear in ar-
eas previously occupied by poor or lower middle-income households.
The new institutions and residents create an environment that is not
hospitable to the interests of the original residents.' 2
The typical household moving into a gentrifying central city neigh-
borhood consists of one or two married or unmarried white adults,
often without children. These people are usually employed in a pro-
fessional or managerial capacity, earning an above-average income. 13
They have been called "pioneers" by some students of the displace-
ment problem. These in-moving "pioneers" are attracted to the cen-
tral city by such factors as a desire to live close to work, and by more
intangible concerns such as the prestige conferred by living in struc-
tures thought to have a higher artistic and architectural value.
Changing life styles, the persistence of families without children, and
the attraction of culturally rich and diverse urban areas are addi-
tional factors that are difficult to quantify, but nonetheless are signifi-
cant in their effects on the displacement process.
The prior residents of gentrifying areas, "natives" perhaps, are pri-
marily from white lower income households, although there are other
categories of displacees including welfare dependents, minorities, and
10. Johnson, supra note 8. See also R. Cybriwsky, Revitalization Trends in Down.
town-Area Neighborhoods, in THE AMERICAN METROPOLITAN SYSTEM: PRESENT AND
FUTURE 21, 22-23 (S. Brunn & J. Wheeler eds. 1980).
11. In the Savannah Historic District in Savannah, Georgia, property values in-
creased 276% (23% annually) between 1965 and 1977, whereas property values for the
county within which Savannah is located increased only 184% (15% annually). Dur-
ing this same period, the taxes generated from the sample properties in the Savannah
Historic District increased by 187% between 1965 and 1977, from $68,625 to $196,890.
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, THE CONTRIBUTION OF HISTORIC
PRESERVATION TO URBAN REVITALIZATION C-35 (1979). Cf Roddewig & Young,
Neighborhood Revitalization and the Historic Preservation Incentives ofthe Tax Reform
Act of 1976: Lessons from the Bottom Line of a Chicago Red Brick Three-Flat, II
URB. LAW. 35 (1979) (discussing the interactive effect of the value of restored dwell-
ings and property tax).
12. See Poinsett, Motor City Makes a Comeback: A Special Report on Detroit, 33
EBONY 29 (1978); Sutton, America Falls in Love with Its Cities-Again, SAT. REV.,
Aug. 1978, at 16; Williams, Faceliftfor Detroit, SAT. REV., May 1977, at 6.
13. LeGates & Hartman, supra note 3, at 223.
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upper income white families.' 4 Renters suffer a disproportionately
high incidence of displacement.' 5 Those forced from their homes
usually encounter substantially increased shelter costs because of a
lack of comparable housing. 16
If the attractions for the in-movers are social, cultural, and eco-
nomic, the forces that push out the indigenous residents are defined
by federal, state, and local law. The primary forces behind gentrifi-
cation are: historic preservation;' 7 conversions of apartments to con-
dominiums;' 8 speculation;' 9 anti-redlining efforts; 20 real property
taxation;2 housing code enforcement;22 and federal housing and
community development programs that operate in tandem with the
private market.23
This article stresses a "push" perspective in its examination of how
these legally structured forces have stimulated the return of the gen-
try to the central urban areas of the United States. Unlike virtually
all of the studies to date which emphasize the socio-economic dimen-
sions of the problem, this article concentrates on what might be
called the law of gentrification. It suggests how the law can be modi-
fied to ameliorate the oppressive private market forces that disadvan-
tage the indigenous poor and lower middle-income residents of the
inner cities. First, the historic preservation movement is treated as a
paradigm of gentrification that illustrates both the causes and possi-
ble remedies for displacement. Thereafter, the article discusses the
primary causes of gentrification and some corresponding remedies.
In addition, consideration is given to other remedial strategies that
are susceptible to legal implementation. These strategies include cre-
ative applications of land use24 and environmental laws,25 rent stabi-
14. Id The displacement struggle involves more than racial prejudice. For the
nexus between housing disadvantages and racism, see Kushner, 4partheid in America:
An Historical and Legal Analysis of Contemporary Racial Segregation in the United
States, 22 How. L.J. 547 (1979).
15. LeGates & Hartman, supra note 3, at 226.
16. Id at 227. See also G. GRIER & E. GRIER, supra note 7, at 8.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 29-70.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 71-82.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 83-87.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 88-97.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 98-104.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 105-11.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 112-25.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 269-313.
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lization,26 and relocation assistance.
Finally, a bias-if not already manifest-should be acknowledged
at the outset. Without significant governmental intervention in urban
revitalization, the plight of the poor can only continue to worsen, and
a system will evolve enabling the privileged to manipulate the eco-
nomic order to their own exclusive interests. In the near future, this
intervention is more likely to be the product of local governmental
initiatives. Indeed, HUD itself has concluded that the problems asso-
ciated with gentrification can best be solved, if they need solving, at
the local level.28 Although some of the anti-gentrification strategies
discussed herein are traditionally and practically more relevant to lo-
cal governments, other solutions are legally required to be addressed
by state and federal officials.
II. HISTORIC PRESERVATION: A PARADIGM OF GENTRIFICATION'S
CAUSES AND REMEDIES
A. Overview
A significant consequence of private and public efforts to restore
and preserve the artistic, cultural, and historic past of neighborhoods
is the burden of displacement put upon the shoulders of those least
able to bear its cost-the poor and, more often than not, racial minor-
ities. In most instances, indigenous low income residents are re-
moved when specific landmarks are saved from demolition or entire
areas are restored.
Compared to other causes of displacement, 21 the historic preserva-
tion movement has produced perhaps the most evidence of the class
conflict dimension of urban revitalization. For example, in Indianap-
olis, Indiana, a mother of four declared to reporters: "I ain't going
nowhere. I'll be here fighting for a long time. It's they who are in-
truding."3 For this unidentified "urban warrior," the enemy is Indi-
ana's Historic Preservation Commission, which designated the
woman's downtown neighborhood a historical district. According to
25. See infra text accompanying notes 314-33.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 334-61.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 362-404.
28. G. GRIER & E. GRIER, supra note 7, at v-vi.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 71-125.
30. Hamilton, Historic Label Brings Housing Hardshi7p, L.A. Times, Dec. 6, 1979,
Pt. VII, at 5, col. 1.
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the woman, her dog was shot, her children were harrassed, and her
house was set afire. Corroboration of what otherwise might appear
as paranoia was provided by the director of a central city social
agency in Indianapolis who told reporters: "It's no secret that arson
is a way of life down here. You use it to get rid of something you
don't want."31 An Indianapolis fire lieutenant who was conducting
his own personal investigation of arson in a downtown historic dis-
trict said, "There are definitely planned arsons in the area. New resi-
dents have openly said that they are going to get all the blacks and
poor whites out."32 A resident of Indianapolis for fifty-two years put
it this way: "If your house is worth $7,000 and you're worried it may
be burned, and someone comes in and offers you $4,000, you think
you're lucky. Especially if you're 70 and don't feel safe."33
The incipient violence in Indianapolis may be unique, but the
struggle over older, inner city districts is not. More than half of the
forty-four cities in a National Urban Coalition Study were "either
designated historic by national, state or local authorities or were in
the process of applying for such designation at the time they were
surveyed. 34 Similarities were found as far apart geographically as
Denver, Colorado and Baltimore, Maryland.
In Denver, the Five Points community was proposed for historic
designation, but the proposal encountered opposition from area resi-
dents and a black businessmen's group. "Whose history is being pre-
served, and at whose expense?" asked one community leader.
35
Another observed that residents of the area only discovered the his-
toric designation when "someone knocked on their doors to offer
them a $6,000 cashier's check to buy their homes. 36
City officials minimized the racial overtones of the conflict in Den-
ver and characterized the problem as one of class. Class, not race,
was clearly the issue in the Union Square area in Baltimore where
the resistance to historic preservation had all the heat typically asso-
ciated with racial conflict. "Don't Let Historical Preservation Eat Up
Our Neighborhood" was the title of a pamphlet advising homeown-
ers that at stake in the struggle were increased property taxes and
31 Id
32. Id.
33. Id
34. THE NATIONAL URBAN COALITION, supra note 2, at 16.
35. Id. at 17.
36. Id.
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code violation notices designed to force exterior renovations or
forced sales. Renters were warned that historic designation would
trigger higher rents and attract a wave of middle and upper income
people who could afford the increased costs that would be beyond the
reach of indigenous residents on fixed incomes.37
The struggles described above corroborate what two Chicago law-
yers, advocates of historic preservation, have written:
Displacement of long-time and low- and moderate-income
neighborhood residents by middle- to upper-income newcomers
occurs as rehabilitation fever sweeps a quaint old neighborhood.
"Restoration block busting" it has been labeled, and the analogy
is apt. In the Lincoln Park/Sheffield neighborhood of Chicago,
hundreds of black, Latino, and old-time Irish, German and Ital-
ian families were gradually displaced by the influx of small-scale
investors and owner-occupiers who renovated the old town-
houses and small apartment buildings. The private market
forces were accelerated by the Chicago Department of Urban
Renewal, which selectively cleared the worst pockets of Lincoln
Park blight and made the land available for "middle-income"
townhouses priced well above $75,000, new parks, and parking
lots for two large neighborhood hospitals. The old residents and
absentee landlords were also encouraged to sell by the high-pres-
sured sales pitches of real estate brokers. They were swayed by
the brokers' tales of wealthy buyers ready to pay more, and all in
cash, than the old time residents had ever dreamed their proper-
ties were worth. The brokers' promises were real, but the long-
time residents understood little of the dynamics of the new mar-
ket forces at work in the neighborhood, had no knowledge of
housing costs in the neighborhoods to which they would have to
move, and failed to realize that their properties might be worth
twice as much in five years as the rehabilitation of the neighbor-
hood increased in strength. As a result, "No More Lincoln
Parks" has become an accepted maxim among Chicago commu-
nity groups seeking to revitalize other neighborhoods without
displacement.3"
There is, of course, a deep irony in recent perceptions of "historic
displacement." The lawyers who speak of Lincoln Park also declared
that "the social and ethnic diversity of a neighborhood is often as
strong an attraction to the young, relatively affluent newcomers as the
37. Id
38. Roddewig & Young, supra note 11, at 72 (footnote omitted).
GENTRIFICATION
charm of the old buildings."3 9 However, the gentrifiers' penchant for
diversity-tolerance nurtured by two decades of social and racial
change in the United States-may well be the greatest enemy of inner
city minorities who in previous years were somewhat shielded from
displacement by the bigotry of many whites scurrying to the suburbs.
Besides, greater tolerance by middle to upper income gentrifiers may
not have increased racial diversity in any meaningful way. In Chi-
cago, for example, the return of whites to inner city areas has not led
to a significant alleviation of racial segregation. Rather, Chicago's
black population (notwithstanding a statistically insignificant number
of privileged professionals) has simply been pushed in lumps to other
sections of the city, where in some cases the blacks have displaced
lower income whites. In Chicago and elsewhere, an increase in racial
tensions has occurred as displaced blacks contend with working-class
whites for Iiebensraum.
At one time, it was arguable that the best chance for desegregated
living was in inner city areas where the poor and minorities already
lived. These areas are highly desirable primarily to young middle-
class white persons priced out of suburban real estate markets and
squeezed by soaring transportation costs. Such individuals are most
able to cope with the strains of urban living, especially where there
are households with pre-school age children or no children at all.
However, the market place, often abetted by cities hungry for in-
creased tax revenues, leads inexorably to nonselective wholesale dis-
placement. Thus, in many instances, preservation-related
gentrification has led to white, middle to upper income colonization
and resegregation.
B. The Law and Historic Preservation
Although current issues in historic preservation are likely to in-
volve conflict between old and new residents, there is little disagree-
ment over legal power to preserve the past. It is now clear that
architectural patterns in a given area may be preserved by legislative
action establishing historic districts pursuant to the police power to
promote the general welfare,' or by other acts "within the concept of
public welfare and . . . effected by the exercise of the usual police
39. id
40 For an example, see the act establishing the "Old Historic Nantucket District"
upheld in Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 774-76, 128 N.E.2d 557, 558-59
(1955),
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power attendant upon zoning.,, 4 Though classic cases such as those
that arose over the French Quarter in New Orleans42 and the "Old
Santa Fe Style" construction in New Mexico43 dealt with maintain-
ing structures already in place, the zoning power has been extended
to protect a restored area, rather than to preserve a historic area in its
existing state.44
As long ago as 1941, the Supreme Court of Louisiana relied on
what remains today as the twin pillars of zoning for historic preserva-
tion theory-aesthetics and economic benefit. In City of New Orleans
v. Levy, 45 a property owner in the Vieux Carre historic district in the
French Quarter of New Orleans argued that the city's attempt to con-
trol the size of a sign outside his business establishment was solely for
aesthetic purposes and thus was an invalid exercise of the police
power. The court answered:
Perhaps aesthetic considerations alone would not warrant an im-
position of the several restrictions contained in the Vieux Carre
Commission Ordinance. But. . . this legislation is in the inter-
est of and beneficial to the inhabitants of New Orleans generally,
the preserving of the Vieux Carre section being not only for its
sentimental value but also for its commercial value, and hence it
constitutes a valid exercise of the police power.46
While the Louisiana court linked the power to preserve architec-
tural aspects to economic considerations, it appears that the number
of courts which will validate zoning on aesthetics alone is increas-
ing.47 On balance, perhaps, the dominant judicial view of the matter
was clearly articulated almost a generation ago:
The term public welfare has never been and cannot be precisely
41. Rebmanv. City of Springfield, 111 Ill. App. 2d 430, 441, 250 N.E.2d 282, 288
(1969).
42. See City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953); City of
New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941); City of New Orleans v.
Imparstato, 198 La. 206, 3 So. 2d 559 (1941).
43. See City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13
(1964).
44. See generally Agnor, Beauty Begins a Comeback: Aesthetic Considerations in
Zoning, II J. PUB. L. 260 (1962); Note, Zoning: Aesthetics: The Chameleon of Zon-
ing, 4 TULSA L.J. 48 (1967), cited in J. BEUSCHER, R. WRIGHT & M. GITELMAN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 882 (2d ed. 1976).
45. 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1941).
46. Id at 28-29, 64 So. 2d at 802-03.
47. G. GAMMAGE, P. JONES & S. JONES, HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN CALIFORNIA
55 (1975).
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defined. Sometimes it has been said to include public conven-
ience, comfort, peace and order, prosperity, and similar con-
cepts, but not to include "mere expediency." . . . And it has
been held or stated that aesthetic considerations alone are not
enough, but that they may be taken into account, if the primary
objects of the regulation are sufficient to justify it. . . . There is
reason to think that more weight might now be given to aesthetic
considerations than was given to them a half century ago.4 8
Thus, by using such strategies as zoning4 9 and eminent domain,5" a
municipality can identify and preserve individual structures and
landmarks or even entire districts because of their historical
relevance.
C. Preservation Without Displacement. Current Issues
Now that the power to preserve structures or entire neighborhoods
on the basis of historic significance has been legally assured, there
remains the problem of reconciling the passion for historic preserva-
tion with the needs of those who bear the social costs of the move-
ment. As the National Urban Coalition suggested:
To those who support historic preservation, community resist-
ance to renovation work has come as something of a surprise,
but scattered incidents have been sufficient to make historic pres-
ervation for all neighborhood residents the theme of some con-
cerned preservation groups. . . . Given the large number of
improving neighborhoods surveyed by the Coalition, strategies
to make historic preservation work for low income residents are
badly needed.5
Clearly, the collision between historic preservation and the housing
needs of low income households must be resolved if urban tensions
48. Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. at 773, 778-79, 128 N.E.2d 557, 561 (cita-
tions omitted).
49. In addition to enacting the typical historic zone ordinance, local authorities
might employ spot zoning, interim or moratorium zoning, and floating zones to pre-
serve areas of cultural or aesthetic interest. See G. GAMMAGE, P. JONES & S. JONES,
supra note 47, at 60-62.
50. An early exercise of eminent domain involving compulsory purchases of pri-
vate land for public purposes, namely historic preservation, was approved by the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668
(1896). The Maryland Supreme Court upheld the use of eminent domain to acquire
land for the Star Spangled Banner Flag House in Flaccomio v. Mayor & City Council
of Baltimore, 194 Md. 275, 71 A.2d 12 (1950).
51. THE NATIONAL URBAN COALITION, supra note 2, at 18.
1983]
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are to be alleviated. As the Task Force on Housing and Community
Development of the National Association of Neighborhoods asserted,
"The reality of displacement also underscores the dangerous possibil-
ity that our cities may become upper income centers, separated from
the rest of the nation. This separation will have the tragic conse-
quences of a nation divided."52 An example of how separation and
tension can literally flare into serious conflict is given in the National
Urban Coalition's discussion of Philadelphia's Spring Garden neigh-
borhood. For years, Spring Garden was the center of Philadelphia's
Puerto Rican community. In May 1977, a firebombing of a newly
rehabilitated house in the area gave rise to charges of Puerto Rican
resistance to the immigration of more affluent whites.53
In the North University Park area of Los Angeles, the ostensibly
laudable work of University of Southern California students in cata-
loging historic structures provoked much comment among neighbor-
hood residents. The work inspired fear that the students were indeed
Trojan horses for a take-over of the neighborhood by the university.
The area is one of the few in Los Angeles where historic district
designation is a likely possibility, and it illustrates both the promise
as well as the problems of historic preservation.54
The Los Angeles Historic Preservation Overlay Zone,55 which may
be applied to North University Park, provides for a historic preserva-
tion association with membership drawn from the real estate profes-
sion, construction industry, architectural community, and owners or
renters in the area. Included in the governing body are representa-
tives of those groups most interested in historic preservation, and
those who stand to profit from revitalization. A bow is made in the
direction of community participation through a requirement that a
bare majority of the association's members live in the designated
zone. Nonetheless, the preference for technical and professional rep-
resentation is unmistakably clear. Perhaps more importantly, the or-
dinance is far more directed at physical preservation than the
retention of neighborhood residents and the preservation of afforda-
52. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEIGHBORHOODS, POSITION PAPER ON THE ISSUE
OF DISPLACEMENT 2 (1978).
53. THE NATIONAL URBAN COALITION, supra note 2, at 19.
54. For a study of gentrification in the North University Park area, see Appendix
I.
55. Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 154-2422 (June 1979) (amending Los ANGELES,
CAL., MUN. CODE ch. I, art. 2, § I(A)(1), (3), (4) (1979)).
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ble housing. For instance, Section 4(d) of the ordinance prohibits
demolition unless "the applicant has. . . made a good faith effort to
sell. . . such structure at or below fair market value to any public or
private person or agency which gives reasonable assurance of its will-
ingness to preserve and restore such structure."56 No such protection
is extended to residents of the building with respect to new housing in
the event the building is actually demolished.
As its purpose clause quite expressly puts it, the ordinance is, inter
alia, designed to:
Protect and enhance the use of structures, features, sites, and ar-
eas that are reminders of the City's history or which are unique
and irreplaceable assets to the City and its neighborhoods or
which are worthy examples of past architectural styles. Enhance
property values, stabilize neighborhoods and/or communities,
render property eligible for financial benefits, and to promote
tourist trade and interest. Foster public appreciation of the
beauty of the City and the accomplishments of its past as re-
flected through its structures, natural features, sites and areas.57
Though there is a passing reference to neighborhood stability, the
purpose clause is otherwise silent about serious issues such as housing
opportunity and displacement within the area coming under historic
designation. Procedural steps of some complexity in practical, polit-
ical, and technical terms have prevented the actual establishment of a
preservation zone anywhere in Los Angeles. However, this fortuitous
protection for low income residents of North University Park is not
likely to be of long duration as middle income consumers of housing,
blocked by exponentially inflating real estate prices on the city's west
side, turn to inner city areas for affordable homes.
If the overlay zone ordinance is deficient in human terms, it is
nonetheless a paradigm of the emphasis in the historic preservation
movement. Indeed, it might be argued that concern for structures
and not the people who live in them is the essence of historic
preservation.
Recently, however, some proponents of historic preservation have
become increasingly concerned about its impact upon the poor. In an
article discussing the tax shelter aspects of historic preservation, it
was suggested that there are unique opportunities for the long-time
residents and their community groups since the attitudes of the gen-
56. Los ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 1, art. 2, § l(A)(4)(d) (1979).
57 Id § 1(A)(1).
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trifiers make them disposed to tolerate the racial diversity presaged
by their recent arrival.58 The authors terminated their article
optimistically:
In many neighborhoods in Chicago and other cities across the
country, neighborhood not-for-profit corporations are being
formed to purchase and rehabilitate housing for existing neigh-
borhood residents. If established in neighborhoods likely to at-
tract private for-profit rehabilitation, they may be in a better
position to guarantee the success of their not-for-profit rehabili-
tation. By properly anticipating private for-profit interest,
neighborhood not-for-profit corporations may be able to buy
more buildings than they have resources to rehabilitate, and sell
some (perhaps those that require much more renovation than
moderate-income rentals can offset) to the private redevelopers
for a handsome profit that can be utilized to rehabilitate a
greater number of buildings for low- and moderate-income ten-
ants. Not-for-profit corporations may be able to interest private
investors in joint ventures under the Tax Reform Act historic
preservation provisions and interest financial institutions in loan
programs much more easily if they can point to spontaneous pri-
vate market interest in their neighborhood as evidence of long-
term neighborhood stability. Finally, the influx of affluent new-
comers created by for-profit redevelopment assures some im-
provement in neighborhood schools, commercial areas and
amenities that local governments are unable to provide through
spending programs alone.59
The mix of private sector initiative and not-for-profit corporations
is consistent with the experience of historic preservation, which in
many instances has been spearheaded by private, not public, sector
organizations. It must be asked, however, whether the private market
will be more responsive to lower income housing needs in the context
of historic preservation than it has been in other areas. Clearly, in
addition to private sector initiatives such as those advocated above,
governmental protection will be required to protect housing opportu-
nity for all residents in preservation areas.
D. Preserving History and Neighborhood Housing Opportunity
If left unchecked, private real estate market forces will inevitably
drive the cost of housing in historic districts beyond the reach of all
58. Roddewig & Young, supra note 11, at 73.
59. Id (footnotes omitted).
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but the most affluent. The taste for historic buildings is indeed a cul-
tivated one, and socio-economic diversity can be maintained only by
a variety of strategies which interweave public and private sector re-
sources. The tension between the movement for historic preservation
and the movement for equal opportunity in housing can be reduced,
but only if compromises are made in the sometimes excessively purist
goals of the historic preservationists.
First, reconsideration might be given to the geographic exten-
sivensss of historic preservation. Perhaps in many instances, saving
landmarks might suffice for restoring entire neighborhoods. Some
districts no doubt need to be preserved intact, or whole villages may
merit restoration as did Williamsburg, Virginia. Nevertheless, there
are alternatives such as California Street in San Francisco where
scores of Victorian-era mansions stand side by side with more mod-
ern-and more affordable-structures of recent vintage.
Of great importance in this regard is the position of the Office of
Archaeology and Historic Preservation (OAHP) of the Heritage Con-
servation and Recreation Service. OAHP has suggested that it would
flexibly apply building certification standards under the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 so as to extend incentives for restoration. Under this
view, a number of buildings in a historic district might be certifiable,
even if they are from different epochs. Thus, the concept of a historic
district is not defeated (for tax or aesthetic purposes) because it is a
montage of historical styles. Indeed, the OAHP has urged that draft
proposals for new National Register districts include more recent
buildings, requiring only that they relate to the "continuity of the
district and contribute to the streetscape."6 °
Second, in addition to mixing styles in historic districts so that
more efficient densities might be obtained throughout the neighbor-
hood, there are important precedents for adaptively reusing interiors.
Restored buildings are less expensive to maintain and can house
more than one family or commercial enterprise. Historic landmark
designation and consequent tax benefits need not be lost because of
alterations that do not destroy the integrity of the structure. The mis-
conception that historic preservation is designed to transform neigh-
borhoods into museums is belied by the statement of the OAHP
Chief of Technical Preservation Services who declared that in apply-
ing criteria essential for Tax Reform Act benefits, "rehabilitation,"
60. Statement by Sarah G. Oldham, National Park Service, at the Tax Reform
Act Conference in Chicago, Illinois (Oct. 27, 1977).
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not restoration, is the heart of the process. 6
Under the certification standards as they eventually evolved, alter-
ations essential for economic viability are permissible so long as they
preserve the historic qualities of a structure. More modern interior
layouts are acceptable if "significant" historical features are not de-
stroyed and the new design is compatible with the building's charac-
ter. Interior alterations should be made so that if they "were to be
removed in the future, the essential form and integrity of the struc-
ture would be unimpaired."62 Though there is evidence that consid-
erable delays can occur in obtaining approval of rehabilitation
proposals by state historic preservation officials or by the National
Park Service, the challenge of historic preservation in both architec-
tural and policy terms is to resolve the competing demands of the
present with those of the past.
Third, although federal tax benefits may be the linchpin of the in-
centive scheme for historic preservation, local real property taxes are
crucial in determining whether there is the opportunity for low and
moderate income housing in designated districts. As one commenta-
tor observed:
At the heart of the displacement process are two simple facts of
economics: rapidly rising property taxes for homeowners and
rapidly rising rents for tenants. . . .The real property tax leads
to fiscal zoning and competition among local governments, cre-
ates disincentives to property maintenance and improvements in
stable or declining neighborhoods, and is an expropriative and
exclusive force in "improving" neighborhoods.
63
There are ways of ameliorating the impact of the property tax in
the neighborhood revitalization process. In fact, some communities
have already successfully experimented with employing the real
property tax to support restoration and rehabilitation activity di-
rectly. A 1977 study in Chicago recommended adoption of a contract
assessment tax plan for neighborhoods chosen by historic preserva-
tion criteria.' 4 The plan resembled the Oregon tax preservation law
61. Statement by W. Brown Morton III, National Park Service, at the Tax Re-
form Act Conference in Chicago, Illinois (Oct. 27, 1977).
62. Historic Preservation Certifications Pursuant to the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
42 Fed. Reg. 54,551 (1977).
63. C. WEILER, NAN HANDBOOK ON REINVESTMENT DISPLACEMENT 72-73 (2d
ed. 1979).
64. SHALES AND Co., PROPERTY TAX INCENTIVES FOR LANDMARK PRESERVA-
TION: DRAFT PROGRAM FOR USE IN CHICAGO AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS (1977).
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which effectively permits owners of qualifying historic property to
freeze the value of the building for purposes of calculating the real
property tax for a period of fifteen consecutive years.65 Additional
tax strategies for ameliorating the impact of real property taxation
might include collection of assessment increases when property is
sold, spreading assessment increases out over a number of years so
that they do not rise too rapidly in too short a space of time, and
exemptions or rebates for low and fixed-income residents.66
Fourth, much of the class and racial conflict associated with his-
toric preservation could be reduced if real, not symbolic, community
participation were built into the process. It is doubtful whether his-
toric preservation ordinances-like that of Los Angeles-truly pro-
vide a forum for the community to express its views. It has been
noted that:
To be effective on an ongoing basis, while instilling confidence
in the community at large, resident involvement must be formal-
ized and ongoing, through representative bodies which actually
have some power over the development and implementation of
program alternatives. Genuine community participation is thus
predicated on a selection process which enables the affected
community to have an opportunity for input, and a follow-up
process which ensures that this input will be taken seriously.'
Appointments that emanate from mayors or city councils-as pro-
vided by the Los Angeles ordinance-do not necessarily institutional-
ize and guarantee the kind of participation that will cut across class
lines, even if the appointees are residents of the designated district.
Fifth, and most importantly, historic preservation and housing
subsidies should go hand in hand. "Before it is granted, historic
designation should be reviewed for the impact it will have on the
neighborhood affected. Because such designation seems to promote
private market rehabilitation activity, such neighborhoods should si-
multaneously be deemed eligible for programs aimed at assisting low
to moderate income residents.""8
Subsidy programs must be operated with greater imagination and
sensitivity. It has been suggested that federal Section 8 rent supple-
ments be extended to homeowners. This would not only keep prop-
65. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 358.475-.565 (1981).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 192-97.
67. C. LowE, SAVING NEIGHBORHOODS 31 (1978).
68. THE NATIONAL URBAN COALITION, supra note 2, at 25.
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erty taxes "to a certain presumably manageable portion of income
but would also compensate for displacive effects of rising home main-
tenance costs, conformity to housing code or historic area standards,
and rising utility costs.",69 Certainly, if new money is to flow into a
district, it should reach neighborhood residents first, not affluent new
arrivals as occurred in the Oakwood district of Venice, California.7 °
It should be stressed that this list of strategies is more illustrative
than exhaustive. The central point of this discussion is that the his-
toric preservation movement can and must be made sensitive to hous-
ing needs and to larger social and economic forces in a given
community. Moreover, no single strategy alone will serve as a brake
on the gentrification of a neighborhood designated for preservation.
Inevitably, housing costs will rise as neighborhoods improve. His-
toric preservation merely exacerbates the process by its direct appeal
to the more affluent sectors of the housing market. What remains to
be achieved is a reshaping of the process of historic preservation so
that it does not continue to produce the socio-economic and racial
segregation that has all too frequently been the end result of histori-
cally preserved or restored neighborhoods.
III. CAUSES OF GENTRIFICATION
A. Condominium Conversions
The conversion of apartments to condominiums and cooperatives
is an urban phenomenon that depletes the supply of rental units and
at the same time causes rental rates to rise in reaction to increased
demand for the reduced pool of units.7 Although the wave of con-
69. C. WEILER, supra note 63, at 75.
70. See Appendix III.
71. Condominium conversions in California typify the problem nationally. The
number of conversions receiving state approval has more than doubled each year with
2,089 units approved in 1976, 4,291 in 1977, and 9,167 in 1978. Cooperatives jumped
to 358 approvals in 1978 from a total of 35 in the prior nine years. DEP'T OF REAL
ESTATE, OWNERSHIP CONVERSIONs-THE PROBLEM (1979). (These figures represent
projects which have already completed state and local processing. They do not in-
clude units in some intermediate stage of local or state approval.) In 1979, there were
135,000 units converted from rental units to condominiums in the United States. OF-
FICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., THE
CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING TO CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES, at IV-5
(1980) [hereinafter cited as HUD CONVERSION STUDY].
Nationwide, as well as in California, conversions are occurring in moderate as well
as high-rent areas. For example, a 1,195 unit project was proposed for conversion in
San Bernardino which was occupied by elderly tenants, 84% of whom had incomes
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versions does not appear to be racially motivated, it is class biased,
driving out persons with low and moderate incomes. Minorities, the
elderly, and the handicapped suffer particular hardships when they
are displaced.72
High rates of conversions have occurred principally in east and
west coast cities, although some municipalities have escaped the phe-
nomenon.73 According to a study of conversions by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),"4 factors that create a
climate conducive to conversion activity include: scarcity of land for
new construction; high-priced single-family homes; high-priced va-
cant residential land; restrictive land use regulations; a declining sup-
ply of rental units; rent controls; a lack of legislation to regulate
conversions; and the existence of well-organized, vocal tenant groups
and strong tenants' rights legislation.75 Other factors that influence
conversions include: employment or population trends that increase
the demand for housing near the urban area; availability of financing
for new construction; spot code enforcement activity in housing
projects serving primarily elderly or low and moderate income
households; local supply of subsidy rental housing; and the existence
of strong neighborhood pressure to limit high density development.7 6
Given the continuation of current housing trends, energy costs, and
high inflation, the rate of conversion should continue to be high in
urban housing markets experiencing overall growth.7 7
below S800 per month. Most severely affected are the communities where conversion
activity has been widespread. For example, in 1978 and early 1979, the City of Sarita
Monica received applications for conversion of over 3,000 units or nearly 10% of its
rental stock. The City of Torrance, California, had 90% of its rental stock converted
to condominiums within a two-year period. OFFICE OF PLANNING & RESEARCH,
CAL. GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, APARTMENT CONVERSIONS (1979).
72. See Fried, Grievingfor a Lost Home, in THE URBAN CONDITION 151 (L. Duhl
ed. 1963); Relocation of the Aged-. A Review and Theoretical Analysis, J. OF GERON-
TOLOGY 32 (May 1977).
73. HUD CONVERSION STUDY, supra note 71, at IV-7.
74. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., HUD CONDOMIN-
IUM/COOPERATIVE STUDY (1975) [hereinafter cited as HUD CONDOMIN-
IUM/COOPERATIVE STUDY].
75. id vol. 1-3. See also HUD CONVERSION STUDY, supra note 71, at V-I to V-
30.
76. COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEV. TASK FORCE, CONDOMINIUM CONVER-
SION CONTROLS 11 (1979); Mober, Flood of the Condominium Destroys Old Neighbor-
hoods to Create New Onesfor the Affuent, In These Times, Oct. 18, 1979, at 191-94.
77. See SAN FRANCISCO DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION
IN SAN FRANCISCO 21 (1978). Conversions are expected to account for at least 80% of
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Displacement results both directly and indirectly from conversions.
Many formerly undesirable neighborhoods have become very attrac-
tive due to downtown access or other locational attributes.78 Devel-
opers purchase buildings in these areas, displace lower income
tenants, and then renovate the units for sale as condominiums to
more affluent buyers. In addition to this direct displacement of lower
income persons, indirect displacement can occur because of conver-
sions in buildings located in "better" areas. Middle income renters
may be unable or unwilling to buy their converted units. They then
seek housing in less expensive parts of town, bidding up rent levels in
the dwindling rental stock. This in turn forces out lower income ten-
ants who cannot afford the higher rents.79
Condominium conversions severely test the traditional "trickle-
down" theory that has been at the heart of housing development in
the United States. The trickle-down theory maintains that each time
the occupancy of a unit changes, the new resident will be from a
lower income level.80 In effect, then, by meeting middle class hous-
ing needs, vacated rental units will trickle down to the poor. How-
ever, as one commentator observed, the trickle-down theory may
work well for "the predominant majority of households. . .[but] for
the poorest urban households, especially poor minority-group mem-
bers, this process is a social disaster."'"
Using the trickle-down theory in support of conversions, develop-
ers argue that condominium purchasers are former renters whose
previous housing will become part of the rental supply for lower in-
come tenants. This claim, however, does not address the absolute
reduction in units caused by conversions and middle class in-migra-
tion. As market demand and inflation escalate the value of housing
future condominium development in San Francisco, assuming the continuation of
existing trends and the relative scarcity of sites suitable for new construction in the
city. Id
78. For example, the Venice study indicates increased conversion activity as spec-
ulators exploit the desirable beachfront area. See Appendix III.
79. COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEV. TASK FORCE, supra note 76, at 9.
80. See J. LANSING, C. CLIFTON, & J. MORGAN, NEW HOMES AND POOR PEOPLE
3 (1969).
81. Downs, The Successes and Failures of Federal Housing Policy, 34 THE PUB.
INTEREST 124, 127 (1974). Professor Donald Hagman proposed a "trickle-up" ap-
proach which would require the construction of low income housing on vacant sites
scattered throughout higher income housing areas before any upper income housing
could be constructed. See Hagman, The Managed Growth Trickle- Up Theory, 27
LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. No. 1, at 7, 8-9 (1975).
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in low income areas, the filtering process cannot work. Displacement
eventually results from the lack of alternative rental housing in the
neighborhood.82
B. Speculation
Speculation is short-term investment in property in order to gain
from quick resale at a higher price. Various factors can contribute to
speculation. In particular, inflation has greatly encouraged specula-
tion in the housing market. For example, single-family home prices
in California have climbed so rapidly that speculators have been able
to buy and resell at substantial profits in six months to one year.83
Speculation is considered a major cause of rapidly rising housing
costs and property tax bills.84 The impact of speculation is so severe
that one analysis concluded, "[S]peculation is the driving force be-
hind most private market displacement."85 As the studies of North
University Park and Venice illustrate,86 speculation is also a key fac-
tor in the gentrification process associated with historic preservation
and condominium conversions. Lower income tenants are forced to
leave when their buildings are purchased for aesthetic restoration or
for sale as condominiums. In addition, indirect displacement occurs
when tenants must move because they cannot afford rising rents
caused by the speculator's increased property taxes and financing
82. R. FICHTER, FREEDOM TO BUILD 79 (1972). The 1975 HUD CONDOMIN-
IUM/COOPERATIVE STUDY, supra note 74, indicates conversions displace approxi-
mately 80% of the previous tenants. See also HUD CONVERSION STUDY, supra note
71. at iv. The primary reasons for tenants not purchasing their units are lack of capi-
tal to meet the down payment requirements, lack of adequate income to carry a mort-
gage, and unwillingness to undertake the economic responsibilities of home
ownership. Id at VI-18 to VI-19. The 1975 HUD study concludes that the serious-
ness of the displacement problem caused by condominium conversion depends upon
the availability of housing alternatives, the time given to relocate, and the characteris-
tics of the tenants themselves. HUD CONDOMINIUM/COOPERATIVE STUDY, supra
note 74.
83. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEV., SPECULATION
(1977). Since they do not live in the homes they purchase, and may leave them vacant
until resale, speculators compete against those who want permanent residences, creat-
ing an artificial addition to normal market demands.
84. 4 SHELTERFORCE 9 (Summer 1979).
85. C. HARTMAN, D. KEATING, & R. LEGATES, DISPLACEMENT-How TO FIGHT
IT 28 (1982).
86. See Appendices I & III.
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costs.87 Thus, while speculation may be profitable for the investor, it
has no benefits for the displaced renter or the potential homeowner.
C. Anti-redlining
"Redlining" describes a practice whereby lenders directly or effec-
tually designate entire areas as poor risks for loans.88 Historically,
funds have been conspicuously unavailable for home mortgages and
rehabilitation loans for buildings located in certain inner city neigh-
borhoods, often those with large or growing minority populations.
The resulting shortage of capital has led to disinvestment that accel-
erated urban decline and substantially reduced opportunities for
neighborhood revitalization. 89
87. One commentary vividly describes the operations and dislocating impact of
speculation on the urban poor in neighborhoods that are being "upgraded":
Block by block, private developers in Washington, D.C. are converting de-
caying homes into elegant townhouses. Some see this restoration movement as a
godsend, for it promises both to upgrade the city's housing stock and to expand
the tax base.
But there is another, less rosy side to the neighborhood rehabilitation: it has
caused rampant speculation in residential property. . . In a kind of reverse
blockbusting, speculators comb neighborhoods on foot and by telephone just
ahead of the restoration movement, making attractive cash offers to owners. If
the owners refuse to sell, the more persistent speculators call in building inspec-
tors who order expensive repairs on the old and dilapidated homes. Homes are
bought and sold the same month, week, and even day for profits of up to 100%
and more....
Aside from the displacement caused by rehabilitation, the spiraling of home
prices has its own dislocation effects. Tenants are sometimes evicted because
they cannot afford the rent hikes that go hand in hand with the new landlord's
high purchase price and increased property taxes. Since property tax assessments
are based largely on sale prices of nearby properties, homeowners face tax in-
creases whether or not their own properties have been improved; these higher
taxes also are passed on to renters.
Some speculators turn the tax woes to their own advantage. At a city council
hearing on property tax assessments, a woman who lived on a street on which
seven homes had been sold in two years testified that speculators had knocked on
the doors of the remaining homeowners saying, "I understand your property
taxes have gone up. Do you want to sell?"
Richards & Rowe, Restoring a City. Who Pays the Price, 1977 WORKING PAPERS FOR
A NEW SOCIETY 54.
88. D. BRYANT, J. SOLOWAY & C. CHIU, CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL LOWER IN-
COME HOUSING LAWS: A COMPILATION AND ANALYSIS 15-10 to 15-11 (1978).
89. See The President's Urban and Regional Policy Group, Cities and People in
Decay (Nov. 1977) (National Urban Policy discussion draft). See also Bentley &
Macbeth, Mortgage Lenders afid the Housing Supply, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 149 (1972);
Coughlin, Redlining and Disinvestment.- The Death of Communities, 2 CHARITIES
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The most obvious indication of redlining is the outright refusal to
make loans solely because of the property's location. Little or no
consideration is given to a loan applicant's financial status or the
physical condition of the property. Redlining is not always so bla-
tant, however. Lenders may finance loans in a redlined neighbor-
hood, but only on terms more onerous than those required for loans
in more affluent areas. Terms that may reflect redlining include
lower loan-to-value ratios,' higher interest rates,9 ' and shorter re-
payment periods.92 Some lenders refuse to grant loans unless the
mortgage amount equals or exceeds a minimum amount.93 Addi-
tionally, lenders often underappraise properties located in blighted
neighborhoods. The borrower is then required to pay cash for the
difference between the mortgage amount and the sale price.9 4
During the 1970's, national attention began to focus on the lending
practices of financial institutions. The courts found redlining vio-
lated the Fair Housing Act.95 Anti-redlining legislation and regula-
U.S.A. 9 (1975); Givens, The 'ntiredlining"Issue Can Banks be Forced to LendZ 95
BANKING L.J. 515 (1978); Comment, Proposals for Financial Reform: Some Implica-
tions for Housing, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 664 (1978).
90. See Duncan, Hood & Neet, Redlining Practices, Racial Resegregation, and Ur-
ban Decay.: Neighborhood Housing Services as a Viable Alternative, 7 URB. LAW. 510,
514 (1975). A "loan-to-value ratio" is a figure computed by dividing the amount that
a lender is willing to lend by the appraised value of the collateral. Lenders will rarely
advance the entire value of collateral for two reasons. First, collateral will always be
insufficient to repay an advance equal to the collaterars total value because of the
transactional costs involved in a foreclosure. Second, the risk that a borrower might
default on a loan would be unacceptably high if the borrower has made no down
payment and, thus, has no financial stake in performing his obligation.
91. "Redlining" by Lenders is Called Cause of Old Communities' Decay, N.Y.
Times, May 26, 1975, at 20, col. 1, reprinted in 121 CONG. REC. 18,883-84 (1975).
92. Id
93. See HOUSING & TRAINING INFORMATION CENTER, THE PHASE OF NEIGH-
BORHOOD DETERIORATION (1978).
94. For example, a buyer who has contracted to purchase a home for $25,000
would be able to obtain a $20,000 loan from a lender utilizing an 80% loan-to-value
ratio, if the lender agrees to value the property at the contract price. The buyer would
be expected to pay the difference between the purchase price and the loan amount,
$5,000 in cash, as a down payment. If, however, the lender sets the value of the
property at $20,000, the loan will be made for only $16,000, thereby forcing the buyer
to make a down payment of $9,000. This substantial increase in cash required may
place an impossible burden on the low or moderate income buyer. Alternatively, it
may force the buyer to negotiate, with a high risk of failure, a costly second mortgage
elsewhere. See S. REP. No. 187, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975).
95. E.g. Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 497-98 (S.D.
Ohio 1976).
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tions were enacted at both the federal and state levels.96 Lenders
were to end arbitrary geographical distinctions as part of the require-
ment to make nondiscriminatory lending decisions.
These actions have facilitated the flow of capital into previously
redlined areas. Many programs to combat redlining, however, do not
protect against gentrification. Indeed, by opening a market of older,
well-located, and aesthetically attractive urban housing to private in-
vestment, anti-redlining efforts actually stimulate gentrification.97 It
becomes easier for in-moving "pioneers" and speculators to obtain
home mortgage and rehabilitation loans for buildings in inner city
areas. Rental units are converted into ownership housing, and as a
result, property values soar, causing more displacement of low in-
come residents.
Thus, there is a significant association between gentrification and
the sudden influx of loan funds to previously redlined neighbor-
hoods. Often affluent newcomers benefit, to the detriment of lower
income and minority residents who were formerly subject to discrimi-
natory lending practices.
D. Real Property Taxation
Property taxes are an important factor in the displacement process
associated with inner city revitalization. Renovation triggers value
appreciation and thus creates a disincentive to private rehabilitation
in the form of increased assessment and taxes.98 Nevertheless, pres-
ervation programs, conversions, and opportunities for speculation
can provide sufficient profit motivation to overcome this barrier in
gentrifying areas. Gentrification results in increased rehabilitation
and turnover of property. In turn, the housing costs for both home-
owners and renters increase since rents and taxes rise with the prop-
96. See infra text accompanying notes 175-87.
97. As Professor Conrad Weiler states:
[G]reening and reinvestment have often come to focus on the credit needs of
specific territories rather than on the credit needs of people and their social com-
munities. There is, consequently, the real possibility that luxury townhouses and
rehabilitation loans for affluent "pioneers" in inner city neighborhoods will be
the prime thrust of greenlining and inner city reinvestment efforts originally un-
dertaken in the name of lower- and moderate-income persons originally living in
these inner-city neighborhoods.
C. WEILER, supra note 2, at 95.
98. R. FISHMAN, HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW 524 (1978).
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erty values.99
Localities attempt to preserve or enhance the size of the property
tax base in their communities. Many local governments adopt the
position that "the greater the average taxable wealth, the lower the
tax rate. .. which must be paid in order to finance a given level of
public service. '" l°" As a result, municipalities have welcomed "up-
grading" of inner city properties by middle and upper income per-
sons. City planners generally perceive additional tax revenues and
increased consumer spending as positive factors. l' t
This local receptiveness to gentrification has been enhanced by
property tax reduction movements such as California's Proposition
13. Briefly stated, this amendment to the state constitution limited
effective local property tax rates. 10 2 For elderly or low income home-
owners living in areas experiencing increased market values due to
inflation and gentrification, Proposition 13 reduced property taxes
99. THE NATIONAL URBAN COALITION, supra note 2, at 12-13; E. GRIER & G.
GRIER, supra note 7, at 6; C. WEILER, supra note 2, at 68.
100. G. PETERSON, PROPERTY TAX REFORM 125 (1973).
101. Schussheim, Private Market Displacement, SELLER/SERVICES, Nov.-Dec.
1978, at 15.
102. Proposition 13 limited state and local government flexibility by:
a. limiting tax rates to I% of full cash value, plus the rate needed to service
bonded indebtedness approved by the voters prior to fiscal year 1978-79.
Each county will levy taxes at the new lower rates. Revenues will be divided
in proportion to past property tax collections among the county governments
and the municipalities, school districts, and special districts within the-
county;
b. rolling back assessed values to the levels on the 1975-76 assessment rolls. If
these levels do not reflect the property's value at that time, the assessment
and assessed value will be increased to this level. Assessed values will be
increased annually to reflect inflation, but increases are limited to no more
than 2% per year. Upon sale, a property will be reassessed at its market
value if that value exceeds the 1975-76 assessment. Newly constructed or
substantially rehabilitated property will also be assessed at market value;
c. requiring that statutes to increase covered state taxes be approved by two-
thirds of the elected members of each of the legislature's two houses, and
prohibiting new state ad valorem, sales or transaction taxes on real property;
and
d. requiring that special taxes, except for taxes on real property, be imposed by
local governments only after approval by two-thirds of the jurisdiction's vot-
ers, and only if such taxes conform to the power granted to the locality under
the state's statutes and constitution. The two-thirds restriction presumably
would not apply to taxes proposed for general purposes (e.g., local sales tax)
by a general local government.
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that had been increasing with soaring market values. At the same
time, however, the anti-gentrification potential from decreased hous-
ing costs may be swallowed up by the drastic reduction in total tax
receipts. This could set into motion powerful pro-gentrification
forces.
Urban governments facing fund cuts as well as inflation have little
incentive to counter these forces. Instead, urban governments may
encourage transfers and renovation since tax revenues will rise with
property values. Thus, gentrification may become an urban strategy
for increasing the local tax base. I0 3
As long as cities perceive that an influx of middle and upper in-
come persons is beneficial to their tax base, they will be reluctant to
mitigate gentrification at the local level. Even if they were inclined to
address the problem, most city planners cannot initiate displacement
relief through property tax reform. Many state constitutions require
property assessments to reflect market values or a uniform proportion
of value."° Uniformity requirements often limit the ability of a lo-
cality to enact tax abatement, deferral, or exemption programs as a
matter of local policy. Consequently, state-level actions may be nec-
essary to help alleviate displacement problems caused by rising prop-
erty taxes.
E. Housing Code Enforcement
Housing codes are meant to insure decent housing by setting mini-
mum maintenance and repair standards for landlords and homeown-
ers. Some government officials have characterized code enforcement
as a "capital preserving" program, while others see it as "slum clean-
ing.,' 05 All agree, however, that the task of code enforcement is an
103. As one urban scholar cautions, a rapid shift in population characteristics
may lead to increased public service needs. Gentrification can create demands for
new or improved capital facilities, better schools, increased police protection, and bet-
ter trash collection. Middle and upper income "urban pioneers" want upgraded side-
walks, buried electric and telephone wires, and off-street parking. In effect, then,
these demands can offset the increased tax revenues produced by gentrification. See
C. WEILER, supra note 2, at 33-35.
104. See D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL
LAW 345-46 (1975); J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXA-
TION: CASES AND MATERIALS 43-46 (4th ed. 1978).
105. Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66
COLUM. L. RE. 1254, 1257 n.12 (1966).
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ongoing proposition. If habitable housing is to be maintained, hous-
ing code enforcement must be a continuous process.
Courts use both criminal penalties and civil remedies to enforce
minimal code requirements. Violations of housing code standards
are usually misdemeanors punishable by a fine, imprisonment, or
both. Jail sentences are rarely imposed, however, and the fines are
typically so low that the deterrent effect is minimal. In fact, many
owners view the payment of fines as part of the cost of "doing busi-
ness" and consider it cheaper to pay the fine than comply with the
code."° Consequently, criminal penalties generally have not forced
owners to maintain and repair their buildings in accordance with
code standards.
Although they have been used sparingly, civil remedies can be
more effective than criminal penalties in achieving compliance with
housing codes. Action can be taken against the nonconforming
building rather than against its owner." 7 Civil remedies range from
injunctions and receiverships to orders to vacate or demolish. In-
junctions have been used in several states to order major reconstruc-
tion and repairs.' Receivership has been viewed as one of the most
effective civil sanctions because it takes the building completely out
of the hands of its owner."° The court appoints a building manager
or public agency to collect rents and to make all the necessary re-
pairs. While orders to vacate or demolish are also effective, their im-
pact on the tenants and the neighborhood is terminal since the unit is
removed from the housing market. As a result, courts have issued
orders to vacate or demolish only in the most extreme cases where tfie
municipality has found the buildings unsafe or unfit for human
habitation.
On occasion, strict code enforcement has disrupted neighborhoods
by triggering a chain reaction of cost increases, abandonment, build-
ing demolition, and finally displacement. Although landlords ini-
106. ld at 1277.
107. See Note, Enforcement of Municioal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801,
830-31 (1965).
108. California's Health and Safety Code permits code enforcement agencies to
require that repairs be made by the owner. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17.980
(Deering Supp. 1983). See, e.g., City and County of San Francisco v. Meyer, 208 Cal.
App. 2d 125, 25 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1962). Philadelphia and Chicago have also made use
of the injunction to secure habitable housing for its residents. See Note, supra note
107, at 827.
109. Gribetz & Grad, supra note 105, at 1272-74.
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tially may comply with code requirements without increasing the
rent, eventually the costs are passed on to the tenants.110 Repairs can
be quite expensive, especially if the building is old or deteriorated.
Financing must come from somewhere, and landlord profits are an
unattractive and sometimes unavailable source. Tenants who are un-
able to afford the rent increases will move, either surrendering their
units to more affluent tenants or leaving their apartments vacant. In
turn, landlords will abandon property when the cost of compliance
makes building operation a losing proposition. The same process ap-
plies to home owners. When they can no longer afford the cost of
repairs, owners are likely to sell to new "pioneers" who are more
sophisticated in obtaining the financing needed to bring the structure
up to code standards.
Beyond abandonment, demolition is the "bottom line" of housing
code enforcement. Buildings may be razed when the necessary re-
pairs are either economically unfeasible or structurally impossible.
This is the ultimate disruption in an inner city neighborhood. Re-
moval of low income units leads to attrition in housing resources and
to a simultaneous increase in rents for the remaining units. Fre-
quently, the remaining units are occupied by more affluent tenants
who have "trickled back" into a housing market that is attractive be-
cause of cost and convenient location. Thus, displacement of low
and moderate income residents can be the net result of overzealous or
insensitive housing code enforcement."'
F. HUD
The federal government, especially the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) has been integrally involved in the
displacement process. For example, during the 1960's and early
1970's, urban renewal programs were important forces in the disloca-
tion of low income groups." 2 Present HUD policies directed at up-
110. San Francisco has compiled data on repair costs in relationship to rent in-
creases as high as $30, $40, and $50 per month. C. HARTMAN, YERBA BUENA: LAND
GRAB AND COMMUNITY RESISTANCE IN SAN FRANCISCO 116 (1974).
Ill. Studies have revealed that stringent code enforcement on a "mass basis" has
led to "mass abandonment" of urban property by the property owners and "mass
occupant displacement" due to the imposition of high rents. For example, in Sacra-
mento, California, about 1,152 rental units were disposed of by demolition orders in
low income neighborhoods from 1963 to 1970. E. SCOTT & E. RABIN, HOUSING
CODE ENFORCEMENT IN CITY OF SACRAMENTO: PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE 212 (1969).
112. Hartman, supra note 9, at 745.
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grading without clearance have produced effects not unlike the
federal bulldozer. Although displacement may now be primarily a
private market phenomenon, commentators have concluded that it is
undoubtedly "aided by public action or inaction which tends to force
displacement into the private sector, where it is harder both to detect
and to remedy."' 13 Congress became aware of the problem,' 14 and in
1978 it directed that "in the administration of Federal housing and
community development programs, consistent with other program
goals and objectives involuntary displacement of persons from their
homes and neighborhoods should be minimized." 115 To achieve this
objective, Congress authorized payment of relocation benefits from
block grant funds to displaced persons." 6 It also required HUD to
study and make recommendations for a national policy combatting
displacement. 117
HUD issued two displacement reports in 1979.118 On the whole,
the reports set displacement in the broadest context and tended to
minimize the role of the federal government in the process.
Critics of HUD assert that it grossly miscalculated the magnitude
of displacement. One study contended that HUD underestimated
displacement by one million or more persons annually. 1 9 The same
study also maintained that displacement is far more harmful, both
financially and psychologically, to low income displacees than HUD
recognized. 120
In the opinion of one critic, the National Housing Law Project, the
underlying suppositions of HUD's "Save the Cities" strategies are at
113. LeGates & Hartman, supra note 3, at 236-37.
114. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 175, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977). The report advo-
cated relocating displaced families in the same neighborhood. The report proposed
that the impact of revitalizing neighborhoods be fully considered. It also warned
communities to guard against gentrification. Id
115. Pub. L. No. 95-557, § 902, 92 Stat. 2080, 2125 (1978) (noted at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5313 (Supp. 11 1978)).
116. Pub. L. No. 95-557, § 103(e), 92 Stat. 2080, 2084 (1978) (codified at42 U.S.C.
§ 5305(a)(I 1) (Supp. 11 1978)).
117. Pub. L. No. 95-557, § 902, 92 Stat. 2080, 2125 (1978) (noted at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5313 (Supp. 11 1978)).
118. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., INTERIM DISPLACEMENT REPORT
(1979); U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEy., FINAL DISPLACEMENT REPORT
(1979) [hereinafter cited as FINAL DISPLACEMENT REPORT].
119. LeGates & Hartman, supra note 3, at 236.
120. Id
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war with the interests of indigenous low income residents. 121 Specifi-
cally, the Project cited the Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) program, Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG), and
the Federal National Mortgage Agency (FNMA) as critical HUD ac-
tivities that exacerbate the displacement crisis. Concerning the
CDBG program, the Project suggested that HUD stresses the preven-
tion or elimination of urban blight without paying sufficient attention
to displacement. 22 UDAG was seen by the Project as "an instant
replay of urban renewal."' 23 As for the FNMA regulations issued in
1978 governing the purchase of central city mortgages, the Project
argued that HUD had made "an unnecessarily broad attempt to halt
the invidious practice of redlining on geographic basis and [it] is
bound to result in the gentrification of inner city neighborhoods."' 124
The underlying thrust of criticism aimed at HUD's programs is
that HUD should not save the cities at the expense of the poor. It
should improve the living conditions of those who presently suffer
most from decaying neighborhoods. Improving neighborhoods, how-
ever, often means transforming them. Older strategies of urban re-
newal transformed neighborhoods by first obliterating them, then
raising in the ashes new construction such as shopping centers,
gleaming central business districts, or upper income housing develop-
ments. These urban renewal programs eventually were abandoned,
partly because of their expense, and partly because of the enormous
impact they had on the housing supply. The emphasis then turned to
rehabilitation rather than clearance. Rehabilitation is spearheaded
primarily by private interests which rely on public policies that sup-
port and complement private investment. This creates a policy di-
lemma. Private sector initiative is a major component of the federal
government's revitalization policy. At the same time, however, pri-
vate investment tends to replace low income housing with shelter for
more affluent residents.
Stripped to the essentials, HUD's rehabilitation policies are criti-
cized as being essentially laissez-faire, laced with moral suasion,
schizophrenic, and ineffectual. Even where HUD subsidies are di-
rectly implicated, "its policies have been derelict in protecting low-
and moderate-income persons displaced for rehabilitation financed
121. 8 HousiNG L. BULL., Oct.-Nov. 1978, at 3.
122. Id
123. Id
124. Id
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through its subsidy programs."' 25 Thus, the displacement problem
grows more acute since HUD policies have not adequately addressed
the overall housing shortage for low income persons.
IV. REMEDIES FOR GENTRIFICATION
A. Condominium Conversions
I. Governmental Regulation
Condominiums were initially regulated through legislation that fo-
cused on technical legal issues regarding the various property inter-
ests involved and also financing and marketing concerns. During the
"condominium boom" of the early 1970's, a host of consumer protec-
tion problems arose that were addressed by additional regulatory
schemes or amendments to the basic condominium statutes. This leg-
islation generally mandates certain provisions with respect to the
management of condominium property and imposes disclosure or
other consumer protection requirements. 26 For example, in Califor-
nia, the Department of Real Estate attempts to protect purchasers of
converted units by requiring disclosure of information in a public re-
port.127 These disclosures provide significant consumer protection
for prospective buyers of condominiums, but they do not offer reloca-
tion assistance or compensation to permit the displaced tenants to
purchase the units they once rented.
While state condominium regulation is generally not concerned
with displacement of the poor, the California legislature has required
localities to employ a variety of anti-displacement measures when
regulating land use.128 These measures must be implemented when
determining whether to issue subdivision maps for proposed conver-
125. Id
126. For a complete analysis of the statutes governing or impacting upon condo-
minium projects in various jurisdictions across the country, see HUD CONDOMIN-
IUM/COOPERATIVE STUDY, supra note 74, at XI-10 to XI-19.
127. The report must contain the following information: (a) legal estate to be
conveyed; (b) location and size of the project; (c) management and operation of the
project; (d) maintenance and operational expenses; (e) statement that the project is a
conversion of an existing structure and the structure's age; (f) taxes; (g) conditions of
sale; (h) utilities; (i) responsibility for roads; (j) availability of public transportation;
and, (k) schools.
128. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66427.1 (Deering Supp. 1983) (delineating the
requirements to issue a subdivision map for conversion); id § 66427.4 (discussing
zoning for mobile homes and the effect of displacement).
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sions 129 and when monitoring conversions in California's coastal
zone. 3° In addition, all localities have broad authority under their
police powers to provide supplemental protections. 131 A preference
exists for resolving the displacement problem at the local level be-
cause of the unique circumstances and the need for specially tailored
solutions that are found in each jurisdiction.
a. Subdivision Map Act
In California, the principal source of power to regulate conversions
is the Subdivision Map Act,' 32 which requires localities to adopt or-
dinances concerning the development of subdivisions. The Act cov-
ers both conventional new construction and the conversion of
existing apartment buildings from single ownership to multiple-
owned condominiums. 33 It expressly provides protections for ten-
ants in a building for which conversion approval is sought. The lo-
cality must deny approval unless tenants are afforded minimal notice
and purchase rights.' 34 The notice requirements provide tenants with
advance warning that a conversion may occur, and thus affords them
extended time to seek new housing. The notice requirements also
ensure that tenants are aware of the public decision-making process
so that they can express their views and influence the outcome.
The Subdivision Map Act does not correctly address the funda-
mental problem posed by conversion-displacement. For example,
the price reductions for tenants are of no help to lower income house-
holds who cannot afford to buy the converted units. The Act, how-
ever, does not preempt the power of localities to provide protections
beyond the minimal requirements of state law. The Act expressly
129. See infra text accompanying notes 132-35.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 136-46.
131. See infra text accompanying notes 147-60.
132. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66410-66499 (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1983).
133. Id § 66427.1.
134. Id Specifically, the statute requires that tenants be given 60 days written
notice of intent to file for approval of a conversion. Id § 66427. 1(a). Tenants must
receive 10 days written notification of approval of a final map for the proposed con-
version. Id § 66427.1(b). Additionally, each tenant must receive 180 days notice of
intention to convert before his tenancy can be terminated. Id § 66427.1(c). Each
tenant must also get a right to purchase the converted unit at the same terms and
conditions that such unit will be initially offered to the general public, or at terms
more favorable to the tenant. This right to purchase must last 90 days. Id
§ 66427.1(d).
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sets forth the legislature's intent not to "diminish, limit or expand,
other as provided herein, the authority of any city, county, or city and
county to approve or disapprove condominium conversion."' 35
Thus, as is discussed below, localities can use the full extent of their
broad police powers to complement the subdivision map require-
ments to address conversion-caused displacement.
b. Coastal Zone Restrictions
Due to the potential for widespread displacement of lower income
households in beach-front communities,136 the California legislature
has required localities to place additional restrictions on conversions
in the coastal zone.' 37 For example, housing occupied by low or
moderate income households cannot be converted or demolished un-
less the converter provides replacement units located in the same city
or county. 138 There are some special exceptions based on project
size, 139 proposed future site use,140 the amount of vacant land, 141 and
the existence of alternative means for providing replacement hous-
ing.142 When replacement units are required, they must be located
135. Id § 66427.1(e).
136. For a discussion of gentrification in coastal zone areas, see the study of Ven-
ice. California in Appendix III.
137. Prior to January 1, 1982, the California Coastal Commission, a state agency,
regulated land use in the coastal zone to minimize the gentrifying effect of conver-
sions, In 1982. the legislature amended the Coastal Act and so now localities regulate
coastal conversions. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65590 (Deering Supp. 1983).
138. Id § 65590(b).
139. Replacement units need not be provided if the demolition or conversion is of
a structure with less than three dwelling units, or is a project involving more than one-
building but 10 or less dwelling units. Id § 65590(b)(1). Presumably, small projects
are exempt because they cannot bear the cost of replacement.
140 Conversions may also be exempt if the proposed future use of the site is
"coastal dependent" or "coastal related." Id § 65590(b)(2). Coastal-dependent uses
are those requiring a site on or adjacent to the sea in order to function (fishing is an
example). CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30101 (Deering Supp. 1983). Coastal-related uses
include those dependent upon coastal-dependent uses (such as commercial facilities
serving visitors). Id § 30101.3. This exemption illustrates that for the purposes of the
Coastal Act, housing is a lower priority than coastal-dependent or coastal-related
land uses.
141. Replacement units may not be required if there are less than 50 acres of land
in the coastal zone that are vacant, privately owned, and available for residential use.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65590(b)(3) (Deering Supp. 1983). This exception appears to be
based on the premise that replacement housing should not be required if there is little
land left for new units.
142. Replacement units are not required if the conversion or demolition occurs
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on the site of the conversion or demolition, or elsewhere within the
coastal zone. If that is not feasible, they must be located within three
miles of the coastal zone.1 43 The replacement units must be made
available within three years of the commencement of the conversion
or demolition.'" They do not have to be newly built, but rather can
be provided through other means such as rehabilitation of existing
housing.
Several qualifications weaken the impact of this response to coastal
gentrification. Replacement units do not have to remain affordable
to low and moderate income households for any specific period of
time. Additionally, there is no requirement that converted apart-
ments that housed families in a particular economic group be re-
placed with housing affordable to others in that same group. Thus,
low income units can be replaced by moderate income units.
As with the Subdivision Map Act,' 45 the state's limitations on con-
versions in the coastal zone constitute only minimal requirements.'46
To the extent that the police power permits, all California localities
can adopt more stringent displacement protections.
c. The Police Power
The police power provision in the California Constitution autho-
rizes cities and counties to "make and enforce. . . all local, police,
sanitary and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with
general laws." 4 When a regulation promulgated under the police
power is determined to be a "taking," compensation must be paid to
those persons whose interests are affected.' 48 This occurs "if regula-
tive legislation is so unreasonable or arbitrary as virtually to deprive
a person of the complete use and enjoyment of his property, [that] it
within the jurisdiction of a locality that has established a procedure whereby the de-
veloper can pay an in-lieu fee into a program that will result in replacement units, Id
§ 65590(b)(4).
143. Id § 65590(b).
144. Id
145. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66410-66499 (Deering Supp. 1983). See su~pra text ac-
companying notes 132-35.
146. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65590(i) (Deering Supp. 1983).
147. CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 7.
148. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See generall,
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:. Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
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comes within the purview of the law of eminent domain." '149
Courts have upheld regulations affecting economic interests in real
property-such as rent control laws-as appropriate exercises of the
police power.'50 Even where regulations resulted in a substantial
diminution in property values, courts have declined to impose a duty
of compensation.'
Thus, localities have wide latitude to act under the police power to
control the dislocating impacts of conversions. The following
presents a variety of remedial steps, premised on this authority, that
have been taken in California and elsewhere in the country.
i. Moratoriums
Temporary moratoriums prohibiting condominium conversions al-
low local jurisdictions time to assess and prepare appropriate legisla-
tion in light of an emergency conversion situation. For example, San
Mateo County, California, imposed a one-year moratorium on con-
versions and then banned them altogether until the vacancy rate ex-
ceeds 4.85%. Several other California cities have also employed
longer moratoriums that prohibit conversions until vacancy rates ex-
ceed a prescribed level, usually three to five percent.' 52 While va-
cancy rate moratoriums have succeeded in stopping conversions, they
may actually thwart the production of new rental units1 53 since the
feasibility of many rental projects is based on their potential for con-
version once the tax shelter benefits are exhausted. 154
ii. Tie-in with new construction or vacancy rates
Instead of prohibiting conversions altogether, localities may seek to
maintain the existing level of rental stock by linking conversions to
149. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 272, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372, 375 (1979) (quoting I NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42(1) (3d rev. ed. 1975)).
150. See, e.g., Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130
Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976) (upholding rent control regulation).
151. See, e.g., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 365 (1975) (denying compensation for zoning action which decreased value of
land from $400,000 to $75,000).
152. One Los Angeles ordinance calls for denying conversion approval if the va-
cancy rate is less than five percent in a given part of the city.
153. Merl, L.A. Moves to Cool "Condomania, " L.A. Times, Nov. 11, 1979, § CC,
Part II, at 3.
154. Rental Market Paradox, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 9, 1979, at 4.
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new rental construction. The city of La Mesa, California, adopted an
ordinance that requires the planning director to calculate annually
the average number of new rental units constructed in the previous
two fiscal years. The number of units that may be converted during
the following year is fifty percent of this figure. If the entire amount
is not converted, there is no carryover to a succeeding year.
In Palo Alto, California, conversions are authorized only when
there is a rental vacancy "surplus." The amount of the surplus is
formulated by multiplying the difference between the threshold or
minimum vacancy rate and the actual vacancy rate by the number of
rental units in the housing stock.155 Once sufficient conversions have
been authorized to deplete this excess, no more are permitted until
there is a reduced occupancy of existing rentals or new rental units
are constructed.
iii. Low and moderate income housing requirements
Another approach to alleviating conversion displacement focuses
on low and moderate income units only. Under an ordinance en-
acted in San Francisco, California, in December 1982, only 200 units
may be converted each year. 156 A lottery system is used to achieve
the fairest and least time-consuming selection process for the conver-
sion of residential properties to condominiums. The ordinance pro-
hibits the conversion of apartment buildings with more than six units.
More importantly, the ordinance mandates that an applicant for con-
version of a building with more than four units must satisfy a ten
percent low to moderate income household occupancy requirement
by providing such units either in the conversion project or within new
construction elsewhere.
157
Converters can evade the purpose of such an ordinance by rapidly
increasing rents, thereby forcing lower income tenants to vacate. A
proposed subdivision ordinance in Los Angeles, California, would
curb such evasion. The proposal calls for disapproval of a tentative
map for a condominium conversion project if more than fifty percent
of the units in the project at any time during the eighteen-month pe-
155. For example, if the threshold vacancy rate must be five percent before con-
versions are allowed, and the actual vacancy rate is currently seven percent for 2,000
rental units in the market, then 40 units could be converted to condominiums (7% -
5% = 2% x 2,000 = 40).
156. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., SUBDIVISION CODE art. 9, § 1396.
157. Id
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riod prior to the map application were low or moderate cost housing,
unless there are exceptional circumstances.
Another approach would assure that a percentage of converted
units remain available to low and moderate income households. Lo-
cal governments may require that a given percentage of units in each
project be sold at below-market prices. Alternatively, the units could
be sold to the locality for rental to lower income persons.
iv. Tenant participation
In order to minimize displacement, a locality may require tenant
participation in the conversion process. Some cities insist on tenant
consent to the conversion.' 58 Under California law, tenants must be
given notice of a proposed conversion.'59 This enables tenants to
participate in public hearings considering approval of the conversion.
v. Relocation assistance
When conversions are approved and displacement will occur, the
converters may be required to pay tenants' moving expenses and to
provide information about alternative housing. The quality of assist-
ance required of developers varies. Some localities limit assistance to
the posting of rental want ads. Several jurisdictions require that the
developer find alternative, comparable housing for displaced tenants.
Most jurisdictions, however, simply require monetary compensation.
Many localities also provide special protections for tenants who are
members of certain groups such as the elderly, the handicapped, or
households with one or more children. Special protections range
from increased relocation payments to life-time leases.
An ordinance of Los Angeles, California, illustrates how several
relocation requirements can be combined in one regulatory
scheme."6 The converter must execute a recorded relocation agree-
ment that is satisfactory to the city. A copy of the agreement must be
provided to each tenant. The converter must provide assistance in
158. In Palo Alto, California, two-thirds of the tenants must consent if the va-
cancy rate is three percent or lower. In Washington, D.C., legislation requires a ma-
jority of tenants to consent to the conversion in all buildings that are not "high-rent"
buildings. New York City requires that at least 35% of current tenants approve the
conversion and consent to purchase their units.
159. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66427.1 (Deering Supp. 1983). See supra note 134 and
accompanying text.
160. Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 153,024 (Oct. 4, 1979).
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finding replacement rental units that are comparable in terms of size,
price, location, and proximity to medical, recreational, and commer-
cial facilities. Payments of no more than $100 per month for up to
one year must be paid when tenants incur high relocation costs. No
monetary limit applies where "special protection" tenants are af-
fected. In addition, the converter must pay each tenant's moving
costs up to $500, plus a relocation fee up to $500. Finally, until he is
successfully relocated, a tenant is permitted to reside in his unit for
up to twelve months. "Special protection" tenants, however, may re-
side in their units indefinitely.
2. Summary
There are several legal bases for controlling the displacing impacts
of conversions. These include the authority to regulate land uses
through such devices as subdivision maps, to impose specific require-
ments directed at sensitive areas like California's coastal zone, and to
protect the public health, safety, and welfare pursuant to the police
power.
A variety of specific remedial techniques aimed at conversions
have been employed by cities and counties in California and other
states. Notice and tenant first-right-to-purchase requirements have
minimal impact, especially for lower income households. More effec-
tive techniques include requiring that replacement housing be pro-
vided so that the overall supply of housing will not be reduced.
Relocation payments are effective means to ease the harsh financial
impacts of a forced move. However, this only provides temporary
relief from the substantially increased housing costs that displacees
will face, and it does not address the non-fiscal impacts such as the
shattering of neighborhood social support networks.
Truly effective relief will necessitate either outright prohibition of
conversions through moratoriums or the provision of comparably
priced replacement housing in the same neighborhood as the con-
verted dwellings. Unfortunately, few localities have imposed
moratoriums or comparable replacement housing requirements.
Thus, while some steps have been taken to address gentrification
through condominium conversions, the most effective means of reme-
dying the problem of displaced households have not been generally
employed.
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B. speculation
A variety of strategies have been developed to combat speculation
and its debilitating effects on the housing market. For example, Ver-
mont and Washington, D.C. impose property transfer taxes. Davis,
California prohibits the sale of residential real property within one
year of its acquisition. In the private sector, banks and developers
have attempted to discourage speculation by imposing conditions on
loans and sales.
1. Governmental Regulation
a. Transfer Taxes
The Vermont Tax on Gains From the Sale or Exchange of Land16 1
focuses primarily on protecting rural areas. It does not apply to
buildings or to certain amounts of land used as the site of a principal
residence. The tax rate varies. The maximum rate is sixty percent of
the gain on the sale or exchange, if the gain is two hundred percent or
more and the land has been held less than one year. The tax rate
drops as the holding period increases or the gain decreases. The min-
imum rate is five percent on a gain of less than one hundred percent
on property held for five or six years. No tax is applied to gains on
property sold after being held for more than six years.
In 1974, the constitutionality of the Vermont Tax was upheld in
Andrews v. Lathrop 162 In Andrews, the plaintiff taxpayers challenged
the tax on equal protection grounds, contending that the method of
assessing gains by measuring the holding period had a discriminatory
impact. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the tax scheme was
constitutional because it was related to the achievement of a legiti-
mate state purpose concerning speculation.'63
The Washington, D.C. Residential Real Property Transfer Excise
Tax"6 is essentially an anti-gentrification measure that was adopted
after an inner city renaissance. Speculators were forcing out poor
residents by buying deteriorated homes to convert into elegant town-
161. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 10001-10010 (1981 & Supp. 1983). See also
Hagman & Misczynski, Special Capital and Real Estate Windfall Taxes (SCREW4VTS
in CANZEUS: A Phenomenon, 28 NAT'L TAx J. 437, 438 (1975).
162, 132 Vt. 256, 315 A.2d 860 (1974).
163. Id at 261-62, 315 A.2d at 863-64.
164. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1401 to -1471 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
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houses for affluent purchasers. 65 The tax is based on the transferor's
gain, which is essentially the sale price minus the sum of all acquisi-
tion, rehabilitation, and transfer expenses.166 The highest tax rate is
for properties sold within six months of acquisition. Transfers of
property held longer than thirty-six months are not taxed. In addi-
tion, the tax does not apply to the first sale of a newly built home, to
gratuitous transfers, or to transfers of the transferor's principal resi-
dence (even if there are also rental units in the building).
The Washington, D.C. law is unique in that transfers of property
are exempt from the tax if the transferor warrants the property is fit
for occupancy and use. Similarly, transfers are not taxed if the trans-
feror warrants the major appliances that are transferred with the
property are fit for the purpose for which they were made. An addi-
tional exemption is allowed for property that has been inspected and
certified as meeting the standards of the District's housing regula-
tions. These exemptions demonstrate that the transfer tax was aimed
at improving the quality of housing as well as stopping speculation.
It is difficult to evaluate the impact of property transfer taxes. For
example, no information is available to show the effect that the Ver-
mont tax has had on speculation. Nevertheless, as one analysis
noted, "If it [the tax] reduces speculative transfers, it may slow the
rate of land price increase, and perhaps also the rate of property tax
increase. If it does not reduce transfers, at least it should generate a
lot of money which can be used to fund tax relief."' 6 7
As for the Washington, D.C. law, the rehabilitation exemptions
weaken its effectiveness as an anti-displacement device. They may
even encourage dislocation if rehabilitation is less expensive than
paying the tax. In addition, the law was, at least at the outset, poorly
administered and unenforced. Seventy percent of the sellers failed to
report sales. Almost all who did report claimed that they were ex-
empt or that they owed no tax because expenses exceeded taxable
gains.
b. Residency Requirements
The City of Davis, California requires 68 that all purchasers of sin-
165. See Richards & Rowe, supra note 87.
166. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1401(11) (1981):
167. Hagman & Misczynski, supra note 161, at 439.
168. Davis, Cal., Ordinance 893 (1977).
GENTRIFICATION
gle-family homes sign an affidavit stating that they intend to reside in
the home for a minimum of twelve months. Intentional violations of
the ordinance can result in fines of up to $500, six months in jail, or
both. Additionally, the city can obtain injunctions to void real estate
sales to investors.
One study 169 concluded that the primary effects of the ordinance
have been a reduction in the waiting period of newly constructed
homes (speculators dropped off of the waiting lists) and a limitation
on the conversion of owner-occupied homes to rental units. It is un-
clear, however, whether the reduction in speculative activity in Davis
was due to the restrictions or to market forces. At the time the city
enacted the ordinance, there was a statewide surplus of unsold
homes, financing terms were unfavorable for speculators, and the rate
of inflation was slowing. These factors combined to make an unfa-
vorable economic climate for speculation. 7 °
Residency requirements such as those adopted in Davis will not
deter speculation in apartment buildings since the requirements do
not apply to rentals. Nevertheless, such ordinances could curb specu-
lative conversions where the converted units were initially purchased
by other speculators for rental or resale. The effectiveness would be
reduced, however, if multifamily buildings are entirely exempted
when one unit is occupied by the owner.
2. Private Anti-speculation Efforts
In 1977, the California Department of Savings and Loans, a state
regulatory agency, urged state-chartered lenders to discourage specu-
lation by giving preference to buyers who will occupy the property
that they own.' 71 Lenders responded to the Department's directive.
Several lenders charge absentee owners higher down payments or in-
terest rates, and others require loan applicants to commit themselves
to owner-occupancy. 17
2
169. CITY OF DAVIS COMMUNITY DEV. DEP'T, A STUDY OF IMPACTS OF ORDI-
NANCE No. 893, DAVIS' ANTI-SPECULATION ORDINANCE (Nov. 1977).
170 Id at 1-2.
171. NEWSWEEK, May 2, 1977, at 31.
172. For example, in the late 1970's, Security Pacific National Bank, the second
largest bank in Cahfornia, charged an interest rate premium of 1.25% on home loans
where the purchaser would not be the occupant. Sacramento Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation requires that owner-occupants pay a 10% down payment on a house, while it
charges a non-owner-occupant a minimum of 25% down payment. Wells Fargo has
set its differential financing so high for non-owner-occupants that it considers it "pro-
19831
86 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol, 25:43
Major subdivision developers have also taken steps to combat
speculation. Developer strategies include limiting sales to one hous-
ing unit per customer, requiring commitments that buyers live in the
home for at least one year, and reserving the right to cancel a sale if
resale is attempted within a specified time period. 7 3
Private anti-speculation measures are like residency requirements
in that they do not deter apartment speculation since they are di-
rected toward ownership housing. Nonetheless, they could help re-
duce the purchase of converted units by investors, and thus
discourage speculative conversions.
3. Summary
Several strategies can be used to combat speculation. Property
transfer taxes that reduce profits from speculation have potentially
the broadest applicability. These taxes can be applied to sales of
land, ownership housing, and rental units. This approach must be
formulated with care, however, to insure that exemptions or al-
lowances for rehabilitation expenses do not permit speculators to es-
cape taxation. Enforcement is crucial.
Restricting residence to owners and imposing onerous lending
terms on absentee-owner buyers are additional means by which the
public and private sectors can discourage speculation in ownership
housing. While these approaches can be utilized for conversion of
apartments to condominiums, they generally are inapplicable to
rental housing.
Speculation in the rental market can be curbed by taxation and
also by rent control.' 74 When rents are controlled, speculative profits
tend to be reduced. In addition, rent regulations can be specifically
tailored to combat speculation. For example, rent increases to cover
increased costs of refinancing can be limited to situations where bor-
rowed money is needed for capital improvements. This prevents
hibitive." This bank requires a full 33V3% down payment and charges a higher inter-
est rate to investors. United California Bank makes loans only to those borrowers
who sign written declarations of their intention to occupy those homes. Id
173. In 1977, Mission Viejo Company, an Orange County, California developer,
required home buyers to sign statements that they would live in those homes for at
least one year. The company also restricted home and condominium sales to one per
customer. The Irvine Company, another Orange County developer, reserves a con-
tractual right to cancel the sale if the home buyer should attempt to resell the property
in less than a year. Id
174. See infra text accompanying notes 334-61.
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owners from borrowing against the building's increasing market
value, passing the costs on to the tenants, and then using the funds to
finance additional speculative ventures.
C. Anti-redlining
Anti-redlining can encourage gentrification in areas that previously
had suffered from the lack of loan funds. Some anti-redlining pro-
grams fail to address the problem of displacement. For example,
California's anti-redlining strategies direct capital into designated ar-
eas while ignoring the adverse effects on the indigenous residents.
On the other hand, some efforts such as the federal Community Rein-
vestment Act recognize and attempt to mitigate the displacement
caused by anti-redlining.
1. California-Missed Opportunities
California's efforts to halt discriminatory appraisal and underwrit-
ing practices do not always benefit minority or low income residents
in redlined areas. For example, the state's Housing and Financial
Discrimination Act of 1977175 has a relatively narrow anti-discrimi-
nation focus and offers little protection to households facing displace-
ment. The Act prohibits state-chartered lenders 176 from considering
factors such as race, religion, or sex when making lending deci-
sions.' 77 Lenders may not discriminate on the basis of conditions or
trends in a neighborhood, unless ignoring such characteristics would
be an unsafe or unsound business practice. 78 Lenders may consider
factors such as the "credit worthiness" of the borrower, the secured
property's marketability, and the diversification of the financial insti-
tution's assets. The poverty of a general area, however, is not a legiti-
mate business consideration.
These reforms have helped alleviate the problem of discriminatory
appraisals and lending practices. Nonetheless, nondiscrimination
does not necessarily aid low income households seeking to remain in
their inner city neighborhoods. Indeed, such reforms may have the
175. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35800-35833 (Deering Supp. 1983).
176 The California law as applied to federally regulated lenders was struck down
in Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir.), affdper
curiam, 445 U.S. 921 (1979). The Circuit Court found that only the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board can regulate federally chartered loan institutions. 604 F.2d at 1260.
177. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35811 (Deering Supp. 1983).
178. Id § 35810.
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opposite effect since displacement is caused in part by rapidly in-
creasing property values. For example, accurate appraisals tend to
raise housing prices above the ceiling imposed by prior discrimina-
tory practices. Thus, although anti-redlining efforts may help inner
city owners realize the true value of their property, the prices may
exceed the resources of prospective low income buyers.
2. The Federal Approach
In contrast to California's strategies, the federal approach recog-
nizes the displacement potential of anti-redlining efforts. For exam-
ple, the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) 17 9 has a broad
scope that enhances its effectiveness as a remedy for gentrification.
The CRA seeks to reverse the flow of capital from inner city areas by
redefining the public obligations of financial institutions. It imposes
an affirmative obligation on federally chartered lenders to help meet
the credit needs of all communities, "including low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods."18
The CRA directs four financial regulatory agencies (the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve Board)
to encourage lenders to meet their affirmative obligation. ' 8' The reg-
ulatory agencies must periodically assess an institution's lending rec-
ord so that it can be considered when processing applications for new
charters, branch offices, mergers, deposit insurance, and other
changes.'82 Displacement is a pertinent factor. The commentary to
the agencies' joint regulations specifically provides: "[I]n connection
with their assessments, the agencies will look favorably upon efforts
by institutions to assist existing residents in neighborhoods undergo-
ing a process of reinvestment and change."' 83
In addition to periodic assessment, the agencies require lenders to
consider the displacement potential of residential, commercial, and
other revitalization projects they finance. For example, the Comp-
troller of the Currency directs its examiners to evaluate the rehabili-
tation credit needs of residents in the community. They must also
179. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1982).
180. Id § 2903.
181. Id § 2901(b).
182. Id § 2902(3).
183. 43 Fed. Reg. 47,146 (1978).
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examine how a development loan, as compared to other types of
financing investments, would affect the credit needs and neighbor-
hood characteristics of the community as a whole.18 4
The public may present its views on a lender's performance in pro-
ceedings before the federal regulatory agencies. Citizens have chal-
lenged applications for institutional changes, and in some cases, such
challenges have resulted in lenders promising to provide anti-dis-
placement relief as a condition for approval of their change re-
quests.18 5 In Oakland, California, an agreement between a lender
and a consortium of community groups acknowledged the "need for
improved financing within minority and mortgage deficient neigh-
borhoods, but not at the social cost of displacement of the residents of
these neighborhoods or extensive speculation."18' 6 The agreement
called for the lender to direct loan funds to lower income owner-oc-
cupants in specified neighborhoods in order to abate speculation.
The lenders also agreed to provide long-term, below-market financ-
ing of apartment renovation under the Department of Housing and
Urban Development's Section 8 moderate rehabilitation program.18 7
Since the Section 8 program subsidizes the rents of low income
households, renovation can proceed without tenant displacement.
184. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.7 (1983).
185. According to HUD Notice CPD 79-10, June 1979, community groups have
effectively used the CRA to combat discrimination displacement. For example, San
Bernardino, California residents protested a branch application filed by the Califor-
nia Federal Savings & Loan. In one of the first hearings before the Federal Home
Loan Bank System, lawyers reached a negotiated settlement with California Federal,
including a commitment by the savings and loan to open a new branch in the city's
barrio. In Missouri, attorneys represented low and moderate income community
groups in filing a CRA protest against a proposed new branch opening in Kansas City
by a St. Louis savings and loan. On the day of the hearing, lawyers successfully
negotiated an affirmative loan policy agreement with the savings and loan that in-
cluded specific commitments to the lower income west side of Kansas City. In an-
other instance, Los Angeles community organizations challenged Home Federal
Savings and Loan Association's application to open a branch in La Jolla, California,
on the grounds that Home Federal had deliberately excluded South Central Los An-
geles (a minority area) from its lending territory. Home Federal settled and agreed to
open a branch in South Central Los Angeles. It also agreed to establish an affirmative
lending unit specifically aimed at low income areas.
186. Agreement to Provide Community Reinvestment for Better Oakland Neigh-
borhoods, entered into by the Northern California Savings and Loan Association
(1980) (copy on file with the authors).
187. See infra text accompanying notes 225-27.
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D. Real Property Taxation
As discussed above, fiscal pressures to increase the local tax base
deter localities from addressing the displacement problem. In fact,
communities may view gentrification favorably as a mechanism for
generating needed revenues.
State and local governments can take action to brunt the gentrify-
ing impact of property taxes. One approach is to reform the tax col-
lection and distribution system, thereby reducing local dependence
on property taxation as a revenue source. For example, tax-base
sharing can be an alternative to singular funding of local services.
Under this sytem, all local governments in a particular region share
in the future growth of that region's commercial-industrial tax
base.188 This reduces conflicting fiscal interests between central cities
and suburbs by minimizing the impact of tax considerations in the
location of business and commercial development.18 9 Thus, increas-
ing the local tax base no longer constitutes an incentive to encourage
gentrification.
Altering the revenue sources for traditionally local services is an-
other technique to reduce the gentrifying effects of property taxation.
The primary example of this approach has been state funding of pub-
lic education. Reallocation of state tax revenues to finance local
schools reduces the concern about improving the local tax base.'
90
Alternatively, property tax remedies can focus on easing the im-
pact of rising taxes on lower income homeowners and tenants in gen-
trifying areas. Property taxes are generally regressive by nature
because the tax is levied in proportion to the value of real property
rather than in relation to household income. Consequently, the poor
and the elderly pay a disproportionate amount of their income in real
property taxes. 191
All fifty states have enacted some sort of relief program to mitigate
188. Minnesota enacted one of the first tax-base sharing programs. Known as the
Minneapolis Plan, it reallocated taxes among 300 taxing districts. See generally R.
KINGSTON & C. CHU, CAL. ASSEMBLY SUBCOMM. ON COMMUNITY DEV., TAX BASE
GROWTH SHARINGS (1977).
189. The Minnesota Plan was upheld by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Village
of Burnsville v. Onischuk, 301 Minn. 137, 222 N.W.2d 523 (1974). A similar ap-
proach was upheld in New Jersey in Meadowlands Regional Redev. Agency v. State,
63 N.J. 35, 304 A.2d 545 (1973).
190. See G. PETERSON, supra note 100, at 125.
191. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, PROPERTY
TAx CIRCUIT-BREAKERS: CURRENT STATUS AND POLICY ISSUES 13-16 (1975).
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the dislocating effects of spiraling taxes. Most of these programs pro-
vide tax relief to renters or elderly homeowners. Some states afford
relief based upon income limitations. 192
One popular form of tax relief is the circuit breaker, designed to
protect household income from tax overload.'93 The circuit breaker
operates by allowing an eligible taxpayer an income tax credit, cash
rebate, or property tax offset when taxes reach a specified percentage
of income. 194 By establishing a tax equivalent standard for renters,
such relief is available to tenants as well as property owners.
Tax abatement for rehabilitation is a second type of relief directed
at individual households in areas experiencing gentrification.'95 Re-
assessments are deferred for a period ranging from five years in
Ohio'96 to fifty years in New York.' 97 Deferring reassessments may
encourage renovation while minimizing the expenses passed on to
modest income homeowners or renters. Since the amount of funds
involved is relatively small, however, abatement has provided mini-
mal assistance against displacement pressures caused by tax in-
creases. Therefore, this type of relief is most effective when used in
combination with other remedies.
E. Housing Code Enforcement
Housing codes need to be enforced to protect homeowners and
renters from health and safety hazards. Code enforcement also per-
mits a city to preserve its housing supply. Nevertheless, housing
codes must be enforced in a sensitive manner to prevent displacement
of low income residents. The following outlines a variety of anti-
displacement techniques that local agencies and courts can employ
when enforcing housing code programs.
1. Selective Enforcement
Selective enforcement of housing code requirements can be a pri-
mary strategy in low income areas. The facts and circumstances of
each case are scrutinized to determine the extent of enforcement that
192, Id at 20-25.
193 R. FISHMAN, supra note 98, at 53 1.
194. Id
195. Id at 524-25.
196. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3735.67 (Page 1980).
197. N.Y. PRiv. Hous. FIN LAW § 93(5) (McKinney 1976).
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should be ordered. The economic hardships imposed can be evalu-
ated and then balanced against the need for enforcement.198 For ex-
ample, the strictness of enforcement might depend on the gravity of
the problem. If the code violation is life threatening, then stringent
enforcement would be imperative. If the violation were less danger-
ous, however, enforcement would depend to a large extent on the
resident's ability to pay the cost of correction. 9 9 Of course, this does
not mean that financial hardship would always constitute an accepta-
ble excuse for noncompliance with code requirements. Rather, selec-
tive enforcement gives agencies and courts the flexibility to scrutinize
the reasonableness of enforcement in individual cases.2 o This in-
troduces displacement considerations into the decision-making
process.
2. Resident Participation
Resident participation is another anti-displacement strategy that
can be used in code enforcement programs. Participation can take
various forms. For instance, local residents could be hired and
trained as code inspectors within their respective communities.
These community inspectors could check the quality of repair work
and possibly correct defects in the enforcement agencies' inspection
198. See Comment, The Landlord's Economic Inability to Meet Housing Code Re-
quirements: The "Hot Bath" Ordinance, an Illustration, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 163, 185
n.158 (1979).
199. In this respect, selective enforcement is similar to the concept of "zoned
housing codes" that have been suggested by some students of the problem. See Note,
supra note 107, at 812-13.
200. Selective code enforcement based upon the economic situation of inner city
residents received judicial support in City of St. Louis v. Brune, 515 S.W.2d 471 (Mo.
1974). The Missouri Supreme Court held that a municipal ordinance requiring every
dwelling unit to have a tub or shower bath in good working condition, properly con-
nected to approved water and sewer systems, was unconstitutional as applied to the
defendant's property. The court noted that the ordinance was unreasonable, arbi-
trary, and confiscatory as applied, but limited the holding to the specific facts of the
case. Id at 476-77. In reaching its decision, the Brune court relied on Dente v. City
of Mt. Vernon, 50 Misc. 2d 983, 272 N.Y.S.2d 65 (Sup. Ct. 1966). In Dente, a land-
lord attacked the constitutionality of an ordinance that required bathing and washing
facilities with hot water. The Dente court reasoned that improvements required by
ordinance are within the police power, but they "must be reasonable, proper and fair
when considered with reference to the object to be attained." Id at 984, 272 N.Y.S.2d
at 67. The Brune court interpreted this to mean that "the urgency of the evil to be
corrected should be weighed against the cost to the property owner." 515 S.W.2d at
475-76.
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records. 2° I
3. Standardized Building Materials
An additional strategy for ameliorating the displacing impact of
code enforcement would be widespread adoption of a national stan-
dard for building materials. Such a standard might promote innova-
tions such as plastic pipe, romex cable, and off-site assembled
plumbing facilities. By taking advantage of technological progress, a
standard for building materials would alleviate part of the cost of
housing code compliance. This would make it less burdensome for
low income property owners and tenants to meet code
requirements.2 °2
4. Sanction Reforms
Reforming the sanctions for housing code violations may also re-
duce the displacement caused by code enforcement. For example,
vacate orders might be issued for specific apartments rather than for
entire buildings. 203 Receiverships might present a viable option in
some cases. Even though such a remedy removes management from
the hands of owners, qualified managers and staff personnel from lo-
cal public agencies have the expertise to operate such buildings until
rehabilitation is complete. 2' If, however, both the cost of repairs
and the cost of alternative management are deducted from rents, re-
ceiverships might prove prohibitively expensive for seriously dilapi-
tated buildings.
5. Housing Clinics and Specialists
Housing clinics and specialists could also be used to assist in miti-
gating the displacing effects of code enforcement. They can act as
201. Cities such as San Francisco and New Haven have provided model examples
of how effective neighborhood organizations have worked with the city's code en-
forcement agency. See C. HARTMAN, supra note 110, at 113.
202. Of course, modernizing standards for building materials would affect persons
with vested interests, especially contractors, suppliers, and tradesmen employed to
handle the electrical, mechanical, plumbing, structural, pipe, and bricklaying jobs.
Nonetheless, modem standards properly implemented could clearly reduce the bur-
den of code enforcement. See C. FIELD & S. RIVKIN, THE BUILDING CODE BURDEN
76-79 (1975).
203. Segal, A Slum Landlord Program-An Essential Ingredient in a Housing Code
Enforcement Program, 58 J. PuB. HEALTH 446, 448 (1967).
204. See Gribetz, New York City's Receivership Law, 21 J. HOUSING 297 (1964).
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referral mechanisms, sources of information, and liaisons with en-
20forcement agencies. ° Sometimes clinics and specialists are criti-
cized because they can be expensive and may reach only a small
number of people.206 Nonetheless, the benefits of housing clinics and
specialists are realized not only through their direct actions, but also
indirectly by helping to prevent abandonment, demolition, and ulti-
mate displacement.
6. Financial Assistance
Code enforcement can cause displacement if the residents cannot
afford the cost of compliance. If significant anti-displacement protec-
tion is to be provided, public funds will have to be made available to
help low income residents pay for necessary repairs.
Several programs provide low-interest loans and grants for rehabil-
itation. These programs operate on the theory that cost reductions
will prevent displacement. They include the federal block grants,
Section 312 loans, and the neighborhood housing services and urban
homesteading programs.2 "7 Many localities also require that owners
of apartments who receive this rehabilitation assistance agree to limit
rent increases for a specified period such as the duration of the
loan.20 8
Under the Section 8 program, low income tenants in renovated
205. In Buffalo, New York, the housing court has a special program where a one-
person staff helps code violators who are elderly, sick, handicapped, mentally im-
paired, or senile. The court assistant refers such people to government social services
and financing programs and also acts as a liaison between the agencies in working out
a solution. See LoRusso, The Buffalo Housing Court: A Special Courtfor Special
Needs, 17 URBAN L. ANN. 199, 203 (1979).
Pittsburgh has a housing clinic designed especially to deal with those code violators
who have difficulty coping with their responsibilities. In the "hard" cases where fines
are not appropriate, the clinic counsels, instructs, and otherwise helps violators in
complying with the codes. See Penkower, The Housing Court of Pittsburgh, 17 UR-
BAN L. ANN. 141, 152 (1979).
In Hamden County, Massachusetts, housing specialists' activities have included
emergency relocation of tenants burned out of their homes, monitoring repairs, estab-
lishing court receiverships, settling disputes, arranging payment schedules, and assist-
ing owners and tenants in filing pro se complaints. See Winer, Pro Se Aspects of
Hampden County Housing Court: Helping People Help Themselves, 17 URBAN L.
ANN. 71, 79 (1979).
206. See Note, supra note 107, at 826.
207. See C. LOWE, supra note 67.
208. 14 HOUSING L. BULL., Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 1.
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units pay only an affordable portion of their income for rent.2" 9 The
balance is paid by the federal government pursuant to a contract with
the property owner. Thus, residents are not displaced by increases in
rents reflecting the landlord's costs to comply with housing code
requirements.
Finally, relocation assistance can help ameliorate the impact of
displacement caused by code enforcement. Federal relocation assist-
ance is limited.210 For example, in Alexander v. HUD,21' the
Supreme Court found that relief under the Uniform Relocation
Assistance Act 212 could only be required where displacement oc-
curred in connection with an acquisition of property for a specific
federal program, 2 " and that the Act was not intended to encompass
persons indirectly displaced by government programs.214
In contrast to the federal position, California requires governmen-
tal entities to provide relocation assistance to persons who move be-
cause of rent increases within one year after completion of publicly
financed rehabilitation. 215 Agencies with residential rehabilitation
programs funded by local bond proceeds must take "every possible
action" to prevent displacement due to rent increases caused by
rehabilitation.216
F. HUD
In the late 1970's, HUD was more responsive to critical analysis217
than during the urban renewal years.2 8 The following considers
some of the changes in HUD's posture and measures them with criti-
cism aimed at the agency. The analysis focuses on remedial steps
initiated in four of HUD's principal housing programs: demonstra-
tions, Section 312 low-interest rehabilitation loans, Section 8, and
community development block grants. Contemporaneous policy
209. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437a, 1437f (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
210. 9 HousING L. BULL., Dec.-Jan. 1979, at 10.
211. 441 U.S. 39 (1979).
212. Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions Policies Act
of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1976).
213. 441 U.S. at 52.
214. Id at 60.
215, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7265.3(b) (Deering 1982).
216. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 37922.2 (Deering Supp. 1983).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 112-25.
218. Hartman, supra note 9, at 801.
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shifts are then considered. After noting changes that are needed in
HUD's new construction site selection criteria, the section concludes
with a discussion of the new federal attitude under the Reagan Ad-
ministration whereby HUD's involvement in and scrutiny of pro-
grams that cause gentrification has been cut back.219
1. Programmatic Initatives and Adjustments
a. Demonstrations
In 1978-79, HUD initiated several grant programs designed to
ameliorate displacement. The Innovative Grant Program gave large
sums to cities such as Portland, Oregon ($600,000) and Columbus,
Ohio (over $2,000,000).220 Both cities planned to use the funds to
reduce the cost of housing for lower income residents. In addition,
technical assistance grants were made to twenty-one neighborhood
organizations in twelve states. These grants were designed to support
indigenous self-help groups. A similar purpose grant of $160,000 was
made to Savannah, Georgia to restore 839 historic Victorian-style
houses and to help more than 1,000 low and moderate income per-
sons remain in their neighborhoods.22'
b. Section 312 Rehabilitation Loans
Regulations governing Section 312 provide that in making low-in-
terest loans for rehabilitation, priority should be given to applications
from low income persons who own the property and plan to live
there after rehabilitation.222 The emphasis on low income ownership
and a declaration of intent to remain afterwards may serve to stimu-
late interest in rehabilitation by nonspeculators. This speculative de-
terrent could be strengthened by specific residency time limits or
219. As this article went to print, Congress enacted the Housing and Urban-Rural
Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181 (Nov. 30, 1983). The Act repeals the Sec-
tion 8 programs, enacts new programs for the construction and rehabilitation of lower
income housing, and contains several provisions reflecting Congress' continued intent
that displacement be ameliorated in HUD programs. See supra text accompanying
notes 114-15. These developments, which demonstrate that lower income dislocation
is not a forgotten issue, are discussed infra in note 405.
220. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., RESIDENTIAL DISPLACEMENT-AN
UPDATE 66-73 (1981).
221. Id
222. 24 C.F.R. § 510.107 (1983).
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lower income occupancy requirements, with penalties for noncompli-
ance and hardship exceptions.
In addition to giving priority to low income residents, additional
regulations provide that no loan application will be approved unless
(a) any displacement is covered by the Uniform Relocation Assist-
ance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (URA) or
(b) the locality administering the Section 312 program agrees to pro-
vide benefits comparable to that afforded by the URA.223 In general,
eligible tenants can rent replacement housing and receive either
housing payments identical to that required by the URA or assistance
under the Section 8 existing housing program. Alternatively, tenants
can receive a "right to continue in occupancy" in the renovated hous-
ing at a rent that will be controlled for four years.
These regulations are an improvement over HUD's former "no
assistance at all" attitude toward displacement. Nevertheless, while
the regulations may provide some temporary relief to displaced
households, the Section 312 approach provides little in the way of an
effective displacement remedy. The rehabilitation program may be a
viable tool for preserving the physical condition of buildings, but it
does not assure low income persons of an affordable housing supply
in the future. Rental assistance payments merely postpone the
financial hardship of moving for a limited period of time. The dislo-
cated household eventually must compete for the short supply of
lower income housing. In addition, use of Section 8 to provide dis-
placement relief deprives other needy households on the waiting lists
from receiving assistance. The continued occupancy approach denies
displacees the freedom to choose where to reside. Additionally, an-
other drawback to this approach is that rents are controlled for only a
limited period.224 They can be raised in two to four years to levels
beyond what lower income households can afford. These problems
could be alleviated if HUD would revamp its Section 312 regulations
to require that replacement housing constitute a net addition to the
lower income supply, Section 8 existing housing not be utilized where
there is a waiting list, and Section 312 rehabilitated housing be made
available to lower income households on a long-term basis.
223. Id § 510.52.
224. Id § 510.105.
19831
98 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 25:43
c. Section 8
HUD's implementation of portions of the Section 8 program 225 re-
flects a more effective response to dislocation and housing loss. Reg-
ulations for the moderate rehabilitation component provide for
contracts with public housing authorities for long-term rent subsidies
in rehabilitated housing units.226 In turn, the local authorities enter-
tain proposals from private landlords who will improve their units in
return for a long-term subsidy contract. Minimization of displace-
ment in areas undergoing private rehabilitation is one of the qualify-
ing policy objectives for participation under the Section 8
227
rehabilitation program.
HUD has required participating cities to pick up all costs of per-
manent displacement. Additionally, it has limited the situations in
which a housing authority can permit permanent displacement and
still receive funds under the program.2 28 If there is a reduction in the
number of units as a result of rehabilitation, displacement will be
permitted for the excess number of tenants. Alternative housing for
the displacees, however, must be located in comparable neighbor-
hoods. The tenants who are not displaced must be permitted to re-
main in the building throughout the fifteen-year period of the
subsidy.
229
If attention to detail is a criterion, then HUD may indeed have left
no stone unturned in preventing displacement under the Section 8
rehabilitation program. HUD, however, has not been as sensitive to
displacement in the new construction component of the Section 8
program.230 Its anti-dislocation efforts in this context contain many
of the same defects found in HUD's approach to the Section 312 re-
225. 42 U.s.c. §§ 1401-1440 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This program has been re-
pealed by the Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181
(Nov. 30, 1983). See infra note 405.
226. 24 C.F.R. §§ 882.401-.413 (1983).
227. Id § 882.401(a).
228. Id § 882.406.
229. A number of processing requirements are designed to insure that existing
residents remain in place after the renovation. To avoid an anticipatory avoidance of
the regulations, the owner must certify that there has been no evictions in the previous
year that were not for "cause." This provision, combined with requirements for am-
ple notice to tenants once the initial screening of the application has occurred, is
designed to guard against evasion of the program's requirement that it benefit existing
residents. Id
230. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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habilitation loan program.23
Proposals for Section 8 assistance must contain an analysis of any
displacement that the development will cause and an enumeration of
steps that can be taken to minimize this dislocation.232 HUD has
established regulations requiring developers to follow certain provi-
sions of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Ac-
quisition Policies Act of 1970 (URA).2 33 The developer must help
tenants who will be temporarily or permanently displaced to find ad-
equate, affordable replacement housing.234 Alternatively, the devel-
oper must make a lump sum payment equalling the amount
necessary to reduce the monthly replacement housing costs over a
four-year period to twenty-five percent of the displaced household's
gross income. 235
While these payments for replacement housing may temporarily
cushion the immediate impact on displaced households, their reme-
dial potential is limited. Since no standards are set for computing the
lump sum payment, the private developer will have every incentive to
calculate on the minimal side. Moreover, HUD requires no guaran-
tees that affordable relocation housing will be available for the four-
year period, and the tenant has no effective recourse if it is not.
The new construction relocation approach clearly has limited effec-
tiveness as a remedy for displacement. No responsibilities compara-
ble to the URA's "houser of last resort" requirements236 are imposed
under Section 8. In fact, it may stimulate added dislocation, since
short-term availability of alternative housing could remove pressures
mitigating against displacement.
d. Community Development Block Grants
The Community Development Block Grant program (CDBG)237
has the potential for funding activities that aid low and moderate in-
come residents of central-city neighborhoods. Since its inception, a
231. See supra text accompanying notes 222-24.
232. 24 C.F.R. § 880.305(g) (1983).
233. Id § 880.209. For a discussion of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and
Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1976), see
infra text accompanying notes 362-404.
234. 24 C.F.R. § 880.209(b)(2), (3), (5) (1983).
235, Id § 880.209(b)(8)(ii).
236. See infra notes 388-94 and accompanying text.
237. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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primary objective of the program has been to benefit principally low
and moderate income people.23 In the late 1970's, Congress further
mandated that in the administration of federal housing and commu-
nity development programs, the utmost care should be taken to mini-
mize the displacement of persons from their homes, 239 that people
displaced by CDBG-funded activities be provided a "reasonable op-
portunity" to relocate in their immediate neighborhoods, 2 40 and that
HUD and block grant recipients examine the impact of apartment
conversions on lower income housing needs.24'
Accordingly, HUD adopted a regulation in 1979 that provided:
[M]ere location of an activity in a low- or moderate-income area
does not conclusively demonstrate that a project or activity ben-
efits lower income persons. A neighborhood revitalization effort
which creates improved housing and better living environment,
principally for low- and moderate-income persons, would be
counted as such. Where such program results in a change in the
income characteristics of the areas so that a majority of the ulti-
mate beneficiaries are higher income persons, the program
would not be counted as principally benefitting low- and moder-
ate-income persons.242
Thus, in theory the "principal benefit requirement" can prevent
many gentrifying activities by directing CDBG funds to meet lower
income needs. In practice, however, the requirement does not totally
eliminate the gentrifying potential of the block grant program. HUD
chose not to require that all monies benefit low and moderate income
people. Funds can be spent on activities that aid the more affluent or
cause displacement.24 3
With respect to the congressional mandates that displacement be
minimized and that neighborhood relocation opportunities be pro-
vided, HUD issued a regulation merely requiring that localities sub-
mit a strategy that would accomplish these ends.2" No standards
238. Id § 5301(c) (1976).
239. See Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-557, § 902, 92 Stat. 2080, 2125 (noted at 42 U.S.C. § 5313 (Supp. V 1981)).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(c)(1)(C)(i) (Supp. V 1981).
241. Id § 5304(c)(1)(A).
242. 24 C.F.R. § 570.302(g)(6) (1983).
243. See id § 570.302(e), (f).
244. With respect to housing needs and displacement, HUD required:
Where the community development program will result in direct or indirect dis-
placement or other hardships to low- and moderate-income persons, the strategy
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were set for measuring whether appropriate steps to minimize dis-
placement have been taken or whether local strategies adequately
deal with the problem.
In addition, the effectiveness of the neighborhood relocation op-
portunity requirement as a gentrification remedy has been recently
cut back by court decision. Although all parties to the litigation
agreed that there was no relocation housing available in the immedi-
ate neighborhood, the circuit court in Mejia v. HUD24 5 held that the
statute is not absolute. It only requires relocation assistance if hous-
ing is available in the neighborhood and does not require a city re-
ceiving block grant funds to use its powers to create a reasonable
opportunity for neighborhood relocation where comparable replace-
ment dwellings exist elsewhere.246
In 1979 HUD also retreated from an older regulation which ap-
plied the URA if block grant monies were used "in conjunction with"
a dislocating activity. HUD restricted coverage by requiring that the
federal monies must be used for public acquisitions before the URA
applies. 247 Thus, if displacement is privately financed, dislocated
households have no protection. At the same time, HUD has deter-
mined that generally the URA does not apply to dislocation occur-
ring before submission of the CDBG application that includes the
displacing activity.248 This is a retreat from the draft regulations is-
sued March 31, 1978, which proposed presumptive coverage of acqui-
sition and displacement occurring up to three years before
submission of a CDBG application requesting HUD funding for
demolition, rehabilitation, or new construction. 249
Finally, HUD did not follow up on the requirement that the dis-
placing effects of conversions be identified. Instead of directly ad-
dressing the problem, it left the discretion to act to the local block
grant recipients.
Thus, although HUD recognized the dislocating potential of its
shall describe the actions the applicant will take to assist such persons to remain
in their present neighborhoods when they prefer and to mitigate any adverse
effects resulting from block grant funded activities.
Id § 570.304(b)(2)(v) (1983).
245. 688 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1982).
246. Id at 531-32.
247. 24 C.F.R. § 42.79(c) (1983).
248. Id §§ 42.79(c)(1), 570.602(a)(I).
249. 43 Fed. Reg. 13,858 (1978).
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CDBG program in the late 1970's and directed that localities mitigate
displacement, 250 the agency did not move aggressively to insure com-
pliance. No standards have been set for measuring whether appro-
priate steps to minimize displacement have been taken or whether
local strategies adequately deal with the problem. Relocation re-
sponsibilities have been restricted to certain CDBG-funded, public
agency acquisitions and are not applicable to directly related, pri-
vately inspired displacement unless the locality so chooses.
e. Summary
HUD has responded to the displacement potential inherent in its
programs in an uneven manner. The Section 312 response was un-
duly limited and probably had minimal remedial impact. The Sec-
tion 8 moderate rehabilitation program has far more promise for
dealing effectively with the problem. In the CDBG program, how-
ever, HUD has adopted a passive response, directing localities to
minimize dislocation to an undefined extent. An overall examination
of HUD's activities in 1978-79 indicates that while the agency may
have been more responsive to criticism than in earlier years, it did not
effectively move to curb displacement caused by its major programs,
despite a congressional mandate that displacement be minimized.
2. Policy Proposals
In contrast to its interim report that minimized the extent of urban
lower income dislocation, HUD's Final Displacement Report in 1979
characterized displacement as a serious problem.25' The report
sought to redirect some HUD programs and to promote local anti-
displacement plans. Specifically, it called for: minimizing displace-
ment, with appropriate relocation assistance provided where dis-
placement is unavoidable; expansion of the lower income housing
supply; and technical assistance from HUD to help develop local re-
medial strategies.252 Since the implementation policies were broadly
formulated and unrefined, the following summarizes the report's gen-
250. 24 C.F.R. § 570.302(h) (1983).
251. The report concluded that "public policy must seek to eliminate the adverse
effects of revitalization and reinvestment on those with the least resources to cope
with increasingly competitive housing markets." FINAL DISPLACEMENT REPORT,
supra note 118, at 2.
252. Id at 15-27.
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eral direction and its suggestions for steps that would promote anti-
gentrification.
The HUD report established a goal that "no person shall be dis-
placed as a direct result of a HUD or HUD-assisted program or ac-
tivity unless an affordable, decent, safe and sanitary replacement
dwelling is available." ' 3 To achieve this end, HUD proposed that
displacement potential be analyzed in conjunction with all project
selection and program funding decisions. Formerly, this requirement
was applied only in conjunction with the CDBG and the Section 8
construction/substantial rehabilitation program. Local anti-displace-
ment strategies would have to address the effects of private invest-
ment and revitalization activities, even though they are not the result
of community development programs.
These policies need more detail for effective implementation.
Standards should be set for localities to clarify the extent that they
are expected to address the displacement problem. HUD will have to
go beyond broad pronouncements. It should delineate performance
criteria, and monitor implementation to insure that the requirements
are met.
In addition to delineating the program requirements, HUD should
take complementary supportive action to eliminate the uneven anti-
displacement features of its various programs. It should also consider
"bonus" funding to stimulate local responses and cut down on
financially inspired resistance. Additionally, to encourage the devel-
opment of housing where it will be most effective, HUD should re-
vamp its site and neighborhood locational standards so that new
units can be made available in revitalizing neighborhoods. This pro-
posal warrants separate discussion.
3. Site Selection Criteria Revision
HUD's ability to address inner city displacement is hampered by
its 1972 site selection criteria for locating insured and public hous-
ing. 254 The criteria are premised on the view that locating federally
assisted housing in central city neighborhoods will adversely affect
areas that are already "overconcentrated" with low income house-
holds. Ironically, these criteria were adopted as an aftermath of civil
rights litigation in the 1960's that successfully challenged the prevail-
253. Id at i.
254. 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.700-.710 (1983).
1983]
104 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW (Vol. 25:43
ing HUD practices of locating subsidized housing only in minority
communities.255
In 1977, HUD proposed regulations that called for easing the 1972
standards. The proposed regulations would allow approval of sites in
areas of minority concentration if there are no feasible sites outside
such areas.256 They also exempt neighborhoods undergoing concen-
trated revitalization or preservation.257 This approach should have
been implemented. It is a reasonable middle ground that promotes
expansion of housing opportunities in nonconcentrated areas and, at
the same time, allows housing to be provided so that displaced urban
households can remain in their neighborhoods. However, the pro-
posals were not adopted in the late 1970's nor by the Reagan
Administration.
4. HUD and Gentrification in the Eighties
With the election of President Reagan, the demonstrations, Section
312, and Section 8 housing programs discussed above have been se-
verely curtailed or eliminated. As a result, the question of the effec-
tiveness of anti-displacement protections in these contexts has
become moot for the present time.
Reflecting the deregulation philosophy of President Reagan, in
1981 Congress also amended the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974258 to change significantly the block grant program.
The 1981 amendments reduced HUD's ability to require localities to
remedy dislocating effects of the program. Comprehensive applica-
tion requirements were eliminated. Instead, a locality must only sub-
mit a simple statement of funding objectives and activities. HUD's
application review authority is effectively eliminated,259 and now it
255. Courts have held that these locational practices violated the 1964 and 1968
federal civil rights acts on the grounds that increasing or maintaining racial concen-
tration and isolation is a form of prohibited discrimination. See, e.g., Shannon v.
HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir. 1970).
256. 7 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 790 (Feb. 18, 1980).
257. Id
258. The block grant legislation is found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981). The 1981 amendments are in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357. For a detailed discussion, see 1981 LegislaiAe
Changes in the Federal Housing Program, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 767 (1982).
259. See 42 U.S.C. § 5304 (Supp. V 1981) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 5304 (1976)).
For cases concerning the scope of HUD's review authority prior to the 1981 amend-
ment, see Coalition for Block Grant Compliance v. HUD, 450 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.
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can only scrutinize performance. 260  No longer can it require that
sufficient information be submitted for evaluation before funds are
released. Even if HUD somehow obtained data that indicated mini-
mal requirements were not being met, it has been deprived of the
ability to withhold funds until it secures adequate assurances of
compliance.
Accordingly, HUD adopted regulations26 that implement the
CDBG program to reflect this philosophical shift. With the decrease
in HUD's oversight authority and the easing of the standards for de-
termining whether block grants benefit lower income people, it is
now easier for localities to fund activities that aid more affluent ur-
ban pioneers.262
In adopting its new regulations, HUD disregarded the relatively
strong policy proposals that were developed under the preceding ad-
ministration.263 Instead, the agency has retreated to a posture of
minimum intervention at the national level to brunt the effects of
gentrification.
HUD now requires that block grant recipients estimate the number
of lower income people that will be involuntarily displaced by public
and private actions. 264 In response to the congressional directive that
localities seek to provide alternative housing for dislocated persons in
their original neighborhoods, the agency's new regulations merely
provide that localities consider this objective (along with several
others) in selecting the general location for newly constructed or sub-
stantially rehabilitated publicly assisted housing.265 When CDBG
activities could lead to displacement, localities are directed to prepare
a policy statement indicating the steps that it will take to minimize
dislocation and mitigate the harm that lower income displacees will
suffer.266 Displacing activities include acquisition, rehabilitation, or
demolition that is totally or partially financed with block grant funds;
Mich. 1978) and City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn.), rev'dsub nom.
on other grounds, City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.
1976).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(d) (Supp. V 1981).
261. 48 Fed. Reg. 43,538 (1983) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 570).
262. Id at 43,574-76 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 570.901).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 112-25.
264. 48 Fed. Reg. 43,566 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 570.306(e)(2)(ii)).
265. Id at 43,567 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 570.306(e)(5)(i)).
266. Id at 43,565 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 570.305).
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such activities that are privately carried out, but are a prerequisite to
a CDBG-funded activity (e.g., land acquisition with non-CDBG
funds for a block grant-funded project); and code enforcement that
receives CDBG monies.2 6
7
Under HUD's new regulations, localities are not required to avoid
involuntary displacement. HUD rejected proposals that it adopt a
provision to this effect. 268 The final rule is so noncommittal that it
appears to afford block grant recipients the discretion to ignore dis-
placement and its negative impacts.
Thus, HUD is retreating to a relatively inactive role in combatting
gentrification induced by the block grant program. While localities
have the authority to address the problem, gentrifying forces and the
relative powerlessness of the poor make it unlikely that local govern-
ments will aggressively combat displacement on their own initiative.
The charges of ineffectiveness made in the late 1970's are likely to
increase in the 1980's, unless significant policy shifts are made.
V. ADDITIONAL REMEDIAL STRATEGIES
A. Land Use Controls
1. Exclusionary Zoning Challenges
Some localities have used zoning to maintain high socio-economic
levels in their communities. Such zoning practices can stimulate gen-
trification by forcing middle income households to seek less expen-
sive housing in inner city areas occupied by the poor. Although
courts have traditionally upheld the power of local governments to
control development by zoning,269 exclusionary land use regulations
have been facing increasing opposition in recent years.270
267. Id at 43,572 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. § 570.612(a)).
268. See id at 43,545.
269. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Ayres v. City
Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
270. Minimum building areas or large-lot zoning regulations have been fre-
quently subject to litigation. Minimums up to five acres had been upheld prior to the
1960's. Eg., Clemons v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal. 2d 95, 216 P.2d 1, vacated, 36
Cal. 2d 95, 222 P.2d 439 (1950). Later decisions have been hostile to minimum area
designations, especially where the effect was to exclude low income housing. See
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
A.2d 713, afppeal dismissed 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263
A.2d 395 (1970). See generally Ackerman, The Mount Laurel Decision: Expanding
the Boundaries of Zoning Reform, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1; Sager, Tight Little Islands:
Exclusionary Zoning, EqualProtection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969).
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In general, the federal courts have proved unreceptive to exclusion-
ary zoning challenges.27' In Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp. ,272 the Supreme Court refused to
invalidate a local ordinance even though it had the effect of excluding
racial minorities from the municipality. The Court held that a dis-
criminatory purpose had to be shown before an ordinance could be
found constitutionally infirm. 273 As commentators point out, how-
ever, the structure of land use law makes it practically impossible to
prove purpose or motivation in the legislative process.27 4 In addition,
the Court placed high, if not insurmountable, hurdles in establishing
standing to sue municipalities for exclusionary practices. 5 As a re-
sult, the Supreme Court has effectively shut off a role for the federal
courts in opening up the suburbs.276
Compared to the federal courts, some state courts have been more
amenable to attacks on exclusionary zoning. In California, for exam-
ple, standing is not a barrier277 and restrictive zoning will be upheld
as a permissible exercise of the local police power only if it bears a
reasonable relation to the general welfare .2 8 The California courts
evaluate zoning laws not only by their impact on the enacting com-
munity, but also by their effects upon the welfare of the surrounding
271region.
In a pioneering decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court estab-
271. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (exclusionary zoning cannot be
challenged in federal courts on the grounds of economic discrimination). But see
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
1042 (1974) (applying Title VIII, the Fair Housing provision of the 1968 Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), to strike down a prohibition
against multifamily housing where the municipal action was indisputably racially
motivated).
272. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
273. Id at 265.
274. See, e.g., Mandelker, Racial Discrimination and Exclusionary Zoning: A Per-
spective on Arlington Heights, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1217, 1245-49 (1977).
275. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). See generally MANDELKER, supra
note 9, at 571-74; Note, Alternatives to Warth v. Seldin: The Potential Resident Chal-
lenger of an Exclusionary Zoning Scheme, 11 URBAN L. ANN. 223 (1976).
276. See McGee, Illusion and Contradiction in the Quest/or a Desegregated Me-
tropolis, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 948, 961-87.
277. Associated Home Builders v. Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135
Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
278. Id at 602, 557 P.2d at 483, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
279. Id
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lished the doctrine that zoning is presumptively contrary to the gen-
eral welfare if it impedes lower income housing.280 The court also
held that land use regulations must offer realistic housing opportuni-
ties for lower income households. 8' Recently, the court held its ex-
clusionary zoning doctrine required that localities not only remove
restrictive barriers, but they must also take affirmative actions to meet
their regional fair share requirements of low income housing.282 Such
affirmative actions include encouraging or requiring the use of fed-
eral and state subsidies, providing zoning incentives to developers,
requiring developers to set aside a certain number of units for lower
income persons, and zoning specific areas exclusively for low-cost
housing or mobile homes.283
The New Jersey approach helps to mitigate the harsh effects of
gentification in two ways. By discouraging exclusionary zoning prac-
tices, middle income households are not forced to displace residents
in inner city neighborhoods. In addition, by promoting the develop-
ment of low income units, households that have been displaced are
able to relocate to other affordable housing in the same region.
2. Subdivision Restrictions and Development Exactions
Almost equal in importance to the zoning power is the right of
communities to regulate subdivisions. Indeed, in many ways subdivi-
sion regulation is far more intimately bound up with the develop-
ment process. Most states had enacted legislation authorizing
subdivision controls by the end of World War II, just in time to regu-
late the explosive development in the post-war era.
Like zoning, subdivision laws were predicated on the police power
and were written to require developers to dedicate land for parks or
schools, to pay for or install infrastructural improvements, and other-
wise to bear the indirect costs of new development that might have
been shifted onto previously developed areas.284 California's Subdi-
280. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 179-80, 336 A.2d 713, 728, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
281. 67 N.J. at 180, 336 A.2d at 728.
282. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 261, 456 A.2d 390, 443 (1983).
283. Id at 262-77, 458 A.2d at 443-51.
284. An excellent overview of subdivisions and the sale of silbdivided land may
be found in D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL
LAW 245-76 (1971).
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vision Map Actz85 is typical of legislation in more developed states.
Developers must prepare a subdivision map for submission to a plan-
ning body for approval. The map must conform to existing laws gov-
erning the development of land. All conditions imposed on the
developer must relate to the subdivision's design, but the legislation
broadly defines design as anything "necessary or convenient to insure
conformity to or implementation of the general plan." '86
Although some states have been careful to delineate what can be
required of a developer, most courts have upheld requirements that
developers provide water lines, streets, sewers, and sidewalks. For
example, in Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles,287 the California
Supreme Court upheld a Los Angeles City Planning Commission's
requirement that the subdivider widen a boulevard, dedicate a street
through the subdivision, and set aside land to improve traffic condi-
tions at an intersection. The court found no confiscation of the own-
er's property and did not require compensation.2 88
Even if Ayres was arguably restricted to improvements directly re-
lated to the subdivision, recent decisions have expanded the power of
municipalities to impose exactions on developers as a condition of
building homes and apartments.289 In Associated Home Builders v.
City of Walnut Creek, zg the California Supreme Court followed
what it said was the majority rule and upheld the imposition of rea-
sonable conditions upon developers even where the conditions did
not exclusively benefit the proposed project.2 9 1 The court only re-
quired that there be a reasonable relationship between the exaction
and the subdivision.292
Other decisions, however, appear to restrict the power to impose
285. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 66410-66499 (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1983).
286. Id § 66418.
287. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
288. Id at 42-43, 207 P.2d at 7-8.
289. Exactions are costs generated by the development that are imposed on devel-
opers instead of the general public. Examples include having the developer pay for
dedication of streets and creation of sewers. See generaly Heyman & Gilhool, The
Constitutionality /of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents
Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
290. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878
(1971).
291. 4 Cal. 3d at 639, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
292. Id at 640, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
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exactions.293 In the words of one court, the "burden cast upon the
subdivider [must be] specifically and uniquely attributable to his ac-
tivity . . .; if not, it is forbidden and amounts to a confiscation of
private property ... 294
Despite the conflict in the case law, local governments can still im-
pose conditions on developers. Through the power of the municipal-
ity to approve a development, the developer can be forced to meet
regulatory requirements or to comply with discretionary controls.
Under the latter, the developer is required to make a completely de-
veloped proposal to a planning body, which then through a process
of negotiation shapes the proposal to attain objectives unobtainable
through more traditional forms of exactions. Both the formal and
informal exercise of this authority can be used as the legal basis for
local action to ameliorate the dislocating effects of gentrification.
3. Inclusionary Strategies
As the previous discussions of zoning, subdivision regulations, and
development exactions indicate, municipalities have the power to in-
fluence what is and is not built within their boundaries. Two recent
examples from California illustrate how localities can use this power
to preserve low income housing opportunities. Local governments in
California now have jurisdiction over coastal housing. They are re-
quired to employ many of the strategies developed by the California
Coastal Commission.z95 The Commission sought not only to pre-
serve the existing low income housing stock, but also to provide new
subsidized housing. Despite fierce opposition from developers and
city governments, the Commission launched a plan that would make
nearly thirty percent of all new multiple-unit housing available to
moderate and low income consumers. The Coastal Commission's
plan required builders to dedicate a portion of their projects to the
low income program as part of the price of obtaining a permit for the
construction of new condominiums or the development of new subdi-
visions.296 It was premised on the assumption that a developer can
293. See, e.g., Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 I11. 2d
375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 264
A.2d 910 (1970).
294. Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 I11. 2d 375, 380,
176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961).
295. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65590 (Deering Supp. 1983).
296. The Los Angeles Times reported one developer labeled the Commission re-
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absorb the loss created by the controlled units from the enormous
windfalls realized from development in the coastal areas. Where the
profit margin appeared more modest, the Commission could grant
density bonuses that allowed additional units a market rate over and
above those included in the developer's original plan.297 Thus,
through its land use regulatory authority, the Coastal Commission
insured that there is a lower income presence, albeit minimal, in a
gentrified area. Similar techniques can be used by local governments
in other areas where the poor are being displaced.
While the Coastal Commission proceeded largely by conditioning
the issuance of development permits on the provision of low income
housing, the City of Los Angeles has used its zoning power to require
the inclusion of low income housing in new developments. In 1973,
Los Angeles adopted a municipal ordinance providing that in every
new development of five or more units (including buildings con-
verted to condominiums), developers must make "every reasonable
effort" to develop at least six percent of the units for very low income
tenants and at least nine percent for low or moderate income ten-
ants.298 Under the ordinance, developers can be required to execute
a written agreement with the city granting it the right to lease or
purchase fifteen percent of the units for use by low income tenants.
Such an agreement can be required as a condition precedent for a
building permit or approval of the tract map.
As originally proposed, the ordinance would have forced the devel-
oper either to absorb the loss from the low income units from ulti-
mate profits or to allocate the difference to the other units. Thus, the
more affluent tenants would have paid slightly higher prices if low
quirements "blackmail." "They come to us and say, 'You can't build your hotel until
you take care of the social problems in the Marina.' Well, we're businessmen. The
social problems are a separate subject. Why should they be tacked onto our project?"
But, the developer concluded, "Sometimes, the most expedient way to handle black-
mail is to go ahead and pay it. We concluded that subsidizing the poor probably cost
less than fighting the Commission in court." L.A. Times, Oct. 28, 1979, Pt. 1, at 11,
col. 2.
297. Donald Neuwirth, Coastal Commission access manager, was quoted by the
Los Angeles Tunes as stating, "It's a situation where everybody wins. The developer
will make a pile. The city gets its share from the taxes, and the poor people don't get
run out of the neighborhood." Id
298. See D. BRYANT, J. SOLOWAY & C. CHIU, supra note 88, at 3-27 to 3-28. The
Los Angeles Ordinance prompted neighboring Orange County, California, to pro-
mulgate a similar ordinance encouraging developers to set aside 15% of developing
land for federal subsidy, usually Section 8. Id at 3-28.
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income tenants lived in the development. Objections from the build-
ing industry led to the present compromise in which the implementa-
tion of the ordinance's inclusionary policy depends upon the
availability of public housing subsidies.299
The practice of requiring the inclusion of low income housing as a
condition of permission to develop has received favorable comment
from legal scholars."° California passed legislation in 1979 that en-
dorsed inclusionary strategies.3 °1 The legislation resolved potential
legal issues as to the authority of certain types of cities to impose such
requirements on builders. It also permitted developers to pay fees in
lieu of including subsidized units.3 2 This practice is probably valid
under existing California land use law.30 3
4. Transfer of Development Rights
The growth of the concept known as Transferable Development
Rights (TDR) further supports the position that communities have
the power to regulate development. TDR recognizes that the right to
develop is an intrinsic aspect of real estate ownership.3 °4 Neverthe-
less, TDR requires development potential to be placed in the service
of comprehensive planning for the entire community. Under TDR,
the planning authority designates conservation zones and transfer
zones. Development may occur only in transfer zones. The develop-
ment potential in transfer zones can be augmented by acquiring de-
velopment rights from parcels in the conservation zones. The owners
who can develop land in the transfer zones must share any income
they eventually receive as a result of purchasing rights from owners
299. Id
300. See generally H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN, IN ZONING, A GUIDE FOR
POLICY MAKERS ON INCLUSIONARY LAND USE PROGRAM (1974); Kleven, Inclusion-
ary Ordinances-Policy and Legal Issues in Requiring Private Developers to Build Low
Cost Housing, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1432 (1974).
301. A summary of Assembly Bill 1151 can be found at Chapter 1207, SUMMARY
DIGEST OF CALIFORNIA STATUTES AND RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED IN 1979, at 403. The
parts of the bill relevant to this discussion were codified as CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 65050, 65915 (Deering Supp. 1983).
302. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65050, 65915 (Deering Supp. 1983).
303. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484
P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971).
304. See Baker, Development Rights Transfer and Landmarks Preservation-Pro.
viding a Sense of Orientation, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 131 (1975); Carmichael, Transferable
Development Rights as a Basisfor Land Use Control, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 35 (1974).
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unable to develop conservation zone property. Thus, owners of land
in conservation zones can be compensated for any loss caused by re-
strictions on their right to develop.
Although TDR has been hailed as an innovative, break-through
concept, 305 it actually is part of a general movement toward greater
government flexibility in land management. Processes such as ease-
ment purchases, land banking, contract zoning, planned unit devel-
opments, and cluster zoning also reflect attempts to regulate the use
of urban land in a more comprehensive way. Unlike most of these
other regulatory techniques, however, TDR is usually community-
wide, not limited to a single parcel or group of parcels assembled by a
developer. Its use for historic preservation of single or contiguous
properties is effected by the establishment of planning districts that
contain both historic areas and transfer sites. Owners of transfer site
property can increase the density and value of their land by buying
development rights from owners whose properties been "struck" with
a historic preservation designation."
While TDR is perhaps best known for its use in historic preserva-
tion and open or recreational space controls,3"7 it has been suggested
that the concept be applied to further development of inner city
neighborhoods." 8 For example, in 1979 a proposal was made to ex-
pand TDR to include areas that have the potential to become eco-
nomic assets to the municipality.30 9 In addition to allowing the
transfer of development rights, the proposal would also permit the
shifting of parking, outdoor advertising, and various licenses and
easements.3" 0 Although this proposal would strengthen the suitabil-
ity of inner city neighborhoods to participate in a TDR system, con-
trols and incentives would be needed to insure that the plan is
responsive to the policy of preserving inner city neighborhoods for
305. See Schnidman, Transferable Development Rights (TDR), in WINDFALLS FOR
WIPEOUTS 532 (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978).
306. See generally Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preserva-
tion of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972).
307. See Chavooshian, Nieswand & Norman, Growth Management Program: A
New Planning Approach, 34 URB. LAND, Jan. 1975, at 22.
308. See Rose, The Transfer of Development Rights: A Preview of an Evolving Con-
cept, 3 REAL EsT. L.J. 330, 348-50 (1975).
309. Danels & Magida, Application of Transfer of Development Rights to Inner City
Communities: A Proposed Municipal Land Use Rights Act, 11 URB. LAW. 124, 128
(1979).
310. Id at 129.
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indigenous residents. The proposal does call for bonuses to partici-
pating inner city landowners in the form of subsidies, additional
transfer zone certificates, and bonus zone certificates. 31' To avoid
windfalls, bonuses would be bestowed only if the proceeds from the
sale of the development or other rights are reinvested to bring the
transfer zone into compliance with local housing codes.3 12
In addition to helping preserve the inner city housing supply, TDR
plans could also be used to facilitate the relocation of low and moder-
ate income residents who are displaced by commercial development.
Under this proposal, the municipality would select suitable sites for
new housing and designate them as preservation zones. Owners of
property in the preservation zone would receive certificates that they
could sell to other owners who wish to develop their land located in
transfer zones. To induce landowners in the transfer zone to partici-
pate in the TDR plan, development at greater than normal densities
would be permitted only if the owners acquired some of the preserva-
tion zone transfer rights. In order to sell their development rights,
however, preservation zone landowners would have to agree to use
part of the proceeds to develop subsidized housing for low and mod-
erate income families displaced from the transfer zones. If a preser-
vation zone landowner declines to participate in the TDR system, his
property could be acquired by eminent domain. The city could then
develop the property from the proceeds of TDR sales made prior to
the commencement of the eminent domain litigation. 13
5. Summary
Once displacement has been identified as a social and planning
concern of consequence, local land use authorities should experience
little legal difficulty employing their broad authority to ameliorate
the impact of gentrification. The applicability of a given land use
strategy will, of course, be determined by the political planning and
environmental realities of a given community. The range of avail-
able techniques, however, indicates that the problem is not one of
power but of will.
311. Id. at 136.
312. Id
313. See Ellinwood, A TDR Plan for Equitable South Inlet Redevelopment
(1979) (unpublished monograph) (on file with Prof. B. Budd Chavooshian, Dept. of
Environmental Resources, Cook College, Rutgers University).
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B. Environmental Law
Federal and state environmental protection laws can hinder devel-
opment of lower income housing. The preparation of an environ-
mental impact assessment is expensive and time consuming, thereby
contributing to the rise of housing production costs. Additionally,
alleged environmental protection can be the basis for rejecting un-
wanted development.
This analysis covers relatively new legal ground: the use of envi-
ronmental law as a gentrification remedy to protect inner city resi-
dents. The environmental assessment process can be a mechanism
for identifying and avoiding displacement and housing loss. It can be
particularly useful in the context of indirect or secondary dislocation,
purely private renewal, condominium conversions, mixed public-pri-
vate projects, and other areas in which alternative legal remedies may
not be applicable.
1. NEPA and the CDBG Program
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),31 4 as ap-
plied by HUD to the Community Development Block Grant pro-
gram (CDBG),315 provides a framework for analysis. Neighborhood
revitalization, housing rehabilitation, and other block grant-financed
activities have the potential for causing substantial displacement and
housing loss. At the same time, the CDBG program is one of HUD's
major tools for providing a decent home and a suitable living envi-
ronment for all Americans. Creative application of NEPA may har-
monize these competing interests.
NEPA requires all agencies of the federal government to prepare
an environmental impact statement for all "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 31 6
The Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) has issued implemen-
tation regulations3" 7 that are binding upon all federal agencies. In
turn, the agencies have promulgated their own regulations governing
their specific programs.
As a result of the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act,
HUD requires block grant recipients to participate in the environ-
314. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
315. 24 C.F.R. pt. 58 (1983).
316. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
317. 40 C.F.R. pt. 1500 (1982).
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mental review process. 318 Localities must assess the effects of block
grant-funded activities at the earliest point in the planning process. 31 9
After the initial assessment is completed, but before requesting re-
lease of funds from HUD, a locality must determine whether the pro-
posed activity would be a major federal action that might
significantly affect the human environment. If a potentially signifi-
cant effect is found, an environmental impact statement (EIS) must
be prepared. 320 The locality must study direct, indirect, and long-
term effects of the proposed activity. In addition, the cumulative im-
pact of the proposed activity and related activities must be consid-
ered. HUD requires that "all individual activities which are related
either geographically or functionally, or are logical parts of a com-
posite of contemplated actions" must be grouped together by the re-
cipient for evaluation as a single project in a comprehensive
environmental review.32'
For environmental assessment purposes, HUD does not distin-
guish between publicly and privately financed or conducted disloca-
tion. This gives federal environmental law great possible utility as a
gentrification remedy. Its effectiveness, though, is related to the fol-
lowing questions: (1) whether the socio-economic impacts of lower
income displacement and housing loss alone are sufficient to require
an environmental assessment, and (2) whether mitigation of these im-
pacts is mandatory or merely discretionary.
a. Socio-economic Impacts and Environmental Assessment
Socio-economic impacts on the environment can be distinguished
from traditional physical impacts such as air and water pollution. In
the gentrification context, the socio-economic impacts are the focal
point and are also the ones must susceptible to accurate measure-
ment. Physical impacts, on the other hand, may be indirect, difficult
318. 42 U.S.C.§ 5304(f) (Supp. V 1981); 24 C.F.R. § 58.10 (1983). Generally, the
block grant-related activities that must be considered in the environmental review or
impact statement are those funded or authorized for funding with Title I monies,
along with those that are not funded or authorized but are set forth by the locality as a
part of its strategy for the revitalizing area in question. HUD regulations make it
clear that "it is not the source of funds for an activity, but the nature of the activity
and its relationship to other activities, which is relevant." Id § 58.2.
319. 24 C.F.R. § 58.31 (1983).
320. Id § 58.37(a)(1). The EIS must be prepared in accordance with CEQ regu-
lations, 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502. See 24 C.F.R. § 58.62 (1983).
321. 24 C.F.R. § 58.32(a) (1983).
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to ascertain, or possibly beneficial if they eliminate blight and disre-
pair. It is important to determine whether displacement, housing
loss, and neighborhood disruption are sufficient to require an envi-
ronmental assessment when they are the sole or primary effects of a
block grant-related activity.
Early federal cases broadly defined "environment," thus bringing
gentrification-related socio-economic concerns within NEPA's pur-
view? 22 One court noted:
The National Environmental Policy Act contains no exhaustive
list of so-called "environmental considerations," but without
question its aims extend beyond sewage and garbage and even
beyond water and air pollution. . . . The Act must be con-
strued to include protection of the quality of life for city resi-
dents. Noise, traffic, overburdened mass transportation systems,
crime, congestion and even availability of drugs all affect the ur-
ban "environment" and are surely results of the "profound influ-
ences of . . . high density urbanization [and] industrial
expansion."'323
Despite the early court decisions, there is an emerging line of cases
that hold an EIS is not required when the sole or primary environ-
mental effects are socio-economic. 24 CEQ regulations follow this
trend.325 Nevertheless, socio-economic effects still must be evaluated
when the physical impacts otherwise require an EIS.3 26 Such physi-
cal impacts may be readily identifiable in the context of demolition or
new construction. Although they may be less visible in rehabilitation
activities, the lifestyles of affluent in-movers or the cumulation of sec-
322. See First Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973). See also
Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972); McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F.
Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Jones v. HUD, 390 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. La. 1974).
323. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1972) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 433 1(a)) (emphasis added).
324. See Goodman Group, Inc. v. Dishroom, 679 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1982); Breck-
inndge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1976); Township of Dover v. United
States Postal Serv., 516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v.
Rumsfeld, 418 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
325. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1982) ("economic or social effects are not intended
by themselves to require preparation of an environmental impact statement"). Cf 24
C.F.R. § 58.34(a)(9)(ii) (1983) (recipients of public service grants do not have to com-
ply with HUD's environmental review requirements if the funded services affect only
the social or economic environment).
326. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1982).
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ondary impacts may provide the physical effects necessary to trigger
an EIS.
b. Mitigation: Mandatory or Discretionary?
Once an environmental assessment is completed, the question
arises whether adverse effects must be minimized or can be ignored.
Neither NEPA nor the CEQ regulations flatly mandate environmen-
tal protection. Instead, both require that all federal agencies direct
their policies, programs, and plans to protect and enhance environ-
mental quality "to the fullest extent possible." '327
In the CDBG context, HUD has granted localities broad discretion
regarding whether and how to implement environmental protec-
tion.32 8 HUD has limited its role to determining whether prescribed
notice and other procedures have been followed. It has retained vir-
tually no substantive review authority. Substantively, only other fed-
eral agencies can object that the activity in question is "unsatisfactory
from the standpoint of environmental quality." '329
Thus, in the context of the CDBG program, HUD is implementing
NEPA in a way that minimizes its potential to mitigate dislocation.
Amelioration of lower income displacement and housing loss is left
to local discretion, even though a variety of pressures may make local
governments favor gentrification. 33 0
Little in the way of substantive enforcement or oversight can be
expected from the courts. In Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council,
Inc. v. Karlen, s the Supreme Court limited judicial review under
NEPA to the factual issue of whether environmental consequences
have been considered.3 32 In selecting a course of action, an agency
cannot be ordered to elevate environmental concerns over other ap-
propriate considerations. Its priorities are not to be reordered by a
reviewing court; that is, a court should not interfere with administra-
tive discretion to choose the action to be taken.333 Curtailing the
scope of judicial review, however, does not prevent HUD or localities
327. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2 (1982).
328. See 24 C.F.R. § 58.4(b) (1983).
329. Id. § 58.75(h).
330. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 98-104.
331. 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
332. Id at 227.
333. Id at 227-28 (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976)).
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from exercising their discretionary authority to implement NEPA in
a broader fashion to counter the dislocating effects of gentrification.
2. Suggestions for Applying NEPA
As discussed above, there are key shortcomings that limit the util-
ity of NEPA as a gentrification remedy in the context of the CDBG
program. In order for environmental protection to serve as a useful
anti-displacement tool, the following policies should be considered.
First, any significant lower income displacement and housing loss
should trigger an environmental assessment. The broad statutory
and regulatory definitions of environment, along with expansive judi-
cial interpretations of NEPA's scope, provide ample enabling author-
ity for this administrative action. This policy would further HUD's
anti-displacement mandate from Congress and would be consistent
with the department's requirement that block grant recipients de-
velop anti-displacement strategies.
Second, the environmental review roles of HUD and the public
should be expanded to insure that all potential impacts have been
thoroughly and accurately analyzed. While HUD may not want to
set local priorities, it should at least require localities to submit a
statement when gentrifying impacts are not ameliorated. The state-
ment should explain how inattention to displacement is consistent
with HUD's mandate from Congress. Insufficient justification should
trigger disapproval of the localities' environmental assessment.
Finally, even though an environmental assessment may not solve
all the problems it identifies, the preparation of the assessment will
have several extra-legal remedial impacts. Since it is available for
public scrutiny and comment, any displacement noted will alert com-
munity residents. This can stimulate comments and pressures for
protective action or for further investigation. In addition, groups in
gentrifying neighborhoods can utilize the assessment process to nego-
tiate for the inclusion of ameliorating steps in the block grant process.
C. Rent Stabilization
In some areas during the late 1970's, astronomical inflation in
property values334 and conversions of rental units to condomini-
334. For example, single-family dwelling prices in southern California increased
by 185% between 1974 and 1979. For the period between 1970 and 1976, when the
rate of increase was not as great, the average sales price to income ratio in Los Ange-
les increased from 2.9 to 3.6. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DEP'T, CITY OF Los AN-
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urns 335 caused many tenants to become subject to substantial in-
creases in rent.33 6 Under such highly speculative market conditions,
middle income persons who can pay more for rental housing rapidly
displace indigenous low income residents. The implementation of
rent controls is one way city planners can attempt to curb such
displacement.
1. History of Rent Controls
Prior to the 1970's, rent controls in the United States were limited
to periods of war-generated "emergency" housing situations.337 The
first American rent controls were enacted after World War I, in
Washington, D.C. and in New York City. In 1921, the Supreme
Court held that rent control in Washington, D.C. was unconstitu-
tional since the war emergency was over.338 In New York, however,
where the courts construed the emergency requirement in a more lib-
eral manner, rent controls remained in effect until 1929.
Rent controls were not adopted again until World War II. In 1942,
Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act, which authorized
the Office of Price Administration to stabilize rents in areas desig-
nated as potential defense-rental areas.339 By October 1942, the en-
tire nation had been so designated. After the war, the number of
defense-rental areas was gradually decreased. Federal rent controls
disappeared entirely by 1954.
Local rent controls have been adopted in a number of jurisdictions
GELES, HOUSING VACANCY, BUILDING ACTIVITY AND PRICE TRENDS: 1965-1976, at
26. Sales prices of rental apartment buildings have also been increasing at a rapid
rate. In Los Angeles, the average sales price of buildings with 20 units or less, which
comprise about two-thirds of the city's rental stock, increased at a rate in excess of
15% per year from 1975 to 1978. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DEP'T, CITY OF LOS
ANGELES, TAX SAVINGS IN APARTMENT UNITS FROM PROPOSITION 13 (1979) [herein-
after cited as TAx SAVINGS].
335. See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
336. Increases in operating costs, excluding debt service, cannot account entirely
for the increases in rent. In most rental units, tenants pay for gas and electricity,
which have also increased in cost at a rapid rate. Additionally, as a result of Proposi-
tion 13, apartment owners in Los Angeles received on the average a 57% reduction in
their property taxes. See TAX SAVINGS, supra note 334.
337. For a history of the housing emergency requirement for rent controls, see
Baar & Keating, The Last Stand of Economic Substantive Due Process-The Housing
Emergency Requirementfor Rent Control, 7 URB. LAW. 447, 456-67 (1975).
338. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921).
339. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 2(b), 56 Stat. 23,25-26 (1942).
GENTRIFICATION
in recent years.340 The first California rent control law was adopted
by Berkeley through the initiative process in 1972. It prohibited
across-the-board rent increases. Rather, the law provided that appli-
cations for rent increases had to be considered on a unit-by-unit ba-
sis. In Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley,3 4 1 the California Supreme
Court ruled that this mechanism was so unwieldy that it in effect
would deny landlords rent increases for years and therefore consti-
tute a denial of due process.342 While the court struck down the
Berkeley ordinance, the decision clearly indicated that California cit-
ies retained the power to adopt rent controls under the police power
granted to them by the state constitution.343
2. Specifics of Rent Controls
Rent controls appear in many different forms, and so the effects of
alternative rent control provisions on the process of gentrification
vary. An effective rent control law is one which will provide tenants
with the security of continuous occupancy free from rent increases
which exceed owners' increases in operating costs. In California and
many other states, a tenant can be evicted without cause by a land-
lord upon thirty days notice, unless the tenant has a lease for a longer
tenancy or local law provides otherwise. 3" This lack of protection
creates a perpetual tenant insecurity in that the continuing right to
rent a unit depends on the will of the landlord, even when the tenant
meets all his obligations. Laws requiring "good cause" for eviction
often can be adopted in the absence of rent controls. Without rent
controls, however, landlords may easily circumvent a good cause re-
quirement by substantially increasing rents, thereby making contin-
ued occupancy by tenants economically unfeasible.
Essentially, therefore, rent control ordinances must avoid legal
340. The one exception to this pattern is New York City, where rent controls have
remained in effect continuously since World War II. See M. LETT, RENT CONTROL:
CONCEPTS, REALITIES, AND MECHANISMS 5 (1976). Starting in 1969. other localities
have enacted rent controls. Boston and several of its suburbs adopted rent controls
for varying periods. See generally G. STERNLIEB, THE REALITIES OF RENT CONTROL
IN THE GREATER BOSTON AREA (1975). In New Jersey, over 100 cities have enacted
rent controls since 1973. See Baar, Rent Control in the 1970's: The Case of the New
Jersey Tenants' Movement, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1977).
341. 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976).
342. Id at 173, 550 P.2d at 1033, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
343. Id at 158-59, 550 P.2d at 1022-23, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87.
344. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 789 (Deering 1971).
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loopholes. The following examines some factors that can undercut
the effectiveness of rent controls as a remedy for gentrification.
a. Exemptions
Rent control laws typically exempt some units. A standard exemp-
tion is for owner-occupied buildings with fewer than a specified
number of units. Rent control laws have also exempted single-family
dwellings, buildings with fewer than a certain number of units, new
construction, luxury units, and federally subsidized housing."'
While the exemption of owner-occupied units might make sense in
instances where the dwelling is the bona fide residence of the owner,
it is essential that any provision that exempts such dwellings include
rigorous tests for owner occupation. Less stringent provisions allow
landlords to evade controls merely by moving in for a few months,
thereby defeating the purpose of the rent control law. Similarly,
blanket exemptions for single-family homes that are not owner-occu-
pied are unjustifiable from an anti-displacement standpoint.3 46
b. Vacancy Decontrol
The presence of a vacancy decontrol provision in a rent control law
is a critical determinant of its impact on gentrification.347 Decontrol
allows a landlord to raise the rent without limit for a unit that be-
comes vacant. After the unit is rented to a new tenant, it again be-
comes subject to the rent control restrictions. However, the new rent
may be much higher than the old rent.
Vacancy decontrol provisions create enormous incentives for land-
345. For example, the Los Angeles ordinance exempts single-family dwellings,
units constructed after Oct. 1, 1978, and luxury units. This list is not all inclusive.
Los ANGELES, CAL., CITY CODE ch. XV, § 151. The Santa Monica ordinance ex-
empts owner-occupied dwellings with fewer than three units and housing constructed
after the adoption of the rent controls. SANTA MONICA, CAL., CITY CHARTER art.
XVIII, § 1801 (1979).
346. Such exemptions are particularly inappropriate where single-family homes
constitute a significant portion of the rental stock. In Los Angeles, for example, about
25% of all rental units are single-family dwellings. See Appendices.
347. The Los Angeles ordinance contains a vacancy decontrol provision that ap-
plies in cases in which either the tenant voluntarily vacated the premises or was
evicted by the landlord. Specific grounds for eviction include: not paying the rent;
breach of the lease; committing a nuisance; subletting without the landlord's ap-
proval; the landlord seeking to use the unit for a family member. Los ANGELES,
CAL., CITY CODE ch. XI, §§ 151.05.C.1, 151.10. See Flaws in Rent Law Not Lost on
Landlord, L.A. Times, Sept. 17, 1979, pt. II, at 1.
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lords to evict tenants in order to charge higher rents. Vacancy decon-
trol may encourage landlords to act on breaches of leases that were
previously ignored. Alternatively, landlords may refuse to maintain
a unit, making continued occupancy undesirable. In neighborhoods
that are undergoing rapid change and increases in rent, landlords can
usually skirt the rent control laws because tenants are poor and not
particularly knowledgeable. In a few years, vacancy decontrol can
lead to substantial discrepancies in rental levels for comparable units
in the same building. Therefore, successful rent control laws specifi-
cally exclude vacancy decontrol provisions.
c. Conversion and Demolition Regulation
In addition to substantial rent increases, conversion or demolition
of units may displace low income tenants. With rising home prices,
property owners can profit more by converting their units for sale as
condominiums than by maintaining them as rental units.348 In fact,
condominiums are so valuable that it is often profitable to demolish
rental buildings and build condominiums, especially when the
number of units per lot can be increased. Thus, to be effective in
preventing gentrification, rent control laws must regulate conversions
and demolitions.349
d. Fair Return Requirements
Due process requires that landlords subject to rent controls be per-
mitted to receive a fair return on their investments.3 ° Rent control
laws either provide for statutory increases for all landlords each year,
348. See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
349. The Los Angeles rent control law places no restrictions on demolitions or
conversions. In fact, the intent to demolish or convert a unit is a basis for eviction
under the law. Los ANGELES, CAL., CITY CODE ch. XV, § 151.09.A.9. In contrast,
the Santa Monica law severely curbs the removal of rent-controlled units from the
market for demolition or conversion. The rent control board must find that the unit is
not occupied by a person of low or moderate income, that it is not affordable by such
a person, and that its removal will not adversely affect the supply of housing in Santa
Monica. SANTA MONICA, CAL., CITY CHARTER art. XVIII, §§ 1803(t) (1979). In
Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 143 Cal. App. 3d 251, 191 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1983), a
California Court of Appeal held that the city could not normally force a landlord to
continue in the business of renting apartments by denying him a demolition permit.
Id at -, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 725. On Jan. 9, 1984, the California Supreme Court
granted a hearing on the case and vacated the judgment of the court of appeal.
350. See Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 165, 550 P.2d 1001, 1027,
130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 491 (1976).
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or they grant discretion to determine what rent increases shall be al-
lowed across the board based on general criteria, including increases
in operating costs and fair return.35' These laws make provision for
individual adjustments for landlords who are not receiving a fair re-
turn on their investment, who have made major capital improve-
ments, or who for other reasons should receive an exceptional rent
increase.
The standard definition of fair return is a return commensurate
with returns on investments in other enterprises having comparable
risks.35 z A problem arises when city planners attempt to translate
this principle into a specific formula to determine a fair return for a
particular building. Is a fair return a specific percentage of the fair
market value of the property or of the cash investment made by the
owner? Should mortgage interest rates, depreciation, and potential
capital gains be taken into account? Despite substantial efforts, a
precise formula has not been articulated for determining what is a
fair return.
353
351. The Los Angeles ordinance permits increases of: 19% for units on which the
rent has not been increased since May 31, 1975; 13% for units which have had no rent
increases since May 31, 1977; and 7% for units which have had no rent increase since
May 31, 1978. Los ANGELES, CAL., CITY CODE ch. XV, § 151.06. Under the Santa
Monica law, the Rent Control Board determines across-the-board rent increases. In
1979 the Santa Monica board granted an increase of 7% over current levels.
352. The two competing fair return standards are "return on value," favored by
landlords, and "return on historical investment." The generally pro-tenant rent con-
trol boards in Berkeley and Santa Monica have since adopted a third formula, "main-
tenance of net operating income." The courts appear to be moving toward acceptance
of this third standard as a formula midway between the value and investment stan-
dards. Owners are entitled to a rent increase if their net operating income is less than
a designated percentage of gross rental income. Both the Berkeley and Santa Monica
rent boards permit an additional inflation factor in this formula, although it is less
than the actual rate of inflation. See Brom, Courts Consider Limits on Landlords'
Profits, CAL. LAW., Sept. 1983, at 16. The situation in California awaits definitive
word from the California Supreme Court, which has agreed to hear Fisher v. City of
Berkeley, 148 Cal. App. 3d 267, 195 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1983), having vacated the court of
appeal decision in December, 1983. The supreme court left standing another court of
appeal decision, Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati, 148 Cal. App. 3d
280, 195 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1983), which approved the return on investment standard.
The latter case is of dubious precedential value, however, because of idiosyncrasies in
the Cotati rent control ordinance. See 2 Victories for Rent Control, San Francisco
Chron., Dec. 30, 1983, at 10, col. 1.
353. Under the Los Angeles law, individual rent increases can be granted in in-
stances where the maximum rent allowed under the ordinance "does not constitute a
just and reasonable return." Los ANGELES, CAL., CITY CODE ch. XV, § 151.07.B.1.
The ordinance states that property taxes, reasonable operating and maintenance ex-
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In 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that a fair rate of
return should be based on the market value of a property in a market
free from aberrant forces such as a severe housing shortage.354 Three
years later the court reversed itself, holding that a calculation of a fair
rate of return could not be based on the fair market value of a prop-
erty determined by what rent level is permitted.355 It then indicated
that a fair return was one which maintained owners at their levels of
net operating income prior to the implementation of rent controls.356
The New Jersey approach is a reasonable and practical standard
for determining fair return. Landlords held to a negative cash flow
by this approach argue that it is unfair and confiscatory. When land-
lords purchase buildings at prices that will lead to negative cash
flows, they are speculating that substantial profits will offset the risks
and losses incurred in taking that position. Since they are speculat-
ing, it is not the role of rent control laws to protect them and award
them individual rent increases not given to other landlords who do
not have negative cash flows. Speculation necessarily implies the
possibility of loss as well as profit.
357
penses, capital improvements, housing services, deterioration, and amount of mainte-
nance shall be taken into account in determining what is a "just and reasonable
return." Id The Santa Monica law, like that of Los Angeles, simply states factors
which shall be considered in determining whether an individual landlord is making a
fair return. In effect, these laws designate the task of determining fair return criteria
to the local rent control boards.
354. Hutton Park Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 556-67,
350 A.2d 1, 13-14 (1975); Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 594, 350
A.2d 19, 28 (1975); Troy Hills Village v. Township Council, 68 N.J. 604, 622-24, 350
A.2d 34, 44 (1975) (the three cases were decided on the same day).
355. Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 215, 394 A.2d 65, 72 (1978).
356. Id. at 241-42, 394 A.2d at 85-86.
357. The Santa Monica rent control law states in pertinent part:
(g) No rent increase shall be authorized by this Article because a landlord
has a negative cash flow if at the time the landlord acquired the controlled rental
unit, the landlord could reasonably have foreseen a negative cash flow based on
the rent schedule then in existence within the one year period following acquisi-
tion. This paragraph shall only apply to that portion of the negative cash flow
reasonably foreseeable within the one year period following acquisition of a con-
trolled rental unit and shall only apply to controlled rental units acquired after
the date of adoption of this Article.
SANTA MONICA, CAL., CITY CHARTER art. XVIII, § 1804(g).
The Los Angeles law states:
2. Anti-Speculation Provision. If the only justification offered for the re-
quested rent increase on the landlord's application is an assertion that the maxi-
mum rents or maximum adjusted rents permitted pursuant to this Chapter do not
allow the landlord a return sufficient to pay both the operating expenses and debt
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Landlords also argue that the net operating income standard is in-
herently inequitable because landlords who charged high rents and
received substantial incomes before rent controls were adopted are
rewarded, while landlords with relatively low rents are penalized.
Rent control ordinances can compensate for these differences by per-
mitting rent increases based on the length of time since the last
increase. 358
Other definitions of fair return present problems. If fair market
value is the standard to determine fair return, the result is tautologi-
cal because fair market value for property depends on its rental in-
come. If return on cash investment is the standard, fair rent becomes
a function of the purchase and financing terms of the building rather
than the rent levels previously in effect for the building.
While fair return eludes precise definition, the courts have indi-
cated that the constitutional fair return standard does not require that
every landlord make a profit or receive a positive cash flow.3 59 They
have consistently held that calculating a landlord's cost need not in-
lude debt service.36 ° The emerging standard is that "efficient" land-
lords have a right to a net operating income equal to that amount
which they had prior to the adoption of the rent controls. 36'
3. Summary
Rent control is essential to prevent gentrification. Without it, low
income tenants can be priced out of their neighborhoods. To be ef-
fective, rent controls must apply to all units whether occupied or va-
cant. Exemptions must not provide loopholes for property owners.
Permissible rent increases should be tied to average increases in oper-
ating costs for landlords. In the long run, this policy leads to a reduc-
tion in rents relative to other living costs since operating costs are
usually equal to only a portion of rental income. The law may ex-
service on the rental unit or units or on the housing complex containing the
rental unit or units, a rent adjustment will not be permitted pursuant to this sub-
section to a landlord who acquired an interest in the rental unit or units after
October 1, 1978.
Los ANGELES, CAL., CITY CODE ch. XV, § 151.07.B.2.
358. See Los ANGELES, CAL., CITY CODE, ch. XV, § 151.06.
359. See, e.g., Zussman v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 371 Mass. 632, 639-40,
359 N.E.2d 29, 33-34 (1976).
360. See, e.g., id
361. Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 241-42, 394 A.2d 65, 85-86
(1978).
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empt new construction if necessary to encourage it in the face of rent
controls, but it must restrict demolition and conversions to prevent
further shortage of rental housing. Only this formula will limit the
gentrification of certain inner city areas.
D. Relocation Assistance
The federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real property Ac-
quisition Policies Act of 1970 (URA)362 embodies a two-pronged at-
tack on the problems of dislocation. First, it prohibits displacement
on account of any federal project unless decent, safe, and sanitary
relocation housing is available to the people displaced, at prices that
they can afford.3 63 If that is unavailable, the dislocation cannot take
place until such housing is provided, through use of project funds if
necessary.364 Second, it provides some relief against the hardships of
a forced move by requiring the displacing agencies assist people in
finding new housing, adjusting to their new situation, and easing the
financial burdens of moving, including increased housing costs.
365
The purpose of the URA is to establish a uniform policy to insure
that people displaced as a result of federal and federally assisted pro-
grams are treated fairly and equitably, and that they will not suffer
disproportionately because of projects undertaken for the benefit of
the public as a whole.366 To lessen the impact of involuntary disloca-
tion, the URA provides for payments to both homeowners and rent-
ers. The payments are to cover moving expenses, 367 replacement
housing costs,368 and a dislocation allowance. 369 In addition, the
URA requires that advisory services be set up to assist displaced per-
sons searching for or adjusting to relocation housing.370 Not only
must the relocation housing be decent, safe, and sanitary, it must be
within the financial means of the displaced household.3 7 ' In addi-
362. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1976).
363 Id § 4626(b).
364. Id § 4626(a).
365. See id §§ 4622-4626.
366. Id § 4621.
367, Id. § 4622(b) (moving expenses payment not to exceed $300).
368. Id §§ 4623 (replacement housing payment for homeowners not to exceed
S15,000), 4624 (replacement housing payment for tenants not to exceed $4,000).
369. Id § 4622(b) (dislocation allowance of $200).
370. Id § 4625.
371. Id §4625(c)(3).
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tion, it must be in neighborhoods generally as desirable as the former
neighborhood with regard to public and commercial facilities.3"'
Perhaps more importantly, the new housing must be within reason-
able proximity to the displacees' employment.373 If the federal
agency involved cannot find satisfactory relocation housing, it must
decide either to cancel the project, or, as a last resort, it may develop
the needed units using funds that otherwise would be used to finance
the project under consideration.374
The URA also applies to displacement caused by a state or local
project or program receiving federal financial assistance. 375 The fed-
eral agency providing the funding cannot approve the federal grant
or contract without assurances that the local agency will comply with
the relocation requirements. Specifically, the local agency must sub-
mit assurances that (1) suitable relocation housing will be available,
(2) relocation payments for moving expenses, dislocation allowances,
and replacement housing costs will be made, and (3) the relocation
assistance services will be provided.3 76
The following examines the effectiveness of federal relocation law
as a gentrification remedy. To avoid losing sight of central issues, the
analysis does not dwell upon specific regulations and special program
rules. Instead, the focus is on certain key features of the URA (cover-
age; last resort housing; planning; the "right" to continued occu-
pancy) and HUD's general implementing regulations.
1. Coverage
A key question in assessing the effectiveness of the URA is the
extent to which displaced persons are protected by its provisions.
Unfortunately, from an anti-displacement perspective, the courts
have narrowly interpreted the Act's coverage.
In 1979, the Supreme Court in41exander v. HUD3 7 7 denied reloca-
tion protection to tenants evicted by HUD from a subsidized apart-
ment complex. After the agency had acquired title, it foreclosed
upon the complex, intending to demolish the buildings and sell the
372. Id
373. See id. §§ 4623(a)(1)(A), 4624(1).
374. Id § 4626(a).
375. Id § 4630.
376. Id
377. 441 U.S. 39 (1979).
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land to private developers.378  The Court's rationale for not ex-
tending the URA's benefits to the displaced tenants was that "persons
directed to vacate property for a federal program cannot obtain relo-
cation assistance unless the agency also intended at the time of the
acquisition to use the property for such a program or project." '379
The Court concluded that HUD's intent to dispose of the apartment
complex did not constitute the requisite intent to use the property for
380a federal project.
This intent requirement clearly narrows the applicability of the
URA and draws a distinction that is contrary to the protectionist pur-
poses of the Act. If the housing at issue in Alexander had been ac-
quired with federal funds for highway purposes, for example, the
evicted tenants would have fallen within the scope of the Act.38 '
Since the evicting federal agency contemplated sale for a nonfederal
program use, however, the URA was not applicable. In both in-
stances, though, the evictor is a federal agency using federal monies,
and the dislocation is equally harmful to the tenants.
In addition to being inconsistent with the purposes of the URA,
Alexander has disturbing implications. The "back to the city" move-
ment associated with gentrification may generate pressures to close
publicly assisted housing complexes in the central city so that the
land on which they are located can be reused. Should changes in use
occur, low and moderate income tenants may not be covered by the
Act.
The courts have been equally restrictive in applying the URA to
other displacing actions that may occur in the gentrification process.
Tenants dislocated by private entities for the renovation or construc-
tion of federally assisted apartments do not come under the Act be-
cause their displacement was ordered by private parties rather than a
federal agency, even though the dislocation would not have occurred
without federal assistance.38 2 Thus, these low to moderate income
378. Id at 45.
379. Id at 63.
380, Id at 66. See also Blount v. Harris, 593 F.2d 336, 341 (8th Cir. 1979) (URA
inapplicable to persons evicted by a federal agency for purposes of liquidating a pro-
ject acquired through foreclosure of a security interest).
381. See, e.g., La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 488 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974).
382. See Moorer v. HUD, 561 F.2d 175, 183 (8th Cir. 1977). See also Dawson v.
HUD, 592 F.2d 1292, 1293 (8th Cir. 1979); Conway v. Harris, 586 F.2d 1137, 1140-41
(7th Cir, 1978).
19831
130 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 25:43
tenants are not entitled to relocation benefits under the URA as a
matter of right. Instead, they are protected only to the extent that
HUD or another appropriate agency chooses to apply portions of the
URA or other anti-displacement measures.383
Local public-private revitalization programs that are federally as-
sisted may also be outside the URA if the public component receives
the federal monies and avoids displacing activities.3"4 Local pro-
grams may be generally exempt if they are federally financed with
only revenue-sharing funds.385 In addition, code enforcement has
been specifically held to be outside the scope of the URA.3 86
Thus, the present utility of the URA as a gentrification remedy has
been restricted by decisions that limit its coverage. When the URA is
applicable, however, its provisions, particularly the "houser of last
resort 387 requirements, can brunt the harsh impacts of gentrification.
2. "Houser of Last Resort" Implementation
The URA prohibits displacement because of a federal project un-
less there is suitable, affordable housing to which displaced house-
holds can move.388 If it is not available, as a last resort the agency
conducting the project may provide relocation housing, using project
funds if necessary.3 9
If followed both in spirit and by the letter, this "houser of last re-
sort" requirement of the URA should brunt the harsh impact of dis-
location. In practice, however, the requirement's effectiveness as a
remedy for gentrification has been limited. Agencies may avoid con-
structing new units by giving governmental displacees priority in
public and other assisted housing. While this may expediently aid
383. See supra text accompanying notes 232-35.
384. See Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870, 878 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 993
(1979) (a quasi-public redevelopment agency, which was armed with eminent domain
powers and used CDBG funds only for nondisplacing activities like provision for
public improvements, was not subject to the URA in conjunction with its dislocating
activities).
385. See Goolsby v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 1369, 1371 (5th Cir. 1979).
386. Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138, 148 (7th Cir. 1981). The court in Devines
held that there was no federal acquisition, so the URA did not apply. Nevertheless,
the termination of the tenants' leases by the city constituted a "taking" requiring pay-
ment of just compensation under the fifth amendment. Id at 146.
387. See infra notes 388-94 and accompanying text.
388. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4626(b) (1976).
389. Id § 4626(a).
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displaced persons, it is hardly fair to those already on the waiting list.
Additionally, relocating displacees in existing public housing merely
exacerbates the current housing shortage.
Public entities also may avoid providing relocation housing by
simply paying the less costly replacement housing payments to dis-
placed tenants. 3 ' For example, HUD's relocation regulations sanc-
tion this practice, since payments exceeding prescribed limits are
authorized as a means of providing last resort housing other than by
construction.39
For renters, these differential payments do not provide a satisfac-
tory displacement remedy. The shortage of affordable housing is a
basic feature of the urban dislocation problem. The payments are
temporary, calculated to provide replacement housing for only four
years.392 After that, the household may again be faced with displace-
ment. Protection may not even last for this limited period. Current
payment levels were set in 1971 and have not been increased to re-
flect the subsequent sharp rise in housing costs. Moreover, the rent
differential payments are not available to all displaced tenants. In
addition to the limited coverage discussed above,39 3 payments are re-
stricted to persons who resided at the acquired premises for at least
ninety days prior to the initiation of acquisition negotiations.394
Thus, in contrast to rent differential payments, expansively imple-
mented replacement housing requirements would provide permanent
relocation housing to all displaced persons regardless of their tenure
in the acquired premises. If this housing is provided in or very near
the old neighborhood, the harsh effects of displacement could be con-
siderably ameliorated.
3. Relocation Planning
Other HUD actions may substantially undercut federal relocation
law and the last resort housing requirements, especially if followed
by other federal agencies. By curtailing relocation planning require-
ments, HUD has obscured the trigger for invoking last resort housing
responsibilities. This impedes public or private monitoring and
390. See 24 C.F.R. §§42.301-.507 (1983).
391, Id § 42.605(2).
392. See id § 42.453(a).
393, See supra text accompanying notes 377-86.
394. 24 C.F.R. § 42.451(a) (1983).
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enforcement.395
Formerly, localities receiving HUD funds were required at the out-
set of a project to prepare a relocation plan for HUD approval. This
relocation plan was to assess the needs of potentially displaced per-
sons, and the sufficiency of existing housing to accommodate them.
If the plan did not demonstrate that the current housing supply could
meet displacees' needs, the agency had to halt the project or provide
additional units. After 1979, however, the regulations require only
an unsubstantiated "written assurance" that within a reasonable pe-
riod of time prior to displacement, a sufficient supply of comparable
replacement housing units will be available for dislocated persons.396
HUD cited several reasons for issuing the new regulations.397
Limited staff resources could be maximized by focusing on monitor-
ing compliance, rather than pre-project review. In addition, reloca-
tion plans can become out of date by the time displacement occurs.
Moreover, for many dislocating activities, the extent of displacement
is not determined by the time of the application for funding.
These reasons are not compelling, however. After an agency has
begun a project, considerable monies have been spent and dislocation
may have occurred. 398 Later redress for affected households who
have moved may be difficult or impossible. More importantly, this
reduction in critical relocation planning eliminates the early warning
capability of the old approach. A deficit in housing resources identi-
fied in the pre-project assessment alerted governmental agencies and
the community that "houser of last resort" planning should begin.
The new approach reverses the analytical process: ifit appears neces-
sary to use project funds for the construction of replacement housing,
then an inventory of displacees' needs and the existing housing sup-
ply is required.
One of the keys to effective utilization of relocation laws is accurate
planning and analysis. Reliance on unsubstantiated assurances of
adequate housing cannot substitute for a careful examination of the
overall housing supply. Localities should be required to assess the
395. For an excellent analysis of an adequate relocation planning process, see
Kushner & Warner, Illusory Promises Revisited: Relocation Planning and Judicial Re-
view, 8 Sw. U.L. REv. 751 (1976).
396. 24 C.F.R. § 42.5(b) (1983).
397. See 44 Fed. Reg. 30,947 (1979).
398. See, e.g., Tenants & Owners in Opposition to Redev. v. HUD, 406 F. Supp.
1024 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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dislocating impacts of their programs before they apply for funding
and begin committing resources. The assessment should include
identification of the variety of circumstances which place seemingly
available housing beyond the reach of displaced persons or render it
unsuitable as a relocation resource. To the extent that there cannot
be a definitive assessment, conditional approval can be given contin-
gent upon later submission of more definite data and plans.
4. The "Right" to Continued Occupancy
The potential of the "houser of last resort" requirement as an effec-
tive dislocation remedy is further undercut by the "right" to continue
in occupancy. This concept was initially developed in conjunction
with the Section 8 substantial rehabilitation program. HUD has now
made it generally applicable when displacement is not initially con-
templated or will be only temporary.399 Under this concept, dis-
placed tenant households are guaranteed the right to return to the
same apartment or project site. While this may be satisfactory for
those who effectively exercise the right, it may in the short term exac-
erbate the lower income housing shortage. Because assisted tempo-
rary relocation is permissible, 4 M competition for the limited number
of available units will increase and drive rents up further. In addi-
tion, households offered the right to continue in occupancy are ex-
pressly not considered "displaced persons" under the URA.4 °1 Thus,
last resort housing is not required.
Several other features of the continued occupancy approach firr-
ther minimizes its impact as an anti-displacement device. The
agency, not the tenant facing potential dislocation, decides whether
the tenant is given a continued occupancy right.40 2  Rents in the
housing are controlled at a fixed percentage of gross income, but the
rent controls cease after four years.4° After that point, rents can be
raised without limitation. Such raises may be well beyond the means
of lower income households, especially when the housing is in a
neighborhood that is being revitalized. 4°
399. 24 C.F.R. § 42.207 (1983).
400. Id § 42.207(a)(3).
401. Id § 42.207(a).
402. Id
403. Id § 42.207(a)(2).
404. See Appendices.
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Thus, as with rent differential payments, the right of continued oc-
cupancy will only postpone dislocation and its adverse impact. This
approach will not provide a long-term remedy for displacement.
5. Summary
Federal relocation law has the potential to effectively address the
problems associated with gentrification. Its promise, however, is far
from fruition. The courts have limited the URA to governmental ac-
quisition. Additionally, relocation payments that offset increased
rental housing costs generally provide only short-term assistance to
displaced persons. These payments fail to address the fundamental
issue, namely, the shortage in the low to moderate income housing
supply. They also by definition remove the displaced person from
the neighborhood and provide space for new, affluent in-movers.
This discussion is not meant to argue against relocation payments.
Instead, it serves to emphasize the necessity of focusing on another
aspect of the URA that has greater long-term promise: the "houser
of last resort" responsibility of the agency conducting the project.
VI. CONCLUSION: REMEDYING GENTRIFICATION-LOOKING
AHEAD
In the foregoing discussion of the law and gentrification, various
remedial steps were identified. The theme emerges throughout the
analysis that ample legal authority exists at the federal, state, and
local levels to remedy the urban dislocation associated with revitali-
zation. Politics may be a bar, and special interests may dominate the
implementation of policy, but the law does not present an insur-
mountable obstacle.
To fulfill its congressional mandate to minimize displacement,
HUD must encourage the effective use of legal tools-at all levels of
government-to remedy the problem. Power can be used to mini-
mize conversions of rental units and to disocurage speculation.
Housing code enforcement and historic preservation can be made
more responsive to the basic human need for shelter. The power to
tax, a matter of increasing public concern, can be implemented to
insure that homeowners and renters are not so excessively burdened
that they are driven from their neighborhoods. The taxing power can
also be used to curb speculation and to encourage preservation of
existing structures. Legal authority can be more creatively employed
to regulate land use practices through such devices as inclusionary
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zoning techniques and transfer of development rights. Environmen-
tal law could be constructively utilized to insure that decent housing
is available along with an unpolluted physical environment. Finally,
the "houser of last resort" provisions of federal relocation law present
opportunities at both the federal and local levels to address the most
critical aspect of the displacement problem-the shortage of afforda-
ble low and moderate income housing.4 °5
While considerable displacement is apparently due to the private
market, these forces and their ultimate direction are shaped by gov-
405. During the late 1970's, gentrification received considerable attention from
Congress and HUD. In the early 1980's, however, displacement of the poor disap-
peared from the national spotlight, and federal housing assistance programs were
sharply reduced or eliminated. Only recently has interest in displacement begun to
reappear at the federal level. As this article went to print, Congress enacted the Hous-
ing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181 (Nov. 30, 1983),
which contains several provisions that address dislocation and demonstrate that it is
not a dead issue. See H.R. 3959, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 10,621 (1983).
See also [Current Developments] 11 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 568-76 (Dec. 5,
1983).
The Act focuses on a critical feature of the gentrification issue-the shortage of
housing for the poor. It provides for entitlement and competitively awarded grants to
states and cities for the construction and rehabilitation of apartments for low income
tenants. Displacement of very low income persons by the more affluent is prohibited,
and the conversion of apartments to ownership housing is restricted. Assistance is
targeted to lower income households, thereby reducing the benefits that may accrue to
gentrifying in-movers. Localities receiving funds must submit annual performance
reports to HUD, and HUD must report annually to Congress on the effectiveness of
the program. Since both the local recipients and HUD must include an analysis 6f
tenant displacement, any dislocating impacts of the program will be subject to scru-
tiny. HUD is to issue regulations on relocation payments and other responses to dis-
placement, so it remains to be seen whether the agency will take a relatively
aggressive anti-displacement posture as it did in the late 1970's, or react indifferently
as it did in the early 1980's.
In addition to the above provisions, the Act tightens the lower income targeting and
monitonng requirements in the Community Development Block Grant program
(CDBG). This reduces the likelihood that these funds will be used for activities that
benefit affluent urban pioneers. At least 51% of the CDBG monies must be used to
support activities that benefit persons of low and moderate income. Housing con-
structed or rehabilitated with block grant funds must actually be occupied by low or
moderate income households. Other CDBG-funded activities must be located in low-
moderate income neighborhoods and support essential services for area residents. Al-
ternatively, a majority of jobs created by CDBG-funded activities must be for low or
moderate income people.
Thus, while the Act does not adopt an all-out attack on gentrification, it does direct
governmental attention to the displacement problem. This ensures that the low and
moderate income persons who are adversely affected by gentrification will not be
forgotten.
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ernment action or inaction. HUD programs such as block and urban
action grants are among the most direct public inputs. HUD must
fully exercise its authority to insure that localities attempt to remedy
both governmental and related private displacement.
Thus, the legal tools are available to combat the displacement
problem. Fiscal, political, and policy considerations will ultimately
determine whether "revitalization" becomes synonymous with "sec-
ond generation urban renewal." Whether those least able to bear the
brunt of this process-the urban poor and minorities-feel the harsh
effects of social change will be determined by the steps taken by
HUD and local governments in neighborhoods across the country.
GENTRIFICATION
APPENDIX I
North University Park: The Beginning of Gentrification
Gentrification is in its nascent stages in the North University Park area of central
Los Angeles. The area is located adjacent to and immediately north of the University
of Southern California campus. Because of the presence of spacious and architectur-
ally unique turn-of-the-century Victorian homes, sections of North University Park
are ripe for historic preservation, a major engine of displacement.
A preliminary analysis of the area indicated a wide population fluctuation since the
1970 census. At that time, the population figure for the area was 39,072. Population
decreased to 36,316 in 1973, but it had increased again to 38,356 by 1977. The appar-
ent reason for this fluctuation is the outward movement of white and black popula-
tions from the area, combined with noticeable increases in the Spanish-speaking and
Asian communities toward the end of the decade. As determined by the Community
Analysis Bureau of the City of Los Angeles, the changes in the ethnic composition of
North University Park are illustrated below.
1970 1977
Number % Number %
White 8,616 22.1 4,638 12.1
Black 19,997 51.2 18,109 47.2
Spanish 8,465 21.6 11,645 30.4
Asian 1,994 5.1 3,964 10.3
Total 39,072 100.0 38,356 100.0
Economically, the North University Park area is dominated by a low income group
with a high percentage minority population. In 1970, the average income for the
twelve census tracts in the area was $6,275. According to data from a city-wide sur-
vey taken by the Community Analysis Bureau, the average income in the area had
increased to $7,662 in 1977. For the City of Los Angeles as a whole, however, average
income had increased from $10,535 in 1970 to $14,030 in 1977. Thus, in 1977 the
average income of North University Park was only 54.6% of the average for the entire
city.
Ironically, though the average income in the area has not risen as fast as the aver-
age income city-wide, housing values in North University Park increased dramati-
cally during the 1970's. The Community Analysis Bureau of the City of Los Angeles
has collected information on both the number of housing sales and the mean sales
value by census tract since 1970. The twelve census tracts that comprise the North
University Park area were analyzed on both variables. In 1970, the total housing
sales in the area was forty-six. Sales in 1977, however, numbered 119. In 1970, the
sales value of single-family units averaged $13,239. By 1977, the average sales value
had risen to $32,242. This represented a 144% increase in average unit value over a
seven-year period.
Some of the increase in housing values in the area is undoubtedly due to the in-
crease in housing values throughout Los Angeles and in Southern California gener-
ally. Without doubt, speculation is fueling the explosion in housing prices. The
University of Southern California and the Los Angeles Coliseum, immediately south
of the University, comprise one major staging area for the 1984 Summer Olympics.
Foreseeing the financial impact of the Olympics, speculators are beginning to have an
effect on the housing values in the community.
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Concern has been expressed for tenants in both the residential and commercial
sectors who will be under extreme pressure to move on and allow higher rent tenants
to take over the space. Two relocation problems could occur: 1) residential areas
could be razed to facilitate construction of either expanded business districts or
greater density, moderate to high income condominiums or apartments, and 2) cur-
rent business tenants will be forced out in the same manner as low income residential
tenants. A complex interplay could develop in the area-low income residents would
not, and indeed could not, patronize businesses aimed at affluent Olympic-goers. At
the same time, the existing businesses would not attract Olympic clientele and would
find the reduced number of low income customers insufficient to sustain their
businesses.
Another factor that has contributed to the increase in housing values in North Uni-
versity Park has been the increasing interest in the preservation of the older homes in
the area. The district has a culturally and architecturally rich history. Only very
recently has the awareness of this heritage created any community consciousness. A
loosely-knit group of property owners known as the Citizens' Committee for the Pres-
ervation of the University District was formed around 1977. From all indications, the
group consists largely of white middle-class professional people who recently
purchased homes in the area. The group has two main concerns: speculators will be
purchasing older homes either to raze them for new apartment or condominium con-
struction, or to convert the homes into rental units in a typical absentee-landlord ar-
rangement. The committee feels both of these scenarios are harmful to the
preservation of historically significant structures and also impinge upon their desire to
make the area once again a "neighborhood" with a cohesive community feeling.
Community groups with a minority population membership are also becoming well
organized and visible. For example, the 29th Street Block Association was formed as
a black neighborhood group. The Greater University Parish, which draws its constit-
uency predominantly from local churches, is an umbrella organization that has been
able to retain its influence by emphasizing the common denominator among all
groups. Unfortunately, none of the existing organizations are representative of the
entire community. In particular, none of the groups seem to speak for the Hispanic
and Asian segments of the area's population.
Whether gentrification triumphs in North University Park obviously depends on
coordination and cooperation between the various interest groups in the neighbor-
hood. The intervention strategies of the City of Los Angeles will also be important.
Because gentrification is in its early stages in North University Park, the City has the
opportunity to preserve low income housing and at the same time maintain the social
and ethnic diversity as well as the architectural heritage of the area.
APPENDIX II
Pasadena: Gentrification in Process
Adjoining Los Angeles to the northeast, Pasadena is a city where federal and local
governmental activity has played a prominent role in the process of gentrification. A
study of Pasadena illustrates the hand and glove relationship between the private
sector and the government.
In 1979 Pasadena had approximately 108,000 residents. The racial breakdown was
60% white, 19% black, 17% Spanish surname, and 4% other. Pasadena's black popu-
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lation increased from 12.5% of the total population in 1960, to 16.6% in 1970. The
greatest increase in black population occurred in the census tracts located in the
northwest section of the city.
The minority presence in Pasadena is given additional significance in light of the
fact that nearly 46% of the city's households fall into the low income category-hav-
ing less than $10,000 annual income for a family of three. On the average, black
families in Pasadena receive less income than families in the remainder of the popula-
tion. According to 1970 census data, 16.2% of black families in Pasadena had an
income less than $3,000, 41.7% had income less than $6,000, and 72.4% had incomes
less than $10,000. These figures compare unfavorably with those for all Pasadena
families, of which 7.8% had incomes less than $3,000, 22.2% had incomes less than
$6,000, and 45.7% had incomes less than $10,000.
In recent years, Pasadena has been grappling with an acute housing shortage. At
the time of this study, the overall vacancy rate for both owner and rental units stood
at 1%, a figure far below the 5% vacancy rate that is generally accepted as desirable.
The housing situation for blacks in Pasadena was characterized by a significant
amount of overcrowding (defined as an average of more than 1.0 persons per room).
The 1970 census reported that there were 791 black housing units, 13.0% of the total,
which were overcrowded. This figure represented a greater level of overcrowding
than that for the overall Pasadena population (4.8%), but it was a lower level than that
for blacks in the entire Los Angeles County (15.5%).
Pasadena's history suggests that housing--or a lack of it-played a major role in
the city's development. In the period between 1940 and 1960, the city's population
burgeoned from 81,864 to 116,407. At the same time, there was increased momentum
to create a strong industrial base in Pasadena and the surrounding area. This indus-
trialization required space. Development of the commercial sector systematically
forced families out of low income housing tracts.
Associated development, especially during the 1960's, caused additional displace-
ment. The northwest section of the city, which contains the highest concentration of
Pasadena's black population, was drastically altered by freeway construction and re-
development projects. In 1959, the Pasadena Redevelopment Agency (PRA) was cre-
ated as a guarantor of the Pasadena Comprehensive General Housing Plan to
maintain a viable and healthy community. One of the first major PRA activities was
the Pepper Redevelopment Area in the northwest section of the city. In 1960, the
area's population was 1,500, 93% of which was black. A survey of the area prior to
redevelopment disclosed that 37% of the residents owned their homes. Two-thirds of
the residents had lived in the area for ten or more years. The survey indicated that
most of the homeowners were satisifed with their dwellings. Subsequent redevelop-
ment of the Pepper area by the PRA displaced 440 families. According to figures
compiled by the PRA, 307 families remained in Pasadena, and the rest moved else-
where. Of the 110 small businesses displaced, 55 remained, 25 moved out of the city,
and 29 were dissolved.
Similar redevelopment activity by the PRA followed closely on the heels of Pepper.
Known as the Orange Grove Redevelopment Project, the activity displaced 112 fami-
lies, of whom 50% were black and 20% had Spanish surnames. Removal of the homes
in this area resulted in construction of 175 condominium units, now known as Orange
Grove Village.
Another PRA activity that sparked considerable controversy was the Villa Parke
condominium development project. Since it involved the use of community develop-
ment block grant funds, the project illustrated the interrelationship between private
reinvestment practices and public policy.
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The Villa Parke project was initially launched in 1972. There were approximately
2,500 persons in the project area-roughly one-third Anglo, one-third Black, and one-
third Hispanic. A 1975 survey of the area conducted by the California State Depart-
ment of Finance Special Census found that more than 42% of those households re-
sponding had incomes of under $3,000. An added 16.6% had incomes under $5,000.
Of all Villa Parke households, 90% were renters.
The PRA plan called for construction of 114 condominium units on 6.6 acres of
land. Sale prices were to range as follows: 24 units at $51,000, 43 units at $65,000,
and 47 units at $77,000. There was a memorandum of understanding between Wil-
shire Diversified, the builder, and PRA that called for the developer to construct 20
Section 8 rental income units. Displacees would be given priority in those replace-
ment units, even though there were hundreds of persons already on the waiting list for
Section 8 housing.
The Villa Parke project was widely criticized by residents and community organi-
zations. In 1978, El Centro de Acci6n and the Western Center on Law and Poverty
challenged the Villa Parke project plan on grounds of its failure to satisfy HUD envi-
ronmental review requirements. The group charged:
1. Reliance on unsupported assumptions and a lack of quantified data by which it
can be evaluated.
2. The federal standard of what constitutes a significant environmental impact was
not applied throughout the document.
3. The conclusion that the expenditure of federal funds for the project would not
constitue a major federal action was contrary to fact and not supported by avail-
able data.
4. There were a number of potentially adverse effects upon the human environment
of the Villa Parke neighborhood which were completely overlooked or inade-
quately addressed.
5. Several aspects of the proposed project contravened requirements of the Housing
and Community Redevelopment Act of 1974, as amended, and federal civil rights
law.
6. The proposed plan did not adequately develop the possible alternatives to the
project nor modifications to minimize its adverse effects.
In asking the PRA either to redo its assessment in compliance with federal law, or
change its finding to one of significant adverse effect and undertake the preparation of
a full Environmental Impact Statement, the groups expressed concern about the pro-ject's potential impact on housing and rent structures in Villa Parke. Ultimately, they
argued, there would be a ripple effect on the residents of the peripheral neighbor-
hoods and the availability of lower income housing in Pasadena as a whole.
Among the principal concerns of the opposition was the fear that the Villa Parke
condominium development would be the catalyst accelerating the gentrification pro-
cess. It was argued that if the development attracted the middle and upper income
families it was targeted to serve, the surrounding neighborhood would also become
more attractive, especially in view of the relatively low rental and property prices in
the area. This would encourage wholly private redevelopment of the neighborhood
without government assistance, and, therefore, without government-imposed safe-
guards. In turn, the increased demand for middle income housing would lead to in-
creased rents and property values. The result of this process would be the permanent
displacement of existing low and moderate income residents with no effective remedy
to mitigate their plight.
To avoid gentrification, the groups urged that the city and the PRA be required to
identify and predict the extent of direct and indirect displacement that would result,
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with a view toward considering alternative methods of minimizing or, if possible,
eliminating such displacement. The groups suggested such alternatives as neighbor-
hood rent control or stabilization plans, other types of rehabilitation loans and grants
then originally contemplated, relocation benefits for indirect displacees, rezoning to
foster stability, anti-speculation measures, and the development of Section 8 rental
units.
The situation was temporarily resolved when the city amended its relocation plan
for Villa Parke to allow for a revision of the project definition of low-moderate in-
come. For a family of four, the top income limit was lowered from $20,300 to
$17,400. This scaled-down figure, however, did not accommodate the majority of the
households with the lowest incomes. Moreover, the developer abandoned plans for
low to moderate income housing in the Villa Parke area, and the PRA stated it would
take no responsibility for displacement of tenants by the private developer. The result
was a classic case of gentrification abetted by governmental action or, perhaps more
accurately, governmental inaction.
APPENDIX III
Venice: Gentrified
Venice, a seaside community of Los Angeles, reflects the problem of gentrification
from its incipient stages to its triumph. Located within and adjacent to the real estate
hot-spot known as the Coastal Zone area, Venice today is the only beach-front low
income area in California and probably the entire West Coast. It was not until the
completion of the Marina del Rey small craft harbor that Venice became an attractive
place to live. Through the 1940's, sewage and oil drilling equipment made it an un-
sanitary and unsightly place. The building of the Marina from 1957 to 1965 also
created an environment of construction noise and air pollution. It was an area attrac-
tive only to those who, because of income or race, could not afford to live elsewhere.
It was a place for Blacks, Chicanos, artists, students, and senior citizens. It is this
socio-economic and racial diversity that is threatened by gentrification.
There are multiple causes of gentrification in Venice. Chief among them is a bleak
housing picture in the Los Angeles area. The housing shortage in Southern Califor-
nia is well documented and is responsible for the enormous increases in housing costs.
Whereas average new home costs were $56,000 in 1976 and $65,000 in 1977, by 1979
the median figure had risen above $100,000. The lack and cost of housing in Los
Angeles is making it increasingly difficult for middle income people to buy or rent.
Some units in Venice are still relatively affordable for people in these income brack-
ets. Thus, people who may have wanted to live in traditionally affluent areas such as
Malibu or the Palisades buy in Venice instead.
Some young professionals and other affluent people are buying in Venice not just to
find a nice place to live, but because investment in property is considered preferable
to higher risk investments such as the stock market. Venice is a "neighborhood in
transition"-just the kind of place that books on investment and articles in real estate
magazines recommend for potential investors.
Besides financial considerations, Venice has become increasingly attractive to peo-
ple of all economic levels for other reasons. As the environmental quality worsens in
Los Angeles, more people want to move to this seaside town, regardless of whether
they can profit financially from the move. In addition, Venice is a place where di-
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verse communities meet. The socio-economic heterogeneity has great appeal to many
in-movers.
Venice consists of eleven contiguous census tracts. The census data for these tracts
reflect some of the changes caused by gentrification.
1. The Peninsula Tract
The Peninsula tract is considered the high income area from which gentrification
obtained its impetus in Venice. In 1977 the Peninsula's predominance of white popu-
lation (95.5%) exceeded Venice's average (55.1%) and also the average of the City of
Los Angeles as a whole (51.6%). See COMMUNITY ANALYSIS UNIT, COMMUNITY DE-
VELOPMENT DEP'T, CITY OF Los ANGELES, ESTIMATE OF POPULATION BY RACE 5
(1977). The age group that dominates is 24-59 years of age, constituting 68% of its
population. This is the highest concentration of any one age group for all of Venice's
census tracts.
The median family income of the Peninsula is also far higher than any other tract
in Venice. This tract also experienced the greatest appreciation in single-family
dwelling price of all tracts from 1960 to 1970. It was in this tract that a two-bedroom,
one bath, one garage cottage sold for $325,000 in 1979. Local Coastal Program, City
Planning Dep't, City of Los Angeles, Multiple Service Survey of Housing Prices
(1979) (unpublished survey). In 1970, the Peninsula exhibited the lowest ownership
rate of all of Venice, as well as the fewest number of single-family dwellings.
The building of the small craft Marina del Rey harbor appears to have changed the
Peninsula from an area where low income whites once existed to one where rather
wealthy whites reside today. The change appears to have taken place in ten years. By
1970, this area could no longer be considered as going through the process of gentrifi-
cation. This area is now the home of an almost completely white, older, high income
population with few children. The residents primarily rent multiple-family housing.
However, the condominium growth of recent years will no doubt cause a rise in the
rate of ownership, if not a rise in the number of single-family dwellings.
2. Canal and South Venice Tracts
The building of the Marina del Rey small craft harbor did not have an immediate
impact on the Canal and South Venice tracts. Location and population factors ap-
pear to have played a role in forestalling development of upper income neighbor-
hoods in these tracts. The Canal tract contains the historic canals that had been
neglected for years and until very recently were eyesores despite efforts to partially
resurrect them from their state of deterioration. The South Venice tracts have the
disadvantage of being farther away from the beach. In terms of population, by 1970
the Canal tract had 15% Hispanics. The South Venice tracts housed an even higher
percentage of Hispanics, 20% in 1960 and 33% in 1970. In comparison, the Peninsula
tract contained only 4% Hispanics in both 1960 and 1970.
The census data for 1970 for particular categories indicated that the Canal and
South Venice tracts would soon follow the Peninsula's development lead. The white
populations of the Canal tract and South Venice tract No. 2741 increased. These two
tracts showed gains in the 24-59 age group. The median family income in these two
tracts appeared slightly above the city's overall median in 1970. The median value of
single-family dwellings appeared slightly below the city's median, but the rents in the
Canal and South Venice tracts appeared higher than the city's median. While the
percentage of owner-occupied homes remained high in both South Venice tracts, the
Canal tract appeared to have an ownership rate similar to that of the Peninsula.
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The proximity of these census tracts to the Marina del Rey small craft harbor, the
increasing wute population, the increase in the 24-59 age group, the slightly higher
median family income, and the higher median rent in the Canal and South Venice
tracts point to the increasing resemblance of these areas to the Peninsula. The lower
median value for single-family dwellings show the unusual strength of land values in
these areas through the early 1970's. The less impacted ownership patterns suggest
that the dominance of single-family dwellings will in this respect differentiate it from
the multiple housing patterns of the Peninsula. This will probably continue to hold
true until the legal and financial obstacles to massive condominium development in
the Peninsula tract are resolved.
3. Walgrove Tracts
Walgrove is an area in which the impact of the Marina del Rey harbor has been
difficult to discern. The emergence of the Marina led to a dramatic change in percep-
tion of the Canal and South Venice areas. The Walgrove tracts, on the other hand,
were the desirable areas for purchase prior to the building of the small craft harbor.
The 1960 census shows a population which was predominantly white with a median
family income that was higher than the income levels of the South Venice, Canal, and
Peninsula tracts.
By 1970, the Walgrove tracts had become much more Hispanic. Almost one-third
of the residents were Hispanic. Blacks also had managed to make some inroads.
Both Walgrove tracts had lost population in the 24-59 age group, although tract No.
2731 had made gains in the elderly group. The median family income had increased,
and the median home values in the Walgrove tracts were second only to those in the
Peninsula tract. Both Walgrove tracts show dominant ownership patterns of single-
family dwellings. The soundness of the housing structures appears to have been
maintained from 1960 to 1970.
Although Walgrove is not as conveniently located as the Canal and South Venice
tracts, its relatively long history of home ownership and the soundness of its housing
have made it an attractive place in which to locate. The real estate values appear to
have remained competitive with the Canal and South Venice tracts.
4. North Beach and Milwood Tracts
In 1960, the high percentages of residents aged 60 and over, the low median family
incomes, and the high levels of unsound housing in the North Beach tracts made it
appear to be an area that was not very appealing to anyone but the very poor. By
1970, North Beach had posted losses in its elderly group while recognizing gains in its
0-24 age group. The shift from the elderly toward those 24 years of age or younger
suggests that North Beach became increasingly populated by students. This was cor-
roborated by the still depressed median family income found in 1970.
Both North Beach and Milwood experienced declines in their white populations by
1970. Although Milwood appeared to exhibit a higher median family income and a
higher median home value than any of the North Beach tracts, both areas lagged
behind the Canal, South Venice, and Walgrove tracts. The North Beach tracts had
the highest density of all of Venice's census tracts, no doubt because of its proximity
to the beach. It is only a subject of speculation why North Beach exhibited lower real
estate values than tracts located further inland. A glance at today's real estate values,
however, makes it obvious that the real estate in North Beach is now regarded as
fungible with property in the Peninsula. The obvious advantage of being on the
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beach has been clarified in today's view of real estate. As a result, the North Beach
tracts have left Milwood far behind in terms of property values.
5. Oakwood Tracts
In 1960 less than half of the Oakwood area was white. One of its two tracts was
dominated by blacks, and blacks comprised nearly a third of the other tract. The
black populations had increased by 1970. By 1977, however, Hispanics came to dom-
inate one tract and they significantly affected the other. Blacks had lost close to 10%
of its population in one tract and 13% in the other.
The age group with the greatest gains in both Oakwood tracts was the elderly. The
24-59 age group decreased significantly. The median family income in 1977 ap-
peared slightly higher than the North Beach tracts, which were the lowest for all of
Venice. Median rents were slightly higher than North Beach, while median home
values resembled the lowest of those in North Beach and Milwood. The Oakwood
tracts posted the greatest losses of single-family dwellings of all of Venice's census
tracts. The rate of unsound housing was high for both tracts in 1960. It appeared to
have improved, but it was still worse than both of the North Beach tracts combined.
Change is starting to penetrate Oakwood, as is evidenced by the opening of several
restaurants, art galleries, and antique stores along the western boundary of the tracts.
Overall, it appears that in the Peninsula, Canal, South Venice, North Beach, and
Walgrove tracts, those persons being displaced by the growing real estate values
within and without Venice were low income whites. The relatively lower real estate
values in Oakwood and some parts of Milwood are probably the reasons for the in-
crease of Hispanics in these tracts. Hispanics are directly impacting the indigenous
black population in Oakwood, causing it to fragment. Thus, Hispanics are being used
as the cutting edge of the acquisition of land by the gentry.
